Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not commit plain error in sentencing defendant to 24-month term of incarceration on certain counterfeit charges involving purchases of cars and possession of counterfeit securities, where defendant argued that said sentence was based in part on Dist. Ct.’s improper assignment of two criminal history points for defendant’s prior state-court conviction on forgery charge, since said conviction could only be viewed as relevant conduct under section 1B1.3 of USSG because state-court conviction involving purchase of marijuana was part of behavior that led to instant federal offense. While both offenses concerned defendant’s use of counterfeit currency, Dist. Ct. could properly find that state-court conviction was not "relevant conduct" that formed part of same course of conduct of instant federal conviction since state-court conviction occurred over one hundred miles away from conduct at issue in underlying charged offense and was done 8 months apart and involved different victims, means and purposes.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress drugs and guns police found in defendant’s storage locker pursuant to search warrant, where police learned of location of storage locker through use of GPS unit that police had placed on defendant’s car without warrant in 2011. While Supreme Ct. in Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012) found that attaching GPS unit to car for purposes of gathering information was search under 4th Amendment, police used GPS unit in objectively reasonable reliance on binding precedent in effect at time of GPS placement, which allowed police to attach GPS unit to car without any 4th Amendment consequence. Fact that defendant argued that instant officers requested judicial authorization to track defendant’s car for up to 60 days, had attached GPS unit when his car was parked on private property and used car’s battery to power GPS unit did not require different ruling.

Dist Ct. erred in four-case consolidated matter in imposing certain terms of supervised release, where record showed that many conditions were imposed without evidence that Dist. Ct. had applied/considered sentencing factors contained in 18 USC section 3553(a) or had provided any explanation for imposing said conditions. Moreover, remand was also required with respect to imposition of terms of supervised release that required defendant to: (1) notify third-parties of risks that may be occasioned by his criminal record, personal history or characteristics; (2) avoid frequenting places where controlled substances are illegally sold; (3) answer all questions from probation officers truthfully and to allow them unfettered access to defendant’s home; (4) perform 20 hours community service on weekly basis upon becoming unemployed for over 60 days; and (5) obtain GED within one year, where said conditions were either ambiguous, vague or overly broad.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officers’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants deliberately withheld from plaintiff favorable polygraph test results of alternative suspects during pendency of plaintiff’s criminal case on murder charges in violation of Brady. Said evidence did not qualify as Brady material since polygraph test results could not have been introduced at plaintiff's criminal trial, and defendants were otherwise entitled to qualified immunity since there was no case law at time of withholding that required that they turn over inadmissible polygraph test results to plaintiff. Defendants were also entitled to summary judgment on conspiracy count since: (1) defendants actually turned over test results to prosecutor who was entitled to absolute immunity from instant lawsuit; and (2) plaintiff could not establish evidence of defendants’ agreement to withhold said test results based solely on prosecutor’s decision not to turn over said results to plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to statutory minimum sentence of 120-month term of incarceration on drug conspiracy charge, even though defendant argued that he was entitled to lower sentence because his cooperation with law enforcement entitled him for “safety valve” relief. Although defendant provided some information about charged offense, defendant’s statement did not qualify for safety-vale relief because said statement left out many unknown facts about plan to deliver truck contained drugs that was at heart of instant charged offense, and because record otherwise showed that defendant did not assist govt.’s investigation during two years from his initial statement until date of sentencing. Moreover, record suggested that defendant used third-party to threaten informant’s family, which would also disqualify defendant from obtaining safety-valve treatment.

Dist. Ct. did not commit plain error in sentencing defendant to 96-month term of incarceration on wire fraud charge stemming from scheme to divert assets from clients-investors into high risk investments, even though Dist. Ct. took into consideration two impact statements submitted by individual and organization who were not victims of charged offense. Dist. Ct. may consider defendant’s broader criminal record and history when imposing instant sentence, and defendant did not object to Dist. Ct.’s announced consideration of said impact statements, even though defendant had 10-month notice that said statements had been attached to presentence report. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not dwell on said statements, but rather focused on details of charged offense.