Criminal Law

People v. Mischke

People v. Mischke
Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (2d) 130318
Decision Date: 
Monday, December 29, 2014
District: 
2d Dist.
Division/County: 
Lake Co.
Holding: 
Vacated and remanded.
Justice: 
BIRKETT
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of, among other things, one counts of first-degree murder (felony murder) and one count of aggravated DUI with cocaine in his urine. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 26 years and 7 years. Court erred in imposing concurrent sentences, as Section 5-8-4(d)(1) of Unified Code of Corrections mandates consecutive sentences when one conviction is for first-degree murder. Plain language of statute shows that enhancement under subsection (d)(2)(B) on any prior DUI offense under Section 11-501, and enhancement is not limited to prior aggravated DUI offenses only. Thus, a person with two prior nonaggravated DUI offenses must be sentenced, upon a third DUI offense, as a Class 2 felon. (McLAREN and HUDSON, concurring.)

U.S. v. Borostowski

Federal 7th Circuit Court
U.S. v. Borostowski
Criminal Court
Confessions
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 13-3811
Decision Date: 
December 31, 2014
Federal District: 
C.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded
In prosecution on possession, receipt and distribution of child pornography charges, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress his statement taken at his home while other officers were executing search warrant, after finding that defendant was not “in custody” at time of police questioning. Reasonable person would not have felt free to leave during instant questioning, where: (1) defendant was handcuffed for 25 minutes prior to instant questioning; (2) questioning occurred behind closed door in small room in defendant’s home, with one officer blocking closed door; and (3) defendant was not released at end of 3-hour encounter and was driven to offsite area, where polygraph test was taken. Dist. Ct. did not err, though, in denying defendant’s motion to suppress seizure of external hard-drive found in car of defendant’s mother, even though mother’s car was not mentioned in search warrant, since mother’s car was on premises at time of search, and mother gave consent to search her car.

People v. Coleman

People v. Coleman
Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Hearsay
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (5th) 110274
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, December 31, 2014
District: 
5th Dist.
Division/County: 
Monroe Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
GOLDENHERSH
Defendant, director of security for international religious ministry, was convicted, after jury trial, of three counts of first-degree murder for deaths of his wife and two teenage sons. Court was within its discretion in admitting sexually explicit photos and videos of Defendant and a woman with whom he was having an affair. Court's admission of hearsay statements of five witnesses as to Defendant's statements to wife of his desire for divorce and that she was ruining his life was not error. Court's admission of expert linguist testimony comparing spray-painted writings at murder scene to Defendant's handwriting, and admission of hardware store receipt for spray paint, was not error. State presented sufficient evidence for jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant killed all three victims, and no error or combination of errors was so grave as to deny fundamental fairness at trial.(STEWART and SCHWARM, concurring.)

People v. Hensley

People v. Hensley
Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Murder
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (1st) 120802
Decision Date: 
Monday, November 24, 2014
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co.,1st Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
HARRIS
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and aggravated battery with a firearm for shooting that killed one person and injured another. Autopsy report was properly admitted, and a medical examiner who did not perform the autopsy was properly allowed to testify as to report, without violation of confrontation clause. Report was prepared in the normal course of business pursuant to medical examiner's office's duties. Doctrine of transferred intent is applicable to attempted murder cases where an unintended victim is injured. (DELORT and CONNORS, concurring.)

People v. Fields

People v. Fields
Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Second Amendment
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (1st) 130209
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, December 31, 2014
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 6th Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
LAMPKIN
Defendant, age 18 at time of offense, was convicted after bench trial of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW). Defendant argued that the under age 21 subsection of AUUW statute unconstitutionally disarms adults who are 18 to 20 years old. The 18-to-20-year-old age group is more likely to be interacting with and thus endangering juveniles under 18, and the under age 21 subsection of statute serves substantial and important government interest to reduce armed violence and illegal activity of street gangs and others, and subsection is reasonably related to this government interest. Thus, subsection does not violate Second Amendment. (ROCHFORD, concurring; HALL, dissenting.)

People v. Lake

People v. Lake
Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (1st) 131542
Decision Date: 
Monday, December 29, 2014
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 5th Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
McBRIDE
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first-degree murder of 14-year-old boy, and sentenced to 45 years. Court did not err in sua sponte dismissal of Defendant's pro se Section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment. State had actual notice of Defendant's petition when an Assistant State's Attorney was present in open court when petition was docketed. State is not required to respond to petition for relief from judgment. Petition was without merit, as enforcement of mandatory MSR term is not an increase in sentencing, as MSR term attaches automatically as though written into Defendant's sentence. (PALMER and GORDON, concurring.)

People v. Gillespie

People v. Gillespie
Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (4th) 121146
Decision Date: 
Monday, December 22, 2014
District: 
4th Dist.
Division/County: 
Champaign Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed in part and vacated in part; remanded with directions.
Justice: 
TURNER
(Court opinion corrected 12/30/14.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of one count of robbery and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. As main offense in case was a sex offense, not the predicate, Defendant's robbery conviction was for same robbery that was predicate offense of his aggravated criminal sexual assault conviction. Thus, robbery conviction violates one-act, one-crime rule. As automatic-transfer provision of Juvenile Court Act did not impose actual punishment, Defendant's eighth-amendment and proportionate-penalties arguments cannot stand. (POPE and KNECHT, concurring.)

People v. Hanson

People v. Hanson
Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (4th) 130330
Decision Date: 
Tuesday, December 30, 2014
District: 
4th Dist.
Division/County: 
Macon Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
STEIGMANN
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of criminal damage to property and domestic battery. Defendant was sentenced to extended-term sentence of 5 years for that conviction, and 364 days for criminal damage to property. Even if court erroneously believed that Defendant was extended-term eligible because of particular prior conviction, error was not sufficiently grave to deprive him of fair sentencing hearing, as Defendant was extended-term eligible. Plain-error doctrine does not apply to court's alleged error as to restitution, where court accepted State's statement of restitution amount, and Defendant did not contest it.(POPE and TURNER, concurring.)

Public Act 98-1142

Topic: 
Eavesdropping
(Nekritz, D-Buffalo Grove; Raoul, D-Chicago) makes several changes to Illinois’ eavesdropping law after the Illinois Supreme Court struck down the current statute for being too broad. It re-establishes Illinois’ all-party consent statute for the recording of private conversations. Specifically, it does the following. (1) An eavesdropper is someone who uses an eavesdropping device to secretly record a private conversation without the consent of all parties involved in the conversation. A conversation is considered private if at least one of those involved had a reasonable expectation that the conversation is private. (2) An eavesdropper is anyone who uses a device to secretly record electronic communications without the consent of everyone involved. (3) An eavesdropper is someone who discloses the content of a private conversation or private electronic communication without permission. (4) The penalty for eavesdropping on a law enforcement officer, state’s attorney or judge is reduced from a Class 1 felony to a Class 3 felony. The penalty for eavesdropping on a private citizen remains a Class 4 felony and a Class 3 felony for a subsequent conviction. (5) It expands the number of crimes in which law enforcement doesn’t need to get judicial permission to eavesdrop as long as they have the approval—written or verbal—of the local state’s attorney. State’s attorneys must submit reports annually explaining how often this exemption was used. Effective Dec. 30, 2014.
View Full Text of Legislation

U.S. v. Hayden

Federal 7th Circuit Court
U.S. v. Hayden
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 14-1812
Decision Date: 
December 30, 2014
Federal District: 
S.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to above-guideline, 46-month term of incarceration on charge of conspiracy to distribute marijuana. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that sentence was unreasonable where: (1) Dist. Ct. explained that above-guideline sentence was warranted because defendant committed charged offense while he was on supervised release for prior drug conviction; and (2) defendant’s completion of 15-year sentence for prior drug conviction had not deterred him from committing instant charged offense. Fact that defendant may seek future relief based on retroactive amendment to sentencing guideline that would lower instant guideline range does not require different result, and Dist. Ct. was not required to delay sentencing so that defendant could take advantage of said amendment.