Criminal Law

People v. Cannon

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Fourth Amendment
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (3d) 130672
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, January 7, 2015
District: 
3d Dist.
Division/County: 
Will Co.
Holding: 
Reversed.
Justice: 
LYTTON
Defendant, age 19 at time of charge, was convicted, after bench trial, of unlawful consumption of alcohol by a minor. Court properly granted Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Police officer walked onto back deck of Defendant's mother's house, without a warrant. Entry onto back deck was reasonable, to ask homeowner about noise complaint, and officer could hear noise coming from back deck. State failed to prove that Defendant was not directly supervised by his mother while he was drinking alcohol, and thus State failed to prove that Defendant did not fall within exemption of the Liquor Control Act for minors drinking under supervision of a parent within the privacy of a home. (O'BRIEN, concurring; SCHMIDT, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

U.S. v. Fard

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Guilty Plea
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 14-1221
Decision Date: 
January 7, 2015
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Vacated and remanded
Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s request to withdraw his guilty plea to wire fraud charge arising out of scheme to obtain money and property from mortgage lenders by means of submitting documents containing false statements in order to induce lenders to loan said money. Record suggested that defendant did not understand nature of instant wire fraud charge, where defendant’s colloquy demonstrated that defendant was confused about concept of fraudulent intent and was equivocal in many of his answers to Dist. Ct. regarding his actions. Moreover, neither Dist. Ct. nor defendant’s counsel explained nature of fraudulent intent in record.

People v. Flowers

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Postconviction Petition
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (1st) 113259
Decision Date: 
Tuesday, January 6, 2015
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
FITZGERALD SMITH
Defendant filed pro se postconviction petition, with affidavits from witnesses claiming that Defendant was innocent of first-degree murder of which he had been convicted. Defendant's culpable negligence in not timely filing petition is not excused by affiants' having moved multiple times over the years, as their affidavits indicate that Defendant could have located them much sooner. Court properly dismissed petition as untimely. (EPSTEIN and ELLIS, concurring.)

People v. Getter

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Self-Defense
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (1st) 121307
Decision Date: 
Tuesday, January 6, 2015
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 4th Div.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded.
Justice: 
ELLIS
Defendant was charged with first-degree murder as to one victim, attempted murder and aggravated battery with a firearm as to another victim, and aggravated discharge of a firearm as to another victim. At trial, Defendant relied exclusively on self-defense theory. As to the first three charges, jury was instructed that State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was not justified in using force to defend himself; Defendant was acquitted on those charges. Jury was not so instructed as to fourth charge, and he was convicted of that charge. Plain error in failing to give self-defense instruction on aggravated discharge count, and defense counsel was ineffective for acquiescing in erroneous instructions. (FITZGERALD SMITH and EPSTEIN, concurring.)

People v. Roe

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (5th) 130410
Decision Date: 
Tuesday, January 6, 2015
District: 
5th Dist.
Division/County: 
Williamson Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
WELCH
Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of failure to register as a sex offender. In reading language in count and statute together, reference in charging instrument to registering within three days of conviction is not a denial of due process. Any variance between charging instrument and proof does not require reversal of conviction, as it was not material, misleading, or likely to expose Defendant to possibly double jeopardy. Defendant was afforded sufficient notice of charge and was given meaningful opportunity to defend himself against the charge. (STEWART and SCHWARM, concurring.)

U.S. v. Cary

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Supervised Release
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 14-1961
Decision Date: 
January 6, 2015
Federal District: 
C.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Affirmed and vacated in part and remanded
In sentencing defendant on charge of failing to register as sex offender, Dist. Ct. erred in imposing as special condition of defendant’s supervised release, requirement that defendant refrain from using any “mood altering substance” where said condition was not mentioned by Dist. Ct. in its oral ruling at sentencing hearing. Moreover, remand was required for Dist. Ct. to clarify what websites defendant cannot access during his supervised release since Dist. Ct.’s requirement that defendant obtain computer software filter to block access to “sexually oriented websites” was too vague, and Dist. Ct. otherwise failed to make any findings to support such ban. Also, Dist. Ct. must make finding of defendant’s ability to pay for alcohol and mental health treatment before making such requirement as part of special condition of supervised release.

People v. Kliner

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Indictment
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (1st) 122285
Decision Date: 
Tuesday, January 6, 2015
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 4th Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
FITZGERALD SMITH
Defendant was convicted in 1996 of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Section 112-2 of Code of Criminal Procedure does not require affirmative showing of compliance that grand jury was impaneled and sworn. Record shows, on face of indictment, that a valid indictment was entered by a sworn grand jury. Thus, court properly denied Defendant's Section 2-1401(f) petition for relief from judgment, as Defendant's convictions are not void. (HOWSE and EPSTEIN, concurring.)

U.S. v. Morris

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 14-2242
Decision Date: 
January 5, 2015
Federal District: 
W.D. Wisc.
Holding: 
Vacated and remanded
Defendant was entitled to new sentencing hearing on charge of distribution of crack cocaine, even though Dist. Ct. imposed below-guidelines, 48-month term of incarceration. Dist. Ct. improperly made no mention of defendant’s principle arguments in seeking 18-month term of incarceration that included claim that: (1) instant guideline range was based mainly on fact that he had sold large quantity of counterfeit drug substances; and (2) 18 to 1 crack/powder disparity unfairly drove his sentencing range significantly higher. Moreover, said failure precluded Ct. of Appeals from determining whether Dist. Ct. had actually considered said arguments in fashioning defendant’s sentence, or whether instant sentence was reasonable.

U.S. v. Smith

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Recusal
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 14-2223
Decision Date: 
January 5, 2015
Federal District: 
C.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Vacated and remanded
Defendant was entitled to new sentencing hearing on finding that defendant had violated terms of his supervised release, where Dist. Ct. judge that imposed instant 15-month term of incarceration had also made appearance as prosecutor in hearing on defendant’s first violation of terms of his supervised release that occurred prior to her appointment to District Ct. bench. District Ct.’s involvement in prior matter constituted ground for disqualification under 28 USC section 455(b) that could not be waived.

U.S. v. Webster

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Evidence
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 13-1927
Decision Date: 
January 5, 2015
Federal District: 
N.D. Ind., S. Bend Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
In prosecution on drug and firearm charges, Dist. Ct. erred in admitting evidence of forensic laboratory reports that confirmed existence of drugs at crime scene, where said reports were admitted into evidence without testimony of analyst who prepared said reports. However, error was harmless where defendant never contested at trial that substances found at crime scene were in fact drugs. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting taped conversation of defendant that was made in caged backseat of squad car, since defendant did not have objective reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to said conversation.