Criminal Law

In prosecution on healthcare fraud charge arising out of allegations that defendant paid kickbacks to physicians for patient referrals, Dist. Ct. did not err in determining that loss amount attributed to healthcare fraud was $744,481 and in imposing restitution order for same amount. Said figure was based on sample of medical records for claims submitted by defendant that indicated overpayments of $47,444 with no evidence of any underpayments. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that Dist. Ct could not calculate loss figure by attributing all overpayments to his criminal conduct, and that Dist. Ct. should have only relied on overpayments stemming from visibly altered claim forms, since defendant’s arguments wrongfully assumed that only evidence linking overpayments to his misconduct was overpayments generated by altered claim forms. Ct. further noted that fact that there were no underpayments to defendant in instant sample forms constituted strong evidence that overpayments were intentional, rather than accidental.

In prosecution on sex trafficking charge under 18 USC section 1591(a), Dist. Ct. did not err in giving jury instruction that explained that govt. had to prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant’s conduct affected interstate commerce, since said instruction was accurate statement of law. Moreover, defendant was not entitled to instruction that required govt. to show that he actually knew or intended that his sex trafficking conduct affected interstate commerce since interstate commerce element of section 1591(a) offense has no mens re requirement.

Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing $4,069,091.06 restitution order as part of defendant’s sentence on wire fraud charge stemming from defendant’s efforts, along with others, in massive tax fraud scheme that entailed submission of false tax returns in names of over 3,000 unknowing, incarcerated or deceased people. Restitution award was based on loss figures provided in presentence report, indicating that intended loss was around $19 million and actual loss was $4,069,091.06, and that Dist. Ct. properly limited defendant’s liability to losses resulting from his own actions. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly base restitution award on actual losses caused by scheme.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant-County Clerk’s mail fraud conviction stemming from defendant’s receipt of $25,000 in bonus payments from federally funded child support fund without required approval of County Board, even though defendant argued that he took said bonuses negligently and in good faith where attorney told him that his taking of prior bonuses without prior approval was consistent with relevant Indiana statute calling for said prior approval. Defendant, as attorney, knew of existence of applicable statute two months prior to taking January 2009 bonus, and jury could properly find that defendant intentionally took said bonus in spite of statute’s mandate that he have prior approval, where third-party testified that he told defendant of need for said prior approval prior to defendant’s receipt of January 2009 bonus. Fact that defendant had obtained legal opinion that defendant had complied with statute on prior occasions when he took bonus without seeking prior approval did not require different result where defendant was actually aware of requirement for prior approval at time he obtained January 2009 bonus.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his guilty plea to drug conspiracy charge, as well as his 540-month term of incarceration on grounds that govt. breached agreement to recommend sentence of between 108 and 135-months incarceration, and that his guilty plea was not voluntary. Record did not support defendant’s contention regarding existence of agreement as described by defendant, and defendant otherwise stated at thorough plea colloquy that no promises had been given as inducement to enter instant blind plea. Record also did not support defendant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him against entering into blind plea, where defendant’s counsel had urged him to accept written plea agreement proposed by govt., and where counsel stated that defendant’s insistence on entering blind plea was against counsel’s advice.