Criminal Law

Defendant entered negotiated guilty plea for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. Rather than filing motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Defendant filed pro se notice of appeal in circuit court. Appeal is dismissed for failing to comply with mandates of Rule 604(d), which require filing motion to withdraw guilty plea prior to appealing judgment entered on negotiated guilty plea. Rule 606(a) permits filing of notice of appeal by either appellant, pro se, or his attorney. A defendant who pleads guilty and later defaults on procedural requirements of Rule 604(d) is not entitled to appointment of counsel to assist him in perfecting an appeal upon filing of a pro se notice of appeal per Rule 606(a). (CONNORS and HOFFMAN, concurring.)

Defendant, age 16 at time of offense, was tried as an adult under Illinois Juvenile Court Act, which mandates automatic transfer to criminal court of 15- and 16-year-olds charged with certain Class X felonies. Defendant failed to show that mandatory transfer is unconstitutional. Defendant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, based on evidence of record. State's closing arguments were not outside bounds of reasonable argument based on evidence, or as invited. Court erred by failing to conduct appropriate preliminary inquiry under Krankel to evaluate posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (NEVILLE and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

State filed petition seeking to have Respondent, who had been convicted of three separate sexually violent offenses, adjudicated a sexually violent person (SVP), per Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. Court accurately informed jury of law and thus properly accepted State's proposed jury instruction per statutory requirements of SVP Commitment Act. Court's quick response to Respondent's timely objections prevented any prejudicial effect of violation of in limine order barring testimony that there had been finding of probable cause to believe Respondent was SVP, and thus cured any error.(McBRIDE and HOWSE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first-degree murder. As composition of Defendant's bloodstained boots and pants were not easily subject to change, and several witnesses identified them through unique characteristics, State did not need to establish a chain of custody. Court properly barred defense from presenting a still video shot that neither impeached forensic investigator nor undermined State's evidence. Defense counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to State's latent fingerprint analysis as those methods have been generally accepted in scientific community for over 100 years. (McBRIDE and PALMER, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder. Prosecutor did not make improper comment, and did not minimize State's burden of proof, in stating in argument that reasonable doubt could not be "crazy", or that it "isn't some mystical magical burden". Court did not err in permitting evidence that Defendant smoked marijuana just prior to shooting, as it was admissible as part of continuing narrative of evening and was intertwined with shooting. Court was properly cautious in voir dire and addressing possibility in questioning as to gang bias. Twenty-five-to-life firearm enhancement is not unconstitutionally vague. (McBRIDE and TAYLOR, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of predatory criminal sexual assault against 8-year-old daughter of his girlfriend. Court erred by failing to instruct jury with IPI 11.66, which is required whenever court admits into evidence a child's sexual-assault outcry statements. As evidence was not closely balanced, error does not rise to level of plain error, and counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise it. (LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance containing synthetic cannabis. Defendant was a clerk at gas station-convenience store selling thousands of legal products . State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the knowledge element of the offense. Defendant asked store owner whether product could be legally sold, and store owner told him yes. Mere suspicion that Defendant knew product was illegal is not sufficient to establish knowledge. (TURNER and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated battery of his girlfriend, who was deaf. Considering all evidence in light most favorable to prosecution, rational jury could find, beyond reasonable doubt, that Defendant was the person who committed the offense, even though victim testified that should could not see him at time of battery, in their bed in early morning hours. State properly elicited evidence of what happened prior to trial, that Defendant spontaneously remarked to officer about beating, and never said that he was innocent or that someone else had done it. (STEIGMANN and TURNER, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trail, of attempted first-degree murder and possession with intent to manufacture-deliver cocaine. Officer testified that when Defendant exited his own vehicle, Defendant pointed gun at him, and that when he watched a video of event, he saw Defendant appear to pull the trigger. Defense counsel failed to object to testimony about video, and actively used that testimony in cross-examination, and is thus invited error. It was a question of fact for jury whether Defendant was aware that gun he pointed had safety on or whether he was unskilled with gun. (TURNER, concurring; POPE, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of unlawful financial exploitation of elderly person. State was required to commence its prosecution within one year of aggrieved person's discovery of offense. When aggrieved person told police detective that Defendant had written checks from her account, and that she had not given Defendant permission to do so, this was more than mere suspicion, and was discovery of misappropriation and knowledge that an offense had been committed. (HOLDER WHITE, concurring; POPE, dissenting.)