Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of DUI under Village ordinance. Village did not bring Defendant to trial within 160-day time speedy-trial period, and thus conviction is vacated. Defendant's recognizance bond meant that he was to be released immediately, and he was thus released from custody on that day, when speedy-trial demand was filed (and demand was thus not prematurely filed) and when speedy-trial term began. Assistant State's Attorney, by stepping up at initial court hearings when Village attorney was not present, was representing Village's interests such that service on ASA was sufficient to stand as service on Village attorney. Village failed to object to either of Defendant's two absences from hearings, both of which were excused by court, and thus Defendant's failure to appear on date when his counsel informed court that he was ill and unable to attend did not waive speedy-trial demand. (McLAREN and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of first degree felony murder, aggravated battery, and mob action, arising from fight in which Defendant participated with two others, during which two men were beaten and one of the men died as a result of fight. Defendant argued that evidence was insufficient for felony murder based on mob action, as he was in separate fight 20-40 feet away from fight that resulted in death. Severe injury and death were reasonably foreseeable as fight escalated. Acts that formed mob action were independent of, and involved different felonious purpose than, acts that caused victim's death, and thus mob action served as proper predicate for felony murder conviction. (SCHMIDT and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with two counts of first degree murder for death of his third wife. Circuit court erred in denying State's motion in limine to admit certain hearsay statements under common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. Statutory hearsay exception (Section 115-10.6 of Code of Criminal Procedure) for intentional murder of a witness, for which reliability is an element, is in direct conflict with common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, which is now codified as Rule 804(b)(5) of Illinois Rules of Evidence, for which reliability is not an element. Conflict is resolved in favor of Rule of Evidence. (SCHMIDT, concurring; CARTER, specially concurring.)

Respondent was adjudicated a sexually violent person. Court properly allowed State's expert witnesses to testify to certain past conduct other than acts underlying his rape and sexual assault convictions, as it pertained to their evaluations of Respondent. "Rap sheets" expert cited for arrest history are types of documents upon which expert in field would reasonably rely. Multiple arrests are relevant as bases for experts' diagnoses of personality disorder with antisocial features. Court expressly told jury to not consider prior arrests as substantive evidence. (JORGENSEN and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, in 1983, by jury of first-degree murder. Court made finding that murder was exceptionally brutal and heinous at sentencing hearing, which then made Defendant eligible for extended-term sentence, and he was sentenced to 75 years. Without extended-term, maximum sentence was 40 years. Defendant argued that portion of his sentence exceeding 40-year maximum is void, as facts extending sentence were not submitted to jury. Defendant's voidness argument is not distinguishable from Apprendi holding, and Apprendi cannot apply retroactively. (LAMPKIN and PALMER, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 4/10/12.) Criminal defendant, who was prosecuted almost entirely on basis of cold-case DNA match, made pretrial motion for DNA database search. Court abused its discretion by denying Defendant's motion to order ISP to conduct a nine-loci database search. Court abused discretion by barring defense from asking State's DNA expert any questions about Arizona study, thus limiting defense's opportunity to cross-examine. (J. GORDON, concurring; McBRIDE, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of unlawful possession of weapon by felon and reckless discharge of a firearm. Court properly admitted prior inconsistent statements of two neighbors, that Defendant fired a gun into the air from his front yard, as substantive evidence under Section 115-10.1 of Code of Criminal Procedure, in finding that neighbors' testimony was an "acknowledgement" of prior statement. (McCULLOUGH, concurring; TURNER, specially concurring.)