Criminal Law

In prosecution on drug conspiracy charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion for new trial based on prosecutor's surprise disclosure during trial of identity of confidential informant who spoke with defendant on recorded conversation. While prosecutor did not offer good explanation as to why govt. refused to identify confidential informant prior to trial, said failure did not require new trial where: (1) defendant should have known of identity of confidential informant from other pre-trial disclosures including subject recorded conversation; (2) defendant refused Dist. Ct.'s offer of recess to prepare defense in response to said disclosure; (3) defendant failed to show how disclosure affected any of his defense theories; and (4) evidence against defendant on charged offense was strong.

In prosecution on bribery charges stemming from scheme in which defendant hired third-party to obtain authorization for zoning variance on defendant's construction of two residential units by paying $8,000 bribe to zoning inspector, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's request for new trial on grounds that prosecutor knowingly used false testimony from third-party about prior $8,000 bribe that third-party had made on behalf of defendant. While third-party misspoke as to number of residential units that were at issue with respect to prior bribe, witness' misstatement did not undermine main inference that defendant had knowingly been paying bribe money, rather than using lawful expediting service. Dist. Ct. also did not err in allowing third-party to testify as to her understanding of statements made by defendant in recorded conversation since said testimony was based on witness' own mental processes.

In prosecution on mail fraud charges stemming from scheme to award City of Chicago jobs to individuals who participated in campaign work, Dist. Ct. did not commit reversible error by initially allowing prosecutor to ask defendant about DUI incident and incident in which defendant argued with police officer as passenger in car, and then shortly thereafter instructing jury to disregard said evidence, which Dist. Ct. mischaracterized as two incidents of "drunk driving." Evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming so as to preclude defendant from establishing any prejudice, and defendant was permitted to give context to said incidents on re-direct. Moreover, it was unlikely Dist. Ct.'s mischaracterization of evidence that was subject of limiting instruction precluded jury from following remaining portion of instruction to disregard type of evidence that was subject of limiting instruction.

In prosecution on unlawful possession of firearm charge, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion by failing to exclude evidence regarding defendant's gang affiliation where said evidence was elicited from witness, who testified he was with defendant at time of defendant's arrest and asserted that he, as opposed to defendant, had possessed firearm that was discovered in neighbor's yard. Under circumstances of case, evidence that witness and defendant were members of same gang was relevant to establish bias of witness, and Dist. Ct. otherwise took precautions to avoid risk of undue prejudice to defendant by giving cautionary instruction against giving consideration of defendant's gang membership in determination of guilt or innocence on charged offense.

Ct. of Appeals held in abeyance defendant-prisoner's motion to file late application for leave to file successive collateral attack where defendant asserted that said application would be late due to prison limits on his use of copy machine. Defendant's motion is premature where application is not yet late, and where defendant failed to disclose particulars of underlying legal claim. Ct., though, did excuse defendant from having to comply with Rule 22.2(a)(4)and (5), as well as Appellate Rule 21(d), which required defendant to file multiple copies of his application, as well as relevant prior opinions and requests for collateral relief.