Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of four counts of first degree murder and one count of possession of stolen vehicle. Sentence of 55 years for first degree murder was within court's discretion. Jury could easily have drawn inferences necessary to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that Defendant personally killed victim. Court is not required to consider absence of a possible aggravating factor as a mitigating factor to result in downward departure from sentence court would have otherwise imposed. (POPE and COOK, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AAUW) and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. AAUW statute is constitutionally permissible despite its restrictions on right of felons to bear arms, as it is a valid exercise of important governmental interest in protecting health, safety and general welfare of its citizens. State met its burden to prove that Defendant was not an invitee, when he possessed rifle, as an element of offense of AUUW. (FITZGERALD SMITH and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder, and sentenced to 85 years imprisonment. Evidence was sufficient for trier of fact to find that Defendant personally discharged firearm that proximately caused victim's death, and thus sentencing enhancement of 25 years was proper. No violation of four amendment in search for victim's body, which was found buried underneath cement floor of uninhabited apartment building. Cadaver dog hit on hole in cement floor, which enhanced probable cause by corroborating information of witnesses that Defendant had dug hole and buried victim. Search on second day was reasonable continuation of search suspended after first evening due to physical exhaustion of searchers. Defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in apartment as he used apatement without permission of his father, who was apartment manager. (HOFFMAN and KARNEZIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of predatory criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse of his 8-year-old daugher. Defendant failed to show error in admission of testimony from victim's mother and grandmother, and DCFS investigator and counsel, as to statements of victim describing Defendant's abuse. Jury was aware that victim was 11 years old at time of trial when testifying as to assaults occurring when she was age 8. (CUNNINGHAM, concurring; HARRIS, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of threatening a public official and aggravated battery. Clear and obvious error, which affected fairness of Defendant's trial, as jury instruction given suggested that a generalized threat to officer was sufficient. Instruction deprived jury of guidance needed to decide whether Defendant's threat contained specific facts indicative of a unique threat to the officer. Evidence sufficient to prove aggravated battery beyond a reasonable doubt, as jury could infer that officer perceived Defendant's placing her teeth on his forearm as a dangerous or possibly injurious act, and an insulting and provoking act, as he pulled his arm away. (POPE and KNECHT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of various offenses including three counts of unlawful possession of a firearm without FOID card, based on his possession of three different firearms and one box of ammunition. Singular act of failing to possess FOID card cannot sustain multiple convictions of an offense comprised solely of that act, but that act may serve as common element of multiple offenses that include additional physical acts (possession of different firearms or of firearm ammunition) as elements. Possession of multiple firearms without FOID card will support only one conviction, but separate conviction based on possession of firearm ammunition without FOID card may also stand. (HUTCHINSON and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of criminal trespass to residence. State was not required to prove that Defendant knew he lacked authority to enter the residence, as statute defining offense does not include mental state with the element of entering a residence "without authority". (JORGENSEN and ZENOFF, concurring.)