Criminal Law

In prosecution on child pornography charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that evidence seized from search of defendant's home was sufficiently attenuated from prior illegal police search of home of defendant's father so as to allow for admission of said evidence at defendant's trial. Search of defendant's home came two hours after search of father's home under circumstances where defendant had consulted with father prior to defendant giving consent to search defendant's home. Moreover, police gave defendant Miranda warnings prior to search of his home, even though said warnings were not legally required. Ct. further noted that suppression of evidence was not warranted where record suggested that defendant was willing to assist police at his home in spite of intervening time to think about said assistance and in spite of his father's contrary advice.

Dist. Ct. did not commit plain error by allowing govt. to submit redacted indictment to jury that had removed allegations against defendant's former co-defendants, who were no longer on trial. Said submission did not constitute improper constructive amendment to indictment since defendant made no claim that redacted indictment broadened possible bases for conviction, and redacted indictment otherwise did not remove any allegations necessary to charged offense.

Dist. Ct. did not commit plain error in sentencing defendant to 96-month term of incarceration on mail fraud charge arising out of defendant's role in scheme to defraud Ill. Dept. of Security by submitting applications for unemployment benefits from aliens that contained social security numbers from unsuspecting law-abiding citizens. Record supported Dist. Ct.'s application of organizer enhancement under section 3B1.1(a) of USSG, where record showed that defendant exercised near total control over submission of applications and had received large share of proceeds of her criminal activity. Dist. Ct. could also apply enhancements for identity theft under section 2B1.1(B)(10)(C)(i) of USSG and for fact that instant scheme involved more than 50 victims even though defendant was charged with only eight counts of mail fraud.

In prosecution on firearm charge, Dist. Ct. did not commit plain error in permitting police officer to testify as both expert and fact witness regarding defendant's actions at arrest scene, when officer told jury that defendant had concealed his hands from officer and when officer gave opinion that defendant's actions were consistent with possession of gun. While Dist. Ct. should have cautioned jury to separate officer's factual testimony from his expert opinion testimony and should have required prosecutor to make jury clear as to when officer was testifying as expert, no reversible error occurred where Dist. Ct. gave standard instruction for opinion testimony, and where defendant otherwise had opportunity to cross-examine officer regarding what he actually saw at arrest scene.

In prosecution on drug distribution and firearms charges, defendant was entitled to new trial on drug distribution charges where Dist. Ct. erred in admitting defendant's 2000 conviction on drug distribution charge since defendant's prior conviction constituted improper propensity evidence. While prior conviction could be admitted under different circumstances to establish defendant's intent, instant evidence was improper where defendant contended that drugs contained in priced packets found in his residence were not his, and where govt. failed to explain how defendant's 2000 conviction related to his intent or any other relevant issue without resorting to improper propensity evidence.