Criminal Law

In prosecution on charges stemming from defendant's disclosure of confidential information about witness in federal witness protection program, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress inculpatory statements given during two interviews conducted by U.S. Attorney in FBI building. While defendant argued that said statements should have been suppressed because Miranda warnings had not been given at time of both interviews, defendant was not in custody for purpose of triggering Miranda protections when making statements during either interview where: (1) U.S. Attorney merely informed defendant, who was Deputy U.S. Marshall, about evidence against him and told him that he may be subject to future prosecution; (2) U.S. Attorney told him he was not under arrest during first interview; (3) set-up of interview room did not prevent defendant from leaving room or suggest that he was under arrest; and (4) prior to giving statement during second interview, defendant was allowed to speak to three individuals of his choosing.

Dist. Ct. did not commit plain error when it entered judgments of conviction on charges of receipt and possession of child pornography, even though defendant argued that entry of conviction on both offenses violated Double Jeopardy Clause because possession of child pornography was essentially lesser included offense with respect to charge of receipt of child pornography. Record showed that separate videos formed bases of receipt and possession of child pornography charges, and thus entry of judgment as to both charges did not affect defendant’s substantial rights under plain error analysis. Remand, though, was required for new sentencing hearing where defendant’s 240-month term of incarceration was based, in part, on Dist. Ct.’s unsubstantiated finding that defendant had improperly asserted that charged offenses were either not criminal in nature or pertained to victimless offenses.

In prosecution on possession of child pornography charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his personal computer pursuant to search warrant even though defendant argued that police lacked probable cause to search for child pornography pictures where focus of original investigation prior to issuance of search warrant was investigation of sexual assault of 4-year-old minor. Instant affidavit attached to warrant application supported probable cause to search defendant's computer where affidavit contained evidence of defendant's sexual interest in children in form of claims that defendant had sexually assaulted three children and had used computer with respect of one of alleged assaults. Fact that officer included in affidavit mere fact that defendant had been subject of 2008 FBI investigation did not require different result, and defendant otherwise failed to rebut presumption that instant search warrant was issued in good faith.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's habeas petition challenging his murder conviction on grounds that prosecutor violated his due process rights by taking advantage of wrong date supplied by defendant during his testimony with respect to confiscation of his gun where, accoreding to defendant, prosecutor improperly claimed during closing argument that defendant had motive to steal another gun. Defendant could not assert violation of rule against prosecutor's use of known false testimony where: (1) prosecutor is generally not forbidden to exploit errors in testimony adduced by defendant; and (2) defendant could have corrected his own misstatement of fact. Moreover, prosecutor did not violate due process clause by eliciting from witness fact that defendant had abruptly stopped answering questions during interrogation by making loud noise where: (1) record showed that defendant had cooperated by police by voluntarily answering other questions leading up to abrupt refusal to answer any more questions; and (2) govt. could properly argue that said silence demonstrated truth or falsity of defendant's prior answers.