Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of drug charges. Court properly denied Defendant's Section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment, alleging that detective knowingly offered perjured testimony . Even though detective's testimony was inconsistent, Defendant failed to prove that it was perjury by preponderance of evidence, which is correct evidentiary standard, as Section 2-1401 petition is a civil matter. Court properly denied Defendant's request for new trial. Evidence against Defendant was overwhelming, and detective's mistake in testimony, that $60 in drug buy money was found on Defendant's person, cannot be said to have changed outcome. (STEIGMANN and APPLETON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of three counts of first degree murder. In his postconviction petition, Defendant failed to present any newly-discovered evidence. Witness affidavits indicate that information was available at trial. Thus, court properly dismissed Defendant's actual-innocence claim. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were already ruled upon by court and thus barred by res judicata. No Brady violations established; Defendant failed to allege how State's coaching of witness alone undermines confidence in trial outcome. (APPLETON and KNECHT, concurring.)

Court found Defendant guilty of two counts of workers' compensation fraud, and he was sentenced to probation, fined, and ordered to pay restitution to workers' compensation benefits administrator. Questions to Defendant by claims representative were confusing and could have been interpreted differently. Evidence did not establish that Defendant intentionally lied to claims representative. Evidence was sufficient to conclude that Defendant made intentional misrepresentations to doctors about his symptoms and limitations made for purpose of obtaining workers' compensation benefits. Statute is not unconstitutionally vague, and is rationally related to purpose of deterring fraud. Portion of restitution order based on costs of surveillance is void, as no evidence that Defendant had made fraudulent statements at time of surveillance. (BURKE, concurring; HUTCHINSON, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of intimidation, home invasion, armed robbery, and aggravated kidnapping, after forcibly entering family's apartment. Court properly found 17-year-old, who was present at incident and who knew Defendant very well, was credible witness who identified Defendant. State was not required to present corroborating physical evidence at trial, as witness' identification and testimony were found credible. 15-year sentencing enhancement for aggravated kidnapping violated proportionate penalties clause. (QUINN and CONNORS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW). Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel. As Defendant was not seized, within meaning of Fourth Amendment, at time gun fell to ground, filing motion to suppress would have been futile, and thus no ineffective assistance of counsel in not filing such motion. (STEELE and SALONE, concurring.)

Appellate court had vacated Defendant's judgment of conviction for attempted first-degree murder, and remanded with directions that Defendant be given opportunity to file a new motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant then appealed, requesting further remand because hearing on his new motion was only "perfunctory". Defendant cannot show that outcome of hearing on motion to withdraw would have been different if his counsel had called PD Office interpreter to testify at remand hearing. Defendant who challenges guilty plea must show prejudice, even if recasting claim of attorney error as violation of Rule 604(d)'s strict compliance standard. (McLAREN and BIRKETT, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 2/1/12.) Court properly exercised its discretion in determining that State acted with due diligence and in granting State's motion to extend speedy-trial deadline in order to complete DNA testing under Section 103-5 of Code of Criminal Procedure. Possibility of DNA evidence came to light late in process of testing materials, at time that prosecutor was on vacation, and report was provided to defense a week later, and promptly sought extension of speedy-trial period. No evidence that State sought to unreasonably delay the case. (McLAREN and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

Proof of a physical act is not a necessary element of offense of obstructing a peace officer. Knowingly providing a false statement to an officer may be obstruction, if statement interposes an obstacle that impedes or hinders officer and is relevant to performance of officer's authorized duties. (FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, KARMEIER, and BURKE, concurring; KILBRIDE, dissenting.)

Defendant was charged, and jury was instructed on and convicted Defendant under predecessor statutes which used term "dangerous weapon". Gun used in robbery was never found, and no testimony as to size, weight, or metallic nature of gun. Uncontroverted testimony of robbery victim was sufficient to prove to jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon. Allegations in indictment, that Defendant's dangerous weapon was a "firearm", did not vary from State's proof at trial as to type of dangerous weapon used. (FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, and KARMEIER, concurring; KILBRIDE and THEIS, dissenting.)