Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW). AUUW statute does not violate second amendment or Illinois Constitution, as statute is reasonably related to its substantial and important goal of enhancing public and police officer safety. Court did not violate Defendant's right to confront witnesses by refusing his request to question detectives who shot him during arrest about a prior incident where same detectives shot and killed a fleeing suspect and City settled with estate of deceased. Unrelated lawsuit is irrelevant to Defendant's claim that detectives were motivated to testify falsely, and no evidence that detectives knew Defendant prior to incident or had any bias against him. (GARCIA, concurring; R.E. GORDON, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault. Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel as his counsel failed to object to irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial portions of interrogation video where police questioned Defendant about other alleged crimes, also violating confrontation clause. Reasonable probability that trial outcome would have been different had counsel objected to this evidence. (NEVILLE and SALONE, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with burglary and retail theft, and found not guilty by reason of insanity. Court properly entered order committing Defendant to inpatient treatment at a secure facility. Defendant's stipulation that a psychiatrist would testify in accordance with his report was not a functional waiver of the entire hearing, but only a waiver of requirement of live testimony. Psychiatrist's report provides sufficiently specific factual basis to support court's finding by clear and convincing evidence. (WELCH and WEXSTTEN, concurring.)

Defendant was found a sexually dangerous person and committed to custody of DOC in 1997. In 2010 court granted State's petition to revoke Defendant's conditional release which it had ordered in 2002. Defendant failed to file his notice of appeal within 30 days after order revoking conditional release, and thus appellate court was without jurisdiction over Defendant's request for leave to file late notice of appeal. (POPE, concurring; COOK, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated DUI, for which he was sentenced to court costs only, and per plea agreement he also pled guilty to intimidation, for which he was sentenced to 9 years. Aggravated DUI is a class 4 felony, and thus costs-only sentence is void, which renders both convictions voidable. Void sentence must be corrected, and on remand court must inform Defendant that sentences must be consecutive, as Defendant committed intimidation offense while out on bond from DUI offense.(HUTCHINSON and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of first degree murder in tavern shooting. Court improperly admitted preliminary hearing testimony of bartender-witness who had been deported by time of trial, in violation of Confrontation Clause. Court improperly restricted defense counsel's cross-examination of bartender, and did not allow constitutionally required adequate opportunity for cross-examination. Court's remarks prior to commencement of hearing are relevant as they evince atmosphere in which cross-examination was conducted, including court's curt response to counsel's inquiry about objection. Court failed to allow counsel to fully and effectively explore areas of witness' interest, bias, prejudice, and motivation; thus, prejudicial error to admit that testimony at trial. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of murder. No ineffective assistance of counsel, as postconviction petition does not make substantial showing of constitutional violation. Filing motion to reconsider sentence would have been fruitless. Defense counsel's decision to not call Defendant's wife as witness was matter of trial strategy, as counsel was aware of her potential testimony and had another alibi witness available. Defense counsel's decision to not call expert on reliability of eyewitness identification, given Illinois trend precluding such testimony as invading province of jury. (CUNNINGHAM and HARRIS, concurring.)