Criminal Law

In instant appeal, defendant challenged Dist. Ct.'s denial of his motion to suppress his incriminating statements and evidence seized from his home, where said motion had been filed in first indictment alleging drug and firearms charges that had been subsequently dismissed without prejudice due to Speedy Trial Act violation, and where defendant had failed to file similar motion to suppress in second indictment alleging the same charges that formed basis of instant appeal. Although Ct. of Appeals found that orders entered in first indictment were not properly before it in instant appeal, it further found that instant record should be expanded to include filings associated with motion to suppress in first case, which could be reviewed under plain error standard, where: (1) defendant did not have opportunity to appeal denial of motion to suppress due to subsequent dismissal of first indictment; and (2) it was understandable that defendant did not file motion to suppress in second case since he could have reasonably believed that prior denial constituted law of case.

In prosecution on drug conspiracy charges, Dist. Ct. erred in admitting evidence from state's expert regarding physical side effects associated with individuals ingesting drugs sold to them by defendant since, although expert's testimony had some relevance on background evidence concerning regulatory scheme pertaining to prescription drugs and dangers that could result from sale of said drugs without medical supervision, said testimony was unduly prejudicial given minimal probative value with respect to elements of charged offenses. However, error was harmless given overwhelming nature of evidence establishing defendant's role in scheme to smuggle and then illegally sell controlled substances without requiring customers to provide prescriptions.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's habeas petition alleging that her trial counsel was ineffective when, prior to giving defendant advice as to whether to enter guilty plea, counsel failed to interview one witness, and further failed to either obtain psychological evidence concerning whether defendant made voluntary confession to two murders or recognize that another witness had given inconsistent statements regarding identity of shooter. Defendant failed to establish any prejudice arising out of alleged shortcomings of counsel or demonstrate that counsel's advice to defendant about whether to plead guilty would have been any different had he done more investigation in case. Moreover, defendant's boastful display to television cameras following her confession essentially precluded any argument that defendant's confession was psychologically coerced.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 168-month term of incarceration on kidnapping charge, even though defendant claimed that said sentence was product of improper double counting where Dist. Ct. applied 6-level enhancement under section 2A4.1(b)(1) of USSG for kidnapping that involved demand for ransom, and where charged offense also involved demand for ransom. Ct., in clarifying Bell, 598 F.3d 366, found that there is no general prohibition against double counting when applying sentencing guidelines, such that same conduct may determine base offense level and also trigger cumulative application of enhancements/adjustments where, as here, no specific guideline instructs otherwise.

Dist. Ct. did not err on remand in sentencing defendant to 144-month term of incarceration on bankruptcy fraud and possession of child pornography charges. Dist. Ct. could properly view money defendant hoped to save by blackmailing his ex-wife through threat to publish nude photographs of ex-wife’s 16-year old sister-in-law when measuring defendant’s pecuniary gain for purposes of instant sentence. Moreover, defendant could not raise issues in instant appeal that pertained to either his sentence or conviction that were actually resolved or could have been raised in his initial appeal.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s guilty verdict on charge of possession of firearm in furtherance of drug-trafficking crime under 18 USC section 924(c) where evidence showed that: (1) defendant kept loaded .40 caliber Sig Sauer semi-automatic pistol just few feet from his front door; and (2) defendant built and ran out of home marijuana grow operation valued in thousands of dollars. Ct. further rejected defendant’s claim that section 924(c) was unconstitutionally vague.