Criminal Law

Defendant entered negotiated plea of guilty to one count of first degree murder, but court failed to admonish defendant of MSR period which would follow imprisonment. Six years later, Defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition, which court properly dismissed as Defendant cannot make a substantial showing of a violation of his constitutional rights. Defendant's guilty plea and sentencing occurred prior to new rule that a defendant who was not advised of the MSR obligation before entering the plea should have his sentence modified to incorporate the MSR in the number of years to which sentenced; thus, retroactive relief under that rule is not available to Defendant. (GARCIA and R.E. GORDON, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with unlawful delivery and unlawful possession of controlled substance. During lengthy pretrial delays, parties learned that the substance in question had been destroyed at the conclusion of a codefendant's case. Inadvertent destruction of the evidence in this case, where court declined to impose a discovery sanction and found that no party had acted in bad faith, did not deprive Defendant of due process. (ZENOFF and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

A circuit court has no obligation to recharacterize a pro se pleading as a postconviction petition, and a decision not to do so is not reviewable for error. The legislature did not intend to exclude the weight of byproducts produced during the manufacture of methamphetamine from the total weight used in determining sentence for methamphetamine manufacture. (FREEMAN, THOMAS, and THEIS, concurring; KARMEIER, KILBRIDE, and GARMAN, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted of arson and aggravated arson. Evidence showed that Defendant deliberately set fire to a building's second-floor wooden landing in high winds, and the fire spread to a nearby building across the alley. Fire marshal testified that it was "absolutely" "a possibility" that the initial fire spread to the other building; thus no basis for jury to have acquitted him of aggravated arson but found him guilty of criminal damage to property, and Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense. State failed to present sufficient evidence that the secondary building was owned by someone other than Defendant, and death certificate from eight months prior to fire, listing decedent's address, was insufficient to prove arson as to that building. Defendant failed to meet his burden to prove that jury was biased against him by court's failure to question jurors about the principle that failure to testify could not be held against him. (CAHILL, concurring; GARCIA, specially concurring.)