Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault, and petitioned the court, under Section 116-3 of Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure, to conduct fingerprint or forensic testing. Court denied petition, finding that evidence had already been subjected to adequate DNA testing. Court properly denied petition, as Defendant failed to show how Y-STR DNA testing would have the potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to his assertion of actual evidence, as Y-STR testing cannot establish who the singular contributor of a crime scene source is, and is not as compelling as an STR profile. Defendant failed to satisfy requirement of Section 116-3 that the tests requested in the petition were not scientifically available at time of trial; the tests Defendant requested on appeal and those requested in original motion had all been judicially recognized as generally accepted by relevant scientific community at time of trial. (TOOMIN and LAVIN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of 11 counts of criminal sexual assault, and argued that his conviction must be reversed because current State's Attorney's extrajudicial statements about the case deprived him of a fair trial, and a special prosecutor should have been appointed. Statements made by State's Attorney during his election campaign, in public appearance and on his website, were directed entirely at his predecessor's alleged errors in drafting search warrant as to Defendant, and no evidence was presented that State's Attorney personally instigated the case or was involved in it to extent that he exceeded his role as prosecutor. Thus, statements did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial and did not create appearance of impropriety sufficient to compel that special prosecutor be appointed. (JORGENSEN and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of reckless homicide and four counts of failing to report an accident involving injury or death, arising from traffic accident where Defendant was charged with driving 91 to 95 mph on a residential street of 30 mph limit. 19-year-old driver of other vehicle was killed. Defendant was sentenced to nine years and five years concurrently; and nine years for reckless homicide conviction; and court ordered that Defendant was to serve 85% of that sentence. State failed to present evidence on, and jury was not instructed on, charge of failure to report accident within one-half hour, thus convictions reversed and convictions instead entered as to lesser included offense. All four convictions of leaving the scene arose from a single physical act, despite the number of persons killed or injured in collision, thus violating one-act, one-crime rule. Court lacked authority to order Defendant to serve 85% of his reckless homicide sentence. (BURKE, concurring; HUDSON, dissenting.)