Criminal Law

Court complied with Rule 431(b) in explaining Zehr principles to jurors divided into 3 groups, and describing "basic concepts of criminal law", and giving them opportunity to voice questions or objections. Court's questions about whether anyone had prior knowledge about the case prior to questioning the venire did not involve lapse of time so egregious that it violated Rule 431(b). (WELCH and STEWART, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Illinois State Police forensic analyst gave testimony relying upon DNA report prepared by nontestifying third-party analyst. ISP forensic analyst's testimony as to DNA report was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted and was thus not hearsay. Instead, analyst disclosed the underlying facts from the DNA report for the limited purpose of explaining the basis for her opinion, which included her own analysis and observations, on the critical issue of whether there was a DNA match between Defendant's blood sample and semen sample recovered from victim. Aggravated kidnapping sentence of 60 years can properly run consecutive to two natural life sentences for two convictions of aggravated sexual assault. (THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, and KARMEIER, concurring; FREEMAN, specially concurring; BURKE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Defendant was originally charged with reckless homicide, then charge was vacated and he was subsequently charged with aggravated DUI in causing death of driver of other vehicle by running red light. Aggravated DUI charge was not "new and additional" for speedy-trial purposes; original and subsequent indictment alleged the same conduct, and thus original indictment gave Defendant notice of the material allegations in subsequent indictment. (FITZGERALD, FREEMAN, THOMAS KARMEIER, and BURKE, concurring; GARMAN, specially concurring.)

(Court opinion of 5/6/10 withdrawn.) Defendant, convicted of attempted murder of a peace officer and aggravated battery of a peace officer, was denied right to fair trial when State improperly shifted burden of proof by repeatedly referring, during closing argument, to Defendant's failure to testify at trial. Jury should have been given instruction as to lesser-included-offense of reckless conduct, as evidence could rationally be used to support conviction of this lesser offense.

(Court opinion corrected 7/6/2010.) Court erred in asking panels of jurors a general question about Zehr principles which had been described earlier, with voir dire on a variety of subjects in intervening time, thus did not provide jurors with opportunity to respond to specific questions about principles; but Defendant did not present evidence of bias to rebut presumption that jurors followed instructions. Because he did not testify, Defendant forfeited argument that court erred in not ruling on his motion in limine as to admissibility of prior convictions. Defendant is entitled to presentencing credit for date of sentencing. (MURPHY and COLEMAN, concurring.)

Defendant failed to establish prejudice by incompleteness of record on appeal, where transcript of jury selection was missing due to court reporter's lost notes, and presentence investigation report was missing. Prosecutor's comments in closing argument suggesting that State's witnesses were afraid of Defendant yet fulfilled their duty as citizens, and that offense was gang-related, and describing Defendant as an animal, did not deprive Defendant of fair trial. Comments were not expression of personal belief in witnesses' veracity, were isolated and not highly inflammatory, and evidence was not closely balanced. (HOFFMAN, concurring; CUNNINGHAM, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery. State presented circumstantial evidence that Defendant was responsible for setting a fire which occurred at the victim's home shortly after the battery incident. Evidence was properly admissible other-crimes evidence for the purpose of either describing the chain of events that occurred around the same time as, and at the same location as, the charged crime (the "continuing narrative" exception), or demonstrating that Defendant attempted to destroy evidence as an expression of his consciousness of guilt. Reversal not warranted by court having given limiting instruction after closing arguments rather than at the time the other-crimes evidence was presented. (KNECHT and McCULLOUGH, concurring.)