Criminal Law

Defendant, age 18, entered open plea of guilty to aggravated criminal sexual abuse of his 16-year-old brother who was also cognitively impaired, and he was sentenced to 4 1/2 years in prison. Because he did not raise the claims in his motion to reconsider sentence, under Section 5-8-1(c) of Unified Code of Corrections and Rule 604(d), Defendant forfeited arguments posited on appeal that court erred in considering his mental retardation as aggravating factor, and that information from reviewing psychiatrist's evaluation was obtained in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination. (MYERSCOUGH and McCULLOUGH, concurring.)

Defendant, age 19 at time of incident, was convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, burglary, and concealment of a homicidal death, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Prosecutor's comments in closing argument were supported by evidence, including statements in Defendant's fictional accounts of incident, portions of which were truthful as admitted by Defendant. Brief comments in closing about what was going through the minds of the missing victim's family were cured by court's instruction to disregard remarks. Court has wide latitude in weighing factors in aggravation or mitigation; court specifically discussed evidence in mitigation, including abusive and tumultuous childhood, and did not abuse its discretion in sentencing within statutory requirements. (QUINN and COLEMAN, concurring.)

Court properly quashed a second search warrant, and suppressed evidence; second warrant was executed within 2 hours after execution of first warrant, when no contraband was recovered from Defendant or his car; and second warrant was supported by only a "bare-bones" affidavit that probable cause existed for search of Defendant's apartment, in describing a single drug transaction conducted by Defendant from a car. Court erred in issuing second warrant, as complaint for warrant must give rise to reasonable inference that criminal activity was ongoing in the home itself. Good-faith doctrine does not apply to executing officer when neither judge nor officer could have held objectively reasonable belief in existence of probable cause to search Defendant's apartment. (PATTI, concurring; LAMPKIN, dissenting.)

Three codefendants filed postconviction petitions claiming their sentences for first degree murder and attempted murder were unconstitutionally disparate to sentences of a fourth codefendant, Salgado, whose 50-year sentence was later reduced by 22 years in postconviction proceedings. As petitioners were not bound by Salgado's postconviction proceedings or resentencing proceedings, the mutuality requirement was not satisfied. Petitioners were not prejudiced, and no constitutional violation is established, as a result of State's failure to appeal order erroneously granting Salgado postconviction relief. (FITZGERALD SMITH and HOWSE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and home invasion in death of his ex-girlfriend, and sentenced to 60 years imprisonment. Defendant contended that his sentence should be vacated because court erred in denying his motion to strike State's notice of intent to seek death penalty, not filed until 247 days after his arraignment. Defendant's claim is not moot, because if court had found he was not death eligible, maximum sentence was 60 years, and judge might have sentenced him to less than maximum. Claim not barred by laches, as defendant filed motion to strike prior to start of trial and prior to hearing on death penalty eligibility. Supreme Court Rule 216(c) imposes mandatory obligation on State to notify defendants within 120 days of arraignment whether it intends to seek death penalty. However, because there are cases where a defendant's rights are not injured by State's failure to timely file notice of intent, the presumption of a directory, rather than mandatory, reading of Rule 416(c) is not overcome, and lack of timely filing does not automatically require court to strike State's notice. (MURPHY and COLEMAN, concurring.)

Defendant convicted of unlawful possession of weapon by felon, and claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move to suppress video of inside of his home taken by confidential informant wearing buttonhole camera during controlled purchase of narcotics from Defendant. Defendant had no constitutionally protected privacy interest in any activity that informant viewed in his home, including Defendant's possession of a handgun, thus motion to suppress would have failed and counsel was not ineffective. Search warrant was not facially deficient, as it included admissions against interest by informant, and that informant had seen narcotic bills inside Defendant's home, and that he had firsthand knowledge of Defendant's possession of pills; thus, no prejudice to Defendant when counsel failed to challenge it. (STEIGMANN, concurring; APPLETON, dissenting.)

Defendant pled guilty to first degree murder, sentenced to 33 years imprisonment and ordered to pay DNA analysis of $200. Defendant appealed $200 fee, arguing that he already had a DNA sample on file, so court was without authority to order DNA sample or to impose fee. Section 5-4-3 of Unified Code of Corrections requires that a person convicted of a qualifying offense submit specimen and pay $200 analysis fee. Statute does not excuse payment of fee for a defendant whose DNA is already in the database; statute provides a process for expungement of DNA from database; statute cannot be interpreted to mean that a person cannot be required to give DNA sample and to pay $200 fine more than once. (HOLDRIDGE and O'BRIEN, concurring.)