Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from a trial court order finding that defendant’s continued pre-trial detention was necessary under the Pre-Trial Fairness Act. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion where the defendant was charged with criminal sexual abuse and where the trial court concluded based on the facts of the case that continued detention was necessary to avoid the specific real and present threat to the safety of a specific person. (MOORE and BARBERIS, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of theft and possession of a stolen firearm and sentenced to five years in prison on each count, to be served concurrently. On appeal he argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress inculpatory statements elicited by law enforcement after counsel was appointed, the State failed to prove him guilty of theft beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the trial court’s order of restitution was improper because it was based on insufficient evidence. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that trial counsel was not ineffective where a motion to suppress would have been without merit and that a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the appellate court found that the trial court erred in the amount awarded in restitution because it did not evaluate the actual costs incurred by the victim, including the fair market value of the items taken but not returned. (TURNER and KNECHT, concurring)

Defendant appealed from a trial court order denying him pretrial release, arguing that the trial court erred when it found that the Pretrial Fairness Act applied to him when he had been ordered to be released on bond prior to the effective date of the Act, that the circuit court erred when it held the State’s petition to deny pretrial release was timely, and that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying pretrial release. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the State may petition for denial of pretrial release for defendants who were ordered released on bond but who were still detained at the time the Act went into effect. The appellate court also found that the State’s petition was timely although it was filed earlier than required under the Act and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant be released prior to trial. (LYLE and NAVARRO, concurring)

Defendant pled guilty to possession with the intent to deliver methamphetamine and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because trial court had a conflict of interest during post-plea proceedings, that defense counsel failed to comply with SCR 604(d), and that the trial court failed to comply with SCR 45. The appellate court vacated the circuit court’s judgment regarding SCR 604(d) compliance and remanded, finding that while there was a facially valid 604(d) certificate, the record established that counsel did not actually fulfill her obligations under the rule. (HARRIS and STEIGMANN, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of criminal sexual assault of a child and sexual exploitation of a child and was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 15 years and four years. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied a fair trial because of the improper admission of other criminal conduct or bad acts, that he was denied a fair trial as a result of testimony vouching for the credibility of the victim, and that he was prejudiced by the State’s improper comments during closing argument. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of evidence and that the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument were proper comments on the credibility of a witness. (DeARMOND and ZENOFF, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 90 years in prison. Defendant was granted leave to file a successive post-conviction petition, which was dismissed pursuant to the State’s motion and defendant appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the petition was dismissed on improper grounds at the second stage because the State was allowed to present new evidence to the court that the defendant was not allowed to rebut and remanded for third-stage proceedings. (TURNER and LANNERD, concurring)

Defendant was charged with 16 counts of felony disorderly conduct stemming from a false report that he was a victim of a crime. The state’s attorney dismissed the case, but the defendant was re-indicted after the appointment of a special prosecutor. Defendant ultimately was found guilty of five counts of felony disorderly conduct and sentenced to 30 months’ probation. On appeal, defendant challenged the appointment of the special prosecutor arguing that there was no statutory authority for the appointment of a special prosecutor, that the appointment was vague and overbroad, and that the circuit court erred in denying a motion for a substitution of judge. The appellate court found that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the appointment of the special prosecutor because it was not timely raised. The appellate court also found that defendant’s due process and double jeopardy rights were not violated by the second indictment and found no error committed by the trial court in the conducting of trial, jury selection, admission of evidence, jury instructions, and sentencing. (COGHLAN, concurring and LYLE, dissenting)

The State appealed from an order of the circuit court granting the defendant’s motion to strike an amended petition for detention under the Pre-Trial Fairness Act. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the order granting defendant’s motion to strike because it was not one of the three orders identified by SCR 604 from which the State may bring an interlocutory appeal. (CATES and BARBERIS, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of cannabis trafficking, possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, and possession of cannabis and sentenced to 14 years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel did not move to suppress on the ground that the officer lacked probable cause to search defendant’s semi-trailer. The appellate court affirmed and the supreme court granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. The supreme court affirmed the judgments of the lower court, finding that defendant did not have a meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because a canine alert provided probable cause to search the vehicle. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

The Illinois Supreme Court considered the question of whether the trial court retains jurisdiction under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472 to correct an omission in its written sentencing order to include a term of mandatory supervised release that the trial court had previously informed defendant would be included in the sentence as a matter of law. The Supreme Court held that SCR 472 authorizes the trial court to make such a correction. (NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring. HOLDER WHITE took no part.)