Criminal Law

Defendant was found guilty of felony murder, second degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, two counts of mob action, reckless discharge of a firearm, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. The appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction of aggravated battery with a firearm, vacated the jury’s finding of guilty for reckless discharge of a firearm, and affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences for felony murder and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. The Supreme Court granted defendant’s PLA challenging his remaining convictions and affirmed the appellate court, finding that the State proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of mob action, the mob action properly served as the predicate offense for defendant’s felony murder conviction, the trial court’s exclusion of prior inconsistent statements was harmless error, and that no clear or obvious error occurred when the trial court did not sua sponte remove a juror. (THEIS, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, and ROCHFORD, concurring. O’BRIEN took no part).

Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder of two victims and was sentenced to a mandatory natural life sentence. Defendant sought leave to file a successive post-conviction petition to raise a claim that the State violated Brady by failing to disclose evidence relevant to his defense. The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, finding that defendant could not establish cause for filing a successive post-conviction petitioner where the issue was not raised in his motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition and where it was previously raised in his initial post-conviction petition. (THEIS, NEVILLE, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, and O’BRIEN, concurring. ROCHFORD took no part.)

Appeal involving the question of whether a motion for substitution of judge brought under section 114-5(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure was subject to the common-law rule holding that, when a motion is filed in the trial court but never ruled on, it is presumed to have been abandoned or waived by the movant. The appellate court held that a motion under section 114-5(a) is not subject to the rule but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the common-law rule of abandonment or waiver applies to motions for substitution of judge. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, and ROCHFORD, concurring. O’BRIEN took no part.)

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 40 years in prison. The appellate court, relying on SCR 366(a)(1), vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and re-instated the sentence, finding that the appellate court is without authority to vacate a defendant’s sentence absent a finding of error or abuse of discretion. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, and ROCHFORD, concurring)

Defendant pled guilty to one count of first-degree murder and was sentenced to 25 years in prison. Defendant field a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and the trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, defendant argued that he was denied the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel relating to an additional claim raised by post-conviction counsel. The appellate court affirmed and the supreme court granted defendant’s PLA. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the lower courts, explaining that while post-conviction counsel is required to provide reasonable assistance when adding a claim to a post-conviction petition, defendant failed to rebut the presumption of reasonable assistance raised by post-conviction counsel’s SCR 651(c) certificate. (THEIS, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

Defendant field a pro se post-conviction petition alleging he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during his bench trial for attempted murder when his attorney failed to present evidence of his mental health history in support of his defense. The petition was dismissed by the trial court after second stage proceedings. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a third-stage evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding that the defendant’s petition failed to make a substantial showing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because it was not reasonably likely that defendant’s health history would have changed the outcome of the trial. (THEIS, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, ROCHFORD and O’BRIEN, concurring. NEVILLE took no part)

Defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition alleging that the mandatory 25-year firearm enhancement added to his sentence was unconstitutional as applied to him because he was 18 years old when he committed the offense. The trial court summarily dismissed his petition and the appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, finding that when looking at the factors relating to defendant’s age as well as the circumstances of the offense, defendant’s total sentence of 40 years in prison was not so disproportionate as to “shock the moral sense of the community,” and that the circuit court did not err in summarily dismissing defendant’s petition because it did not have an arguable basis in law. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

Petitioner pled guilty to one count of first degree murder and was sentenced to 40 years in prison. Sixteen years later she filed a petition for a reduced sentence. The trial court denied the petition by finding that petitioner was not entitled to relief under the statute. The appellate court reversed by finding that petitioner was not properly given the opportunity to respond to the State’s motion to dismiss her petition. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the trial court, explaining that any error was harmless as a matter of law because petitioner was not entitled to relief under the statute where she was sentenced pursuant to a fully negotiated plea deal. (THEIS, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, and ROCHFORD, concurring. NEVILLE, dissenting. O’BRIEN took no part.)

Defendant was convicted of two counts of vehicular invasion, two counts of domestic battery, and one count of aggravated domestic battery, and the trial court, after merging two counts, sentenced defendant to 30 years in prison. Defendant argued on appeal that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of vehicular invasion. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the State met its burden where defendant was indicted and convicted on vehicular invasion by reaching and not entering the vehicle and that the reaching into the vehicle, which was simultaneous with a stabbing, met the definition of “force” under the vehicular invasion statute. (BIRKETT and KENNEDY, concurring)

Defendant appealed from a trial court order denying her pretrial release, arguing that the Pretrial Fairness Act does not allow the State to file a responsive verified petition to deny pretrial release in cases where a defendant remains in custody after having been ordered released on the condition of depositing a security. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the State is allowed to file responding petition under the circumstances present in this case and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s petition for pretrial release. (CAVANAGH, concurring and TURNER, specially concurring)