Defendant appealed from a circuit court order denying him pretrial release and argued that the State failed to meet the statutory requirements for detention under the Pre-Trial Fairness Act. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court complied with the requirements of the Act and made all the necessary findings on the record, and, as a result, the appellate court could not conclude that the trial court’s order was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. (STEIGMANN and KNECHT, concurring)
Defendant, who was 18 years old at the time of the offense, was convicted of first-degree murder and appealed challenging the constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s administrative order tolling the speedy trial term during the Covid-19 pandemic and claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court reversed and remanded for resentencing, finding that trial counsel failed to challenge defendant’s sentence as a de facto life sentence and that this deprived defendant of the effective assistance of counsel. (PUCINSKI, concurring and COGHLAN concurring in part and dissenting in part)
Defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated criminal assault and sentenced to 35 years in prison. On appeal, he argued that the State failed to prove him guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault based on the display of a dangerous weapon because the weapon was not displayed during the assault, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence because the arrest was illegal where it was a warrantless arrest based on an investigative alert, and that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing based on the trial court’s comments during sentencing. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant, that the trial court properly denied the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, and that nothing in the trial court’s comments during sentencing indicated the sentence was based on an improper consideration. (MITCHELL and LYLE, concurring)
In prosecution on charge of possession of machinegun, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress Clock component that defendant spit out of his mouth in hospital emergency room while being treated for gunshot wound in his buttocks. Record showed that police officer followed defendant to hospital and discovered from defendant that he had been shot in buttocks during shooting incident to which police had been called. Also, once at hospital, officer waited outside area where defendant was being treated, and hospital personnel discovered that defendant had plastic object in his mouth and believed that said object contained drugs. While defendant argued that plastic object that turned out to be Glock component that was used to convert firearm into fully automatic weapon should be suppressed because hospital personnel acted as agent of police, Ct. of Appeals held that Dist. Ct. could properly conclude that hospital staff, in encouraging defendant to spit out plastic object, acted with purpose of providing medical treatment to defendant. Too, police officer neither induced nor encouraged medical staff to act. As such, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred, where no agency relationship existed between hospital staff and police.
Defendant was found guilty of aggravated battery and first-degree murder and was sentenced to 50 years in prison. On direct appeal, defendant argued that his speedy trial rights were violated and that the trial court erred when it prevented Krankel counsel from presenting additional claims and evidence at the Krankel hearing. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant was tried within the statutory speedy trial period and that the trial court did not prevent Krankel counsel from performing his duties or improperly limit the evidentiary hearing. (WELCH and BARBERIS, concurring)
In prosecution on drug distribution and firearm charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress drugs and firearms seized from defendant’s home and vehicles, where defendant asserted that warrant issued for said seizures lacked probable cause. Ct. of Appeals found warrant application contained sufficient facts to establish probable cause, where application relied on facts discovered through two controlled drug buys between third-party and confidential source that occurred outside defendant’s home, where reasonable inference of facts in warrant application indicated that third-party obtained drugs from plaintiff’s home prior to delivery of drugs to confidential informant. Fact that confidential informant did not enter into defendant’s home during controlled buys did not require different result. Defendant was entitled, though, to vacatur of one of his two unlawful possession of firearm convictions, where defendant possessed simultaneously two firearms that formed basis for both of his convictions.
In prosecution on drug charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress warrantless search of his apartment under circumstances, where: (1) neighbors called police after letting in two individuals seeking access into defendant’s apartment and after hearing gunshots; (2) when police arrived they noticed shell casing outside of defendant’s locked apartment door, as well as two bullet holes in said door; (3) police called for ambulance and unsuccessfully attempted to make contact with anyone inside defendant’s apartment; (4) police gained access to defendant’s apartment by use of sledgehammer; (5) once inside defendant’s apartment, police saw in plain view raw cannabis at issue in defendant’s charged offenses and went to two closets to determine if anyone was injured; (6) search lasted 90 seconds; and (7) police arrested defendant when he arrived at his apartment. Ct. of Appeals found no Fourth Amendment violation, where: (1) police had reasonable basis to believe that someone was injured inside of defendant’s apartment; (2) use of sledgehammer was reasonable; and (3) police were looking for persons who might have been injured or were in need of assistance when they observed raw cannabis. Ct. of Appeals rejected defendant’s contention that exigent circumstances evaporated once police failed to see anyone injured near apartment door.
Defendant was found guilty of attempted first-degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, and possession of a stolen weapon by a felon and sentenced to 33 years in prison. Defendant filed a post-conviction petition arguing actual innocence based on affidavits from newly discovered witnesses. The trial court denied the petition after a third-stage evidentiary hearing and defendant appealed. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court’s decision was not manifestly erroneous after considering the evidence presented at trial and the evidence contained in defendants post-conviction petition. (CAVANAGH and LANNERD, concurring)
Defendant appealed from a trial court order granting the State’s petition to deny release under the SAFE-T Act, arguing that the Act did not allow the State to file a verified petition to deny pretrial release in a case where the defendant remained in custody after having been ordered released on the condition of depositing security. The appellate court vacated the order and remanded with instructions that the defendant, who was arrested prior to the enactment date of the Act, be allowed to elect to stand on the terms of his original pretrial conditions or to file a motion for a hearing under the Act. (WELCH and MOORE, concurring)
Defendant appealed from an order of the trial court granting the State’s petition to deny pretrial release. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that while the language of the revised statute abolished the requirement of posting monetary bail, it did not eliminate the option to post the previously ordered security and that defendant must be given the option to either stand on the terms of his original pretrial conditions or file a motion under the new section 110-5(e). The appellate court noted that its holding was limited to only those defendants similarly situated to the defendant in the appeal, i.e., those defendants who were arrested and detained prior to the Act taking effect. (WELCH and CATES, concurring)
