Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether 20-year-old defendant can assert that his 100-year sentence on murder, attempted murder and home invasion charges is unconstitutional under Illinois Proportionate Penalties Clause of Illinois Constitution. Appellate Court, in affirming defendant’s sentence, found that defendant could not raise such challenge, where defendant was not serving de facto life sentence, because he would be eligible for parole after having served 20 years under section 5/5-4.5-115(b) of Illinois Code of Corrections. This is so, Appellate Court observed, because, regardless of length of imposed sentence, parole provides meaningful opportunity for release within 20 years. (Partial dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether Appellate Court has any authority, upon reversal of trial court’s order dismissing defendant’s post-conviction petition, to direct re-assignment of new circuit court judge to consider matter upon remand “in interest of justice.” Appellate Court invoked Rule 366(a)(5) when making said reassignment, and defendant argued in his petition for leave to appeal that Rule 366(a)(5) applied only to civil appeals. Defendant also maintained that: (1) substitution of circuit court judges could only be made upon proper showing of bias or actual prejudice; and (2) Appellate Court’s decision to substitute circuit court judge was also  improper because it was made without any request to do so by the parties.

This case presents question as to whether defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek reduction in defendant’s 31-year sentence on attempted first degree-murder conviction pursuant to section 8-4(c)(1)(E) of Criminal Code, which allows for said reduction upon showing that defendant was acting under sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation, and that defendant would have negligently or accidentally caused victim’s death had victim died. While Appellate Court found that both prongs for sentence reduction under section 8-4(c)(1)(E) had been met, state argued in its petition for leave to appeal that record showed that defendant was not entitled to said reduction, and thus his trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek said reduction, where defendant intentionally shot unarmed victim and responded disproportionately and non-accidentally during mutual combat with victim. (Partial dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether jury properly convicted defendant of both second-degree murder of one victim and attempted first-degree murder of second victim during incident in which second-degree murder victim confronted defendant, and defendant responded by blindly shooting second-degree murder victim and by shooting attempted-first-degree murder victim/bystander. Appellate Court found that jury had rendered inconsistent verdict that required vacatur of attempted first-degree conviction, where: (1) jury found defendant guilty of second-degree murder for series of shots when defendant’s intent had not changed when shooting both victims; and (2) jury in finding defendant guilty of second-degree murder, necessarily found existence of mitigating factor of unreasonable belief in need for self-defense. In its petition for leave of appeal, State argued that defendant’s convictions for second-degree murder and attempted first-degree attempted murder were not inconsistent, and that evidence of mitigating factors did not negate mental state required for attempted first-degree murder charge.

This case presents question as to whether Illinois Aggravated Unlawful Use of Weapon (AUUW) statute, which prohibits possession of firearm in vehicle without concealed carry license (CCL) violates Second Amendment under Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111. Record showed that defendant was found guilty of AUUW statute arising out of incident, where witness claimed that she was shot by individual in defendant’s vehicle at time when both she and defendant’s vehicle were entering Interstate 290. Appellate Court, in rejecting defendant’s constitutional challenge, held that Bruen did not prohibit State from criminalizing open carry of firearms without individual having CCL that is at issue in instant AUUW statute. Moreover, Appellate Court found that nothing in Bruen suggested that open carry without CCL is protected under Second Amendment.