Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from a trial court order dismissing his post-conviction petition, arguing that his petition made a substantial showing that, as applied to him, the provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections that enabled certain prisoners sentenced after a specific date to apply for parole violated the equal protection clause. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant had waived his constitutional claim when he entered a valid and voluntary guilty plea. (SCHOSTOK and KENNEDY, concurring)

Defendant appealed from the circuit court’s dismissal of his post-conviction petition after a third-stage evidentiary hearing, arguing that the trial court’s dismissal was an error because he made a substantial showing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant did not establish that trial counsel was deficient when he counseled defendant regarding the risk of pursuing an insanity defense at trial instead of pleading guilty but mentally ill. (JORGENSEN and SCHOSTOK, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of driving while his license was revoked and sentenced to eight years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court should have declared a mistrial after erroneously barring his necessity defense and after defendant had testified to driving illegally in reliance on a pretrial ruling that the trial court reconsidered. Defendant also argued that he was prejudiced by improper argument during closing arguments. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction without enhancement, vacated his sentence, and remanded with directions. The appellate court found, in part, that the trial court’s decision to bar the necessity defense during trial based on the facts of the case did not deny defendant a fair trial and, as a result, a mistrial was not warranted. (ALBRECHT, concurring and PETERSON, concurring in part and dissenting in part)

During the pendency of proceedings relating to defendant’s post-conviction petition, the trial court determined that the defendant was “unfit to communicate” with appointed counsel and ordered that the Department of Corrections provide fitness restoration treatment. The Department appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked statutory authority to impose the requirement. The appellate court affirmed and remanded, finding that once a trial court has found a post-conviction petitioner unfit, it is authorized to order the petitioner with fitness-restoration treatment. (JORGENSEN and SCHOSTOK, concurring)

Defendant appealed from the third-stage dismissal of his successive post-conviction petition in which he argued his indeterminate sentence of 200 to 600 years, which resulted from an offense he committed when he was 18 years old, violated the proportionate penalties clause. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court did not properly take into consideration the defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics when it initially sentenced him and that he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing. (DELORT, concurring and NAVARRO, dissenting)

Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated vehicular hijacking and was sentenced to a mandatory term of natural life under the Habitual Criminal Act. Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that counsel was ineffective because he incorrectly argued that the life sentence was discretionary. The trial court denied the motion and defendant appealed. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacated the conviction and sentencing, finding that under the circumstances it would be unjust to hold defendant to his guilty plea where his lawyer was deficient and where the trial court did not correct defendant’s misapprehension of the consequences of a guilty plea. (LAMPKIN and ROCHFORD, concurring)