Defendant appealed from the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that the trial court denied him his right to counsel for post-plea proceedings. The appellate court vacated the trial court’s denial of the motion to withdraw guilty plea and remanded for further proceedings, finding that the trial court failed to properly admonish defendant under SCR 401(a) before accepting a waiver of counsel. (DAVENPORT, concurring and McDADE, specially concurring)
In prosecution on armed robbery and other related charges arising out of robbery of jewelry store, Dist. Ct. did not commit reversible error in allowing defendant’s wife to testify against defendant (on finding that wife was co-participant in charged crimes and thus could not invoke spousal testimonial privilege), where other evidence, including cellphone records, overwhelmingly tied defendant to said robbery and established defendant's guilt as to said charges in absence of wife’s testimony. Also, while other witness testified to hearsay statement implicating defendant via questioning from co-defendant’s counsel regarding attempt to sell proceeds of robbery, defendant’s counsel did not object to said testimony at time it was given. As such, defendant was not entitled to new trial, where record did not otherwise establish any prejudice arising out of said hearsay statement, where there was no subsequent reference to said testimony, and evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming,
Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in imposing as special condition of supervised release on drug distribution charge requirement that defendant undergo sex-offender assessment to determine whether sex-offender treatment is necessary. Presentence Investigation Report indicated that defendant had been convicted in 2010 of misdemeanor offense involving defendant’s sexual assault of his stepdaughter, and defendant essentially did not challenge reliability of information contained in presentence report. Moreover, imposition of said condition promoted Sentencing Commission’s policy goals of deterrence, reliability and protection of public. Also, record did not indicate that defendant had previously received sex-offender assessment or treatment. Ct. rejected defendant’s contention that instant misdemeanor offense was too old to support any present need for rehabilitation or protection of public.
Defendant was found guilty of aggravated driving under the influence of cannabis, resulting in the death of two people, and was sentenced to six years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that section 11-501(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code was facially unconstitutional because it treats individuals who possess a medical cannabis card differently from those who do not possess a card. Defendant also argued that the trial court should have exercised its discretion to impose a sentence other than imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed, finding that section 11-501(a) is not unconstitutional because there is a rational basis for treating the classes differently and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced defendant to prison. (LANNERD and KNECHT, concurring)
Defendant was convicted of being an armed habitual criminal and was sentenced to 11 years in prison. The trial court dismissed defendant’s post-conviction petition and defendant appealed, arguing that post-conviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance by failing to present defendant’s claims in the appropriate legal form failing to overcome routine defenses to procedural bars, abandoning claims, failing to provide documentation for claims, and generally misunderstanding post-conviction proceedings. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. (C.A. WALKER and TAILOR, concurring)
Defendant was found guilty of three counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and was sentenced to three consecutive terms of 78 months in prison. The appellate court vacated two of defendant’s convictions on direct appeal and later the trial court vacated the final conviction on the basis that it was unconstitutional pursuant to a Supreme Court case. Defendant filed a petition for a certificate of actual innocence, which the trial court denied, and defendant appealed. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant did not meet his statutory burden of proving innocence by a preponderance of the evidence on all offenses charged in his indictment, including those charges that were nol-prossed by the State. (HOWSE and ELLIS, concurring)
Defendant appealed from the circuit court order dismissing his post-conviction petition for relief in which he argued that section 5-4.5-115(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections violated equal protection because it “arbitrarily” limited the opportunity for parole for individuals sentenced after a certain date. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act did not recognize defendant’s claim as a basis for relief and that, even if it did, section 5-4.5-115(b) did not violate equal protection. (HUTCHINSON and JORGENSEN, concurring)
Defendant was convicted of two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and was sentenced to a total of 14 years in prison. On direct appeal, he argued that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the late disclosure of an expert opinion, that one of his convictions must be vacated for violating one-act, one-crime principles, and that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause. The appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction on one count, finding that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his conviction, and vacated the remaining conviction and remanded for a new trial on the basis that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. (McLAREN and JORGENSEN, concurring)
Defendant was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and sentenced to seven and a half years in prison. On appeal, he argued the sufficiency of the evidence. He also challenged the length of his sentence, arguing that the trial court engaged in an impermissible double enhancement of his sentence when it used his prior conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon both as an element of the offense and to impose a higher sentence. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction and that the sentence was authorized by the language of the statute. (MIKVA, concurring and C.A. WALKER, specially concurring)
Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions on charges of conspiracy to distribute unlawful drugs and distribution of unlawful drugs, where record showed that defendant provided logistical assistance while another individual sold drugs from secret compartment on empty bus. Ct. of Appeals rejected defendant’s claim that although he may have known that bus contained unspecified contraband, he was unaware that said contraband was unlawful drugs. Dist. Ct. also did not err in denying defendant’s motion for new trial based on contents of four notes that individual jurors gave to Dist. Ct. during trial that suggested that jurors were deliberating on charged offenses prematurely. Record showed that questions pertained to substantive commentary on evidence already admitted, and that Dist. Ct. consistently told jury that it could not comment on said evidence, and that jurors were forbidden from deliberating on charges until close of evidence. While Dist. Ct. and government conceded during trial that jurors’ questions may have suggested that jurors were deliberating during trial, record also suggested possible alternative explanation that jurors were merely confused, and thus there was no overwhelming case of jury’s premature deliberations to support motion for new trial.
