Defendant appealed from a trial court order revoking his probation, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing inadmissible hearsay evidence at the probation revocation hearing and by considering that evidence in its determination. The appellate court dismissed the appeal as moot because defendant had already completed the terms of his imprisonment. (ODEN JOHNSON and TAILOR, concurring)
Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that police lacked probable cause when they searched his vehicle, that the trial court erred when it permitted a witness to testify regarding defendant’s intent, that the State failed to prove he had the intent to deliver, and that his sentence was an abuse of discretion. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the smell of cannabis was sufficient to form the basis for probable cause to search the vehicle and that the trial court did not err in the admission of evidence or in the imposition of a sentence. (McLAREN, concurring and JORGENSEN, specially concurring)
Defendant pled guilty to three counts of aggravated battery to a child and was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 20 years, 20 years, and 5 years. On direct appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to admonish him of the terms of his negotiated plea pursuant to SCR 402(a) and that post-plea counsel did not comply with SCR 604(d). The appellate court disagreed and affirmed, finding that the trial court complied with Rule 402 and that the record did not support defendant’s contentions that the Rule 504(d) certification was false. (KNECHT, concurring and LANNERD, specially concurring)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s petition for post-judgment relief under 735 ILCS section 2-1401 that challenged his 40-year sentence on murder charge because, according to defendant, said sentence was unconstitutional as de facto life sentence under circumstances where he was only 20 years old at time of charged offense. Record showed that defendant had pleaded guilty to said offense, and Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, held that trial court’s failure to recharacterize defendant’s petition as petition for post-conviction relief was not reviewable, and that defendant had waived instant sentencing issue, where, pursuant to terms of guilty plea, defendant had waived all constitutional errors.
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly dismissed at first stage defendant’s pro se petition for post-conviction relief that challenged his mandatory life sentence on first-degree murder charges, even though defendant asserted that his sentence was unconstitutional as applied to him, where: (1) he was found guilty on five counts of first degree murder; (2) he was 22 years old at time of charged offenses; and (3) trial court did not properly consider his youth and immaturity at time he committed said offenses. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, rejected defendant’s claim that his post-conviction petition alleged sufficient gist of constitutional claim that rationale of U.S. Supreme Court decision in Miller, 567 U.S. 460, should be applied to him as 22-year-old, so as to allow his petition to proceed to its merits. App. Ct. further observed that statute mandating life sentence for instant multiple murders for individuals over 21 years old did not shock moral sense of community. (Dissent filed.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s petition for relief under section 2-1401 Code of Civil Procedure, where defendant alleged that his natural life sentence for his Class X armed robbery conviction violated proportionate penalties clause of Ill Constitution because identical offense of armed violence predicated on robbery with Category III weapon is punished less severely than his armed robbery conviction. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found no proportionate penalties clause violation under identical elements test, because generally broader class of dangerous weapons under armed robbery statute was distinct from specific statutorily defied list of dangerous weapons under armed violence statute.
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to reconsider his 9-year sentence on driving with revoked license charge that was imposed under section 5-4.5-95(b) of Code of Corrections, where said sentence was based, in part, on finding that defendant was Class X offender, and where trial court had failed to apply amendment to section 5-4.5-95(b), which made said section inapplicable to defendant’s case and which took effect after date of original sentence, but was in effect at time of trial court’s ruling on motion to reconsider sentence. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that amendment was inapplicable to defendant’s case, where defendant was originally sentenced well before July 2021 amendment to section 5-4.5-95(b) became effective.
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly dismissed at first stage of proceedings defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief, where, according to defendant, trial court had failed to rule on said petition within 90 days of when petition had been filed and docketed, and where defendant asserted that his petition sufficiently alleged Brady violation, as well as ineffective assistance of counsel and actual innocence claims. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, held that trial court entered dismissal order within 90 days of filing and docketing of said petition, where ruling came within 90 days of defendant’s payment of docketing fee. Also, trial court properly dismissed alleged Brady violation, where defendant failed to allege facts to support claim that State had offered two witnesses favorable deals in exchange for their testimonies. Appellate Court further found that: (1) defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was properly dismissed, where defendant’s allegations of counsel’s shortcomings would not have altered outcome of trial: and (2) dismissal of defendant’s actual innocence claim was proper where proposed new evidence would not have altered outcome of trial.
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s motion seeking leave to file successive petition for post-conviction relief that made claim that defendant was actually innocent of murder charges, and that his mandatory life sentence was unconstitutional, because he was only 21 years old at time of charged offenses. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, held that: (1) defendant could not establish colorable claim of actual innocence based on affidavit of witness who claimed that someone else had committed murders, since defendant had failed to demonstrate that said affidavit constituted “new evidence” that he could not have discovered prior to trial; and (2) defendant’s proportionate penalties clause claim regarding his life sentence fails because, at age 21, defendant was not “young adult offender.” for purposes of advancing claim under Miller, 567 U.S. 460, and because defendant failed to establish cause and prejudice warranting leave to file successive post-conviction petition.
This case presents question as to whether Appellate Court properly declined to consider strength of evidence supporting defendant’s guilt on murder charge, after finding that defendant was entitled to new trial, where trial court had improperly failed to give defendant’s proposed jury instruction that would have told jury that person who did not initially provoke use of force against said person has no duty to attempt to escape danger before using force against said aggressor. In its petition for leave to appeal, State argued that Appellate Court should have considered strength of State’s case against defendant and used harmless error analysis to uphold defendant’s murder conviction.