Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from the trial court’s denial of her motion to withdraw guilty plea and to vacate the judgment. On appeal, she argued that the mental health court committed plain error when it failed to admonish her in accordance with SCR 402 and that defendant’s post-plea attorney had a conflict of interest in arguing her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. The appellate court rejected the first argument, finding that the mental health court was not required to substantially comply with Rule 402 at the hearing where it accepted the parties’ agreement to modify the sentencing terms of defendant’s plea. But the appellate court found that defense counsel was operating under and actual conflict of interest when he represented defendant in both agreeing to a modified sentence and in moving to withdraw that agreement. The appellate court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for the appointment of conflict-free counsel and new post-plea proceedings. (HUTCHINSON and BIRKETT, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and defendant appealed, arguing that the FOID Card Act and Concealed Carry Act are unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The appellate court affirmed, finding that as a “shall-issue” state, Illinois conforms to the requirements of the Second Amendment and does not restrict law-abiding citizens from possessing firearms in a manner that would be unconstitutional. (REYES and LAMPKIN, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and sentenced to two years’ probation. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion to quash and suppress because the police lacked probable cause to search her vehicle and that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that she constructively possessed the gun recovered from her car. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle when narcotics were in plain view and that a rational trier of fact could conclude that defendant had knowledge of the presence of a gun in her locked glove compartment. (FITZGERALD SMITH and ELLIS, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of being an armed habitual criminal and sentenced to eight years. On appeal, defendant argued the sufficiency of the evidence and that the armed habitual criminal statute was unconstitutional as it applied to him because it violated the Second Amendment. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction even though it was contradictory and that the statute did not violate the constitution because the legislature’s ability to impose status-based restrictions disqualifying certain categories of people from possessing firearms is consistent with the national historical tradition of firearm regulation. (LAVIN and COGHLAN, concurring)

Defendant appealed from his conviction for two counts of threatening a public official. On appeal, defendant argued that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because probation officers are not public officials, that his due process rights were violated when the trial court handcuffed him during the discharge hearing, and that the State failed to lay proper foundation for admission of documents under the business records exception to hearsay. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the probation officers were public officials under the language of the statute, that the trial court erred when it did not conduct a hearing before using restraints but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of evidence. (BIRKETT and KENNEDY, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant's motion for a new trial because his trial counsel failed to complete his MCLE requirements. The appellate court affirmed, observing that a failure to comply with MCLE does not mean that an attorney is incapable of providing adequate representation and that admission to the bar is the proper indicator of an attorney’s fitness to practice law, not completion of continuing education requirements. (LYLE and NAVARRO, concurring)

Petitioner appealed from an order of the trial court denying him leave to file a successive post-conviction petition. On appeal, defendant argued that he made a prima facie showing of both cause and prejudice for having failed to raise his constitutional claims in his initial post-conviction petitioner. The appellate court disagreed, finding that there was no basis in recent amendments of the Criminal Code for defendant to obtain the relief requested under the post-conviction hearing act. (ROCHFORD and MARTIN, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of burglary and possession of burglary tools and sentenced to concurrent sentences of three and two years, respectively. The issue on appeal was whether officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant based on the fact that he was running in the rain while holding the front of his pocket. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the appellate and trial courts, finding that under these facts the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. (NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD and O’BRIEN, concurring)