Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants provided plaintiff with constitutionally inadequate medical care, where basis for said ruling was finding that plaintiff had not exhausted internal administrative remedies prior to filing instant lawsuit. While plaintiff had filed one grievance two days late, plaintiff established good cause for said delay, where delay was caused by prison library’s failure to make timely copies of said grievances. Also, with respect to second grievance, record did not support Dist. Ct.’s finding that plaintiff was not credible in his contention that he had not timely received prison’s response to his grievance, and defendants provided no evidence that they had timely transmitted to plaintiff any response to said grievance. As such, defendants failed in their burden to show that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and plaintiff was entitled to have his grievances be heard on their merits.

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering judgment in favor of defendants in action under section 1610(a) and (g) of Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), as well as section 210 of Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), seeking to execute $71.5 million default judgment against Iran for its role in terrorist bomb attack in Jerusalem. Three of four collections of Persian antiquities that were subject of instant lawsuit and were held by University of Chicago and Chicago’s Field Museum of Natural History could not be subject to any execution order since they were either no longer in U.S. or were no longer owned by Iran. As to fourth collection, section 1610(a) of FSIA could not be used to support execution order since that section permits execution only under circumstances where foreign state itself has used said property for commercial purposes in U.S., and Iran’s act of loaning collection did not qualify as commercial use of said property. Also, Ct. rejected plaintiffs’ argument that section 1610(g) represented free-standing exception to execution immunity for terrorist-related judgments, and thus plaintiff still had to satisfy immunity exception requirements set forth in section 1610(a). Ct. further found that section 201 of TRIA could not be used by plaintiffs since instant collection had not been blocked for execution by existing execution order. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants subjected him to false arrest and unlawful searches and seizures that resulted in multiple counts of animal cruelty and neglect charges to which plaintiff had been found not guilty. Plaintiff adequately alleged that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him on animal cruelty charges, where he merely showed up to animal control with two dogs that had problems with aggression or had been sick from whelping puppies, but who otherwise showed no signs of abuse or neglect. Moreover, because plaintiff stated adequate claim for false arrest, his related claim that defendants subjected him to illegal searches of his person, vehicle and business could go forward. Fact that plaintiff did not raise issue with respect to search of his vehicle until he identified issue in his amended complaint that was filed after applicable two-year limitations period had elapsed did not require different result, since said allegation related back to original, timely complaint, where said claim sufficiently related to search and seizure issues raised in original complaint.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support Dist. Ct.’s imposition of discovery sanctions against plaintiff, where defendant presented evidence that plaintiff had withdrawn more than $300,000 in funds from account in period of time both before and after show-cause hearing in which plaintiff claimed he had no funds to pay prior sanctions award of $261,025.11 that had been entered jointly and severally against plaintiff and two other individuals. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that defendant should have submitted said evidence at earlier hearing, where record showed that plaintiff had taken steps to hamper defendant’s ability to obtain said evidence. Moreover, amount of discovery sanction ($47,000+) was not unreasonable, where award was related to defendant’s overall attempt to collect on $261,025.11 sanctions order and to plaintiff’s attempts to hide his assets. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in entering additional $65,263 sanctions order arising out of Dist. Ct.’s finding that plaintiff was in civil contempt arising out of plaintiff’s failure to pay $261,025.11 sanctions order. Instant $65,263 sanction should have been viewed as criminal contempt, where it was issued to punish plaintiff, rather than to compensate defendant, and Dist. Ct.’s failure to use procedures required to impose criminal contempt required that matter be remanded for new hearing.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s action alleging that certain private citizen defendants discriminated against him on account of his anxiety disability in violation of Fair Housing Act (FHA) by intentionally attempting to remove personal property from plaintiff’s real estate. Under FHA, plaintiff had to assert that said property was removed because of his disability, and allegations in complaint suggested that defendants were motivated to remove said property only because of belief that plaintiff had refused to return property that belonged to them. Dist. Ct. also did not err in granting motion for summary judgment filed by both private citizen and public official defendants in plaintiff‘s similar 1983 action alleging 4th Amendment violation arising out of said removal of property, where plaintiff had failed to show that private citizen defendants were either acting under color of law for purposes of section 1983 action or had made agreement with public official defendants (police officials who supervised property removal) to unconstitutionally deprive plaintiff of his property, since record showed that said police officials were unaware at time of property removal that private citizen defendants had failed to obtain court order allowing them to summarily take said disputed property.

In plaintiff-prisoner’s action alleging that defendant-prison warden violated Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) when he confiscated plaintiff’s “pentacle medallion” used by plaintiff to observe his Wiccan religion, Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff’s request for issuance of preliminary injunction seeking return of said medallion. Instant medallion was small enough, when worn around neck, to comply with prison regulations regarding wearing of jewelry, and RLUIPA prohibits govt. from imposing substantial burden on plaintiff’s religious exercise, where, as here, plaintiff claimed that wearing said medallion would protect him from “harm, evil entities and negative energy.” Moreover, record failed to support defendant’s claim that seizure of medallion was necessary to protect plaintiff from gang-related violence, where there was no showing that other inmates would see medallion that plaintiff had agreed to wear under his shirt. Ct. also rejected Dist. Ct.’s observation that seizure of medallion was harmless act because plaintiff had other means to observe his religion.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-Highway Authority’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s putative class action under section 1983 alleging that defendant’s imposition of fines for plaintiff’s failure to pay toll on defendant’s toll-way violated plaintiff’s due process and equal protection rights. Plaintiff-Ohio resident failed to pay tolls on three occasions during same trip by going through transponder-dedicated lanes without having transponder, and defendant otherwise provided plaintiff with sufficient due process by providing plaintiff with written notice of toll violations that conveyed right to hearing and also offered plaintiff 7-day grace period during which plaintiff could pay missed tolls without incurring $20 per violation fine. Plaintiff’s complaint that toll-way signage was confusing and did not give sufficient notice of how toll system worked did not rise to level of constitutional violation, since instant procedures were set forth in either statutes or regulations, and onus was on plaintiff to inform himself of said statutes/regulations. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that instant hearing would not have given him meaningful opportunity to be heard since he could not have presented defense that he was unaware of any violation at time it was committed, since: (1) due process does not entitle plaintiff to hearing at which he would succeed; and (2) defendant could have presented other defenses to instant violations.

Dist. Ct. did not err in de-certifying class action in section 1983 action in which plaintiffs-current and former detainees of defendants’ jail alleged that poor level of dental care rendered by defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference to their medical needs in violation of their 8^th and 14^th Amendment rights. Dist. Ct. could properly conclude that plaintiffs had not presented any common questions of fact of law for purposes of certifying class action under Rule 23(a)(2), where: (1) after hearing evidence on plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief, Dist. Ct. found that plaintiffs’ individual claims represented, at best, isolated instances of indifference to particular inmate’s medical needs; and (2) plaintiffs who testified at hearing presented different situations that involved different types of dental pain, which took place at different times and involved different medical professionals and prison staff, as well as different alleged deficiencies in treatment processes. Moreover, resolution of plaintiffs’ proposed common questions of fact, that concerned defendants’ failure to require face-to-face evaluation from registered nurse within 24 hours, as well as defendants’ failure to provide timely return to clinic appointments, necessarily depended on variety of individual circumstances that precluded class action treatment and did not point to systematic deficiency that would lead to finding that all inmates were effectively denied treatment.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed defendants’ appeal of Dist. Ct. judgment of foreclosure on defendants’ home, after Dist. Ct. found that defendants had defaulted on residential mortgage note and ordered that defendants’ home be subject to sheriff’s auction after time for redemption by defendants had expired. Under Townsend, 793 F.3d 771, Dist. Ct.’s order was not final and appealable judgment, where, at time of said order, defendants retained statutory right to redeem their home prior to any judicial sale, and where judicial sale was subject to future judicial proceeding. Fact that plaintiff’s recovery would be limited to proceeds of sheriff’s foreclosure sale, or that instant foreclosure order would be final and appealable under Wisc. state law, did not require different result.