Federal Civil Practice

Ct. of Appeals granted plaintiff’s counsel’s petition for rehearing after having found that Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s request to sanction said attorney for having filed instant case in Arkansas state court, which required defendant to remove said case to federal court, and then to transfer case to Western District of Wisconsin. While plaintiff’s counsel argued that said sanction ($34,575.80) could not be imposed under 28 USC section 1927 (as found by Ct. of Appeals in its original opinion), since any misconduct in filing instant action (that had no Arkansas-resident plaintiffs and required Arkansas state court to apply Wisc. state law) in Arkansas state court occurred before instant case “appeared in federal court’s docket,” Ct. of Appeals found that sanctions were nevertheless appropriate under its inherent authority, where plaintiff’s counsel pursued bad-faith litigation strategy by initiating instant case in patently inappropriate forum.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-Deputy Sheriffs’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff-tenant’s 4^th Amendment rights when they entered plaintiff’s apartment and evicted her based on eviction order that no longer applied, where plaintiff had previously been evicted based on said order, but was allowed to return to her apartment. Record showed that plaintiff obtained court order less than week after second eviction that allowed her to return to instant apartment until landlord obtained second eviction order, and defendants could not rely on quasi-judicial immunity since they entered plaintiff’s apartment without valid eviction order. Fact that clerk had re-stamped more recent date on initial eviction order did not allow defendants ability to claim quasi-judicial immunity, where clerk played no role in issuance of eviction order. Dist. Ct., though, did not err in granting defendant-landlord’s motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, since plaintiff failed to show that landlord knew that its attempt to evict plaintiff (who had otherwise failed to pay rent for long period of time) was unlawful, especially where landlord had sought legal advice prior to attempting to evict plaintiff.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant’s appeal of Dist. Ct.'s order denying defendant’s motion to vacate preliminary injunction and holding defendant in contempt for violating said preliminary injunction arising out of defendant’s alleged retention of defendant’s computer equipment and confidential information after defendant had been terminated. Record showed that plaintiff’s action alleging violations of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Ill. Trade Secrets Act and Ill. Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, was still pending at time defendant filed instant notice of appeal, and thus defendant could appeal contempt finding only if he could appeal issuance of preliminary injunction. However, defendant filed instant notice of appeal more than 30 days following issuance of preliminary injunction, and thus instant appeal was untimely. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that contempt order was appealable because he was also appealing denial of his motion to vacate preliminary injunction, since instant motion to vacate cannot enlarge time to appeal underlying issuance of preliminary injunction.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiffs-casinos in state-court conspiracy and unjust enrichment action alleging that executive (John Johnson) at defendants-horse tracks made promise in 2008 to give Gov. Blagojevich $100,000 campaign contribution in exchange for his signature on 2008 bill to tax largest casinos in Illinois for benefit of Illinois horse racing industry, where jury could credit testimony that: (1) Blagojevich and his long-time aid Lon Monk told Johnson that Blagojevich would trade his signature on 2008 Act for campaign contribution; (2) Johnson agreed to said proposal and gave additional reassurances to give said contribution; and (3) instant proposal and agreement constituted two acts to support alleged conspiracy charge. However, record did not support jury’s finding of RICO conspiracy, where instant one-time bribe agreement failed to establish continuity element of said offense, which required showing that scheme took place over series of acts and over period of time. Fact that 2008 Act would expire in future, and that there was potential for need of future bribe to obtain same benefits in new law was too speculative to support finding of continuity. As such, jury’s finding that plaintiff’s incurred $25,940,000 in damages was sustained, but that finding of treble damages of $77,820,000 under RICO was vacated.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that police had violated his constitutional rights by: (1) stopping car in which he was passenger without probable cause or reasonable suspicion that criminal conduct had recently taken place; (2) placing him under arrest and then placing him in back seat of squad car; and (3) eliciting confession from him that he owned gun found in search of car, where said confession took place in back seat of squad car. Summary judgment was improper with respect to police stopping car since police conceded that they lacked probable cause to stop car on traffic violation and were unaware at time of stop that defendant, who was under suspicion of committing domestic violence offense, was in car. However, summary judgment was proper with respect to portion of section 1983 claim alleging illegal arrest since police had probable cause to arrest defendant once they noticed he was in car, where police had received recent information that defendant had been involved in domestic violence incident. Moreover, search was valid, where driver gave permission to search car, and conditions in back seat of squad car were not so harsh so as to invalidate defendant’s subsequent confession to owning gun that led to instant firearm possession charges that formed basis of defendant’s guilty plea.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing with prejudice plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action against defendants-prison officials, after discovering that plaintiff had failed to disclose existence of $1,400 trust account when filing in forma pauperis petition. Plaintiff successfully obtained in forma pauperis status, after stating that he had only $10 in cash and $726 in his “release” account that could only normally be accessed once he was released from prison. Under 28 USC section 1915(e)(2)(A), Dist. Ct. “shall dismiss” prisoner complaint if it determines that prisoner’s allegation of poverty in his in forma pauperis petition was untrue, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff’s failure to disclose existence of his trust account was deliberate and material lie. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s argument that he was unaware of trust fund balance, where record showed that plaintiff spent $600 from said account two weeks after filing in forma pauperis petition.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff-bank’s motion to voluntarily dismiss its action seeking to foreclose on home mortgage signed by defendants-owners, where said action had been filed under Dist. Ct.’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 USC section 1332(a)(1), and where, although plaintiffs and defendants-owners were citizens of different states, plaintiff’s shared citizenship with defendant-bank that held junior mortgage on said home precluded plaintiff from establishing complete diversity requirement set forth in section 1332(a)(1). While defendants-owners, who had filed third-party complaint in instant action against loan server, argued that case was properly in federal court, because defendant-bank that held junior mortgage was not necessary party under Rule 19(a), Dist. Ct. could properly find that instant lawsuit could not in good conscious and equity proceed without defendant-bank, since Dist Ct. could not afford plaintiff complete relief without presence of defendant-bank in instant lawsuit. Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that alleged violations of federal statutes in their third-party complaint could supply federal-question jurisdiction, where there was no federal question in plaintiff’s state-law foreclosure action.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-warden’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-former prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that warden and other prison officials violated his 8^th Amendment rights by being deliberately indifferent to possibility that he was being held beyond actual release date for his murder conviction, where record showed that plaintiff had served his full sentence by some months at time defendant-record officer supervisor recalculated defendant’s sentence following Prison Review Board’s vacatur of its November 1993 order finding that defendant had violated term of his MSR at time defendant had committed murder. While record showed that certain prison officials held mistaken belief that defendant had violated term of his MSR, which, in turn, had increased length of his sentence, plaintiff had failed to show that warden was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s custody status, where: (1) warden was not responsible for calculating plaintiff’s release date; and (2) warden took steps to refer issue to others, who were responsible for calculating said release date. However, Dist. Ct. erred in granting similar motion for summary judgment filed by defendant-record officer supervisor, where said defendant: (1) failed to review all relevant documents in plaintiff’s master file that could have cleared up misconception that defendant had two additional years added to his sentence; and (2) failed to send relevant documents to others who were investigating issue of plaintiff’s sentence. Also, said defendant’s reliance on previous sentence miscalculation did not constitute step taken to verify its accuracy.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdict in favor of defendants-police officials in section 1983 action alleging that defendants used excessive force when executing search warrant, under circumstances, where plaintiff was injured after one defendant tossed flashbang grenade prior to entering apartment where plaintiff was located. Record showed that defendants were told that occupants of apartment ran drug operation from said premises and carried gun, and jury could properly find that defendant’s use of flashbang grenade was objectively reasonable. Fact that officer who tossed in flash bang grenade might have discovered plaintiff’s presence had he first entered apartment to conduct more thorough inspection did not require different result, and jury could have believed officer’s testimony that it was too dangerous to enter apartment prior to deploying flashbang grenade.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s 4^th Amendment rights by failing to present judge, who issued arrest warrant, with sufficient facts to establish probable cause to support drug delivery charge that was eventually dismissed. Defendant was arrested after police observed him and another individual interact with confidential informant who subsequently told police that he purchased drugs from said men. Moreover, while information contained in standard complaint form concerning factual background for instant drug delivery charge was insufficient to establish probable cause to support issuance of arrest warrant, officer testified that he gave sworn statement to judge that defendant was involved in narcotics transaction that was based on contents of detailed police report that did provide sufficient facts to establish probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest. Fact that officer could not recall all facts that he told judge did not require different result. Moreover, plaintiff could not assert any Monell claim against city itself where he could not establish 4^th Amendment claim against officers.