Federal Civil Practice

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s $1 award on his section 1983 action alleging that defendant-prison official used excessive force during altercation that occurred almost 10 years prior to date of instant lawsuit. While plaintiff argued that he was entitled to more than nominal damages, where defendant had hit him twice on head with walkie-talkie, jury could have properly found that injury was attributable to plaintiff having fallen and hit his head on table, which was not caused by defendant. Ct. also discussed possibility of future rule that would do away with nominal damages and just allow courts to enter awards of court costs and attorney fees, where record established violation of litigant’s legal rights, but no actual damages.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying motion by plaintiffs (unsuccessful primary candidates for Indiana Superior Court judge) to void 2014 general election results for Superior Court judge for purposes of holding special election that would include plaintiffs, along with the successful candidates in 2014 general election, where statute setting forth procedures for holding primary election for Superior Court judge were found to be unconstitutional. While plaintiffs argued that proposed special election was only way to vindicate their constitutional rights, Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiffs’ request for special election was untimely, where plaintiffs filed their request for preliminary injunction only three months prior to 2014 general election and two months after losing in primary election. Moreover, requests for special elections are rarely granted, and in balancing plaintiffs’ right to be on ballot against state’s significant interest in getting on with process of governing after established election cycle is complete, plaintiffs failed to overcome said significant interests, where burden of special election would fall on county judiciary (for having to void elections of 16 judges), other candidates (who would be required to endure expense of second election) and county clerk. Ct. further noted that Indiana had not yet established new procedures for electing Superior Court judges at time of plaintiffs’ request.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in portion of plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s 1^st Amendment rights when they confiscated death certificate of plaintiff’s murder victim that plaintiff had ordered in mail, even though defendants argued that confiscation was appropriate because plaintiff’s receipt of said death certificate posed threat to safety and security of prison. While defendants argued that plaintiff’s receipt of said death certificate would increase tension in prison and decrease chance of plaintiff’s rehabilitation because he would use death certificate as some sort of trophy arising out of his murder conviction, plaintiff argued that he needed death certificate for use in his state-court post-conviction proceedings. Moreover, defendants failed to provide any contrary evidence to support their assumption that plaintiff would use death certificate as trophy.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-civilly committed sex offender’s section 1983 action alleging that state curtailed his liberty by employing staff at its Treatment and Detention facility, who are unable to provide him with appropriate care and treatment that would allow him to be eventually released. While Dist. Ct. held perception that plaintiff’s case was without merit because U.S. Constitution cannot compel defendants to comply with state statutes, plaintiff had 14^th Amendment right to receive treatment for his disorder that led to his civil confinement and to be released when he had improved enough so that he was no longer dangerous. In instant case, dismissal was premature, since record failed to contain evidence that would resolve whether Treatment and Detention facility was providing plaintiff with required licensed professionals who alone have authority to make determination regarding plaintiff’s right to be released.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting petitioner’s request to unseal grand-jury materials regarding grand-jury’s 1942 investigation into Chicago Tribune article that published information regarding U.S. success in cracking Japanese war codes. Petitioners’ request, which was based on desire to generate scholarly article about Tribune article and govt.’s investigation into sources for said article, did not fit within list of acceptable reasons for unsealing grand-jury records as set forth in Rule 6(e)(3)(E). However, Dist. Ct. had inherent powers regarding supervision of grand-jury materials, and Dist. Ct. could grant petitioner’s request even though reason for unsealing grand-jury materials was not included in Rule 6(e)(3)(E) list. Moreover, govt. agreed that Dist Ct. did not abuse its discretion in granting petitioners’ request for reason cited by petitioners. (Dissent filed.)

In section 1983 action alleging that defendant-police officer violated plaintiff’s rights by using excessive force during plaintiff’s arrest, Dist. Ct. did not err in allowing defendant to introduce evidence that: (1) during disputed encounter, plaintiff had threatened to sue defendant and others and had indicated that he had filed prior lawsuits; and (2) certain items were recovered from plaintiff’s home, and that plaintiff was distraught when police had declined his request to attribute said items to plaintiff’s nephew. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that both statements constituted impermissible character evidence under Rule 404(b) and were unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403, where: (1) neither statement violated Rule 404(b) since both statements were introduced to establish what was said and done in critical moments before plaintiff sustained his injuries, and thus were not used to establish any negative propensity inference; and (2) plaintiff failed to establish any prejudice arising out of introduction of either statement into evidence, since there was nothing inherently emotional about telling officers that he had filed prior lawsuits, and jury was not given description of items found by police in plaintiff’s home.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-Indian tribe’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s action alleging that defendant violated Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act (FACTA), when defendant issued plaintiff credit card transaction receipt that contained more than last five digits of his credit card number, as well as his credit card’s expiration date. FACTA could not be applied against defendant, since defendant was entitled to assert tribal sovereign immunity, where: (1) Indian tribes possess common-law immunity from suit traditionally held by sovereign powers, unless Congress clearly and unequivocally registers intent to abrogate tribal immunity; and (2) Congress did not register said abrogation in FACTA, where it did not specifically include Indian tribes in FACTA’s definition of “person.” Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that Indian tribes were included in term “every government” that was contained within definition of “person.” Ct. also noted that, under Spokeo, 135 S. Ct 1540, question remained as to whether plaintiff’s “injury” in instant case was sufficiently concrete to confer standing on him to assert instant alleged violation of FACTA.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant was deliberately indifferent to his leg condition, where plaintiff had scalded his leg after slipping in prison kitchen near pot of boiling water. Plaintiff testified that: (1) he told defendant-director of prison’s medical clinic that he still experienced numbness and pain in his leg, ankle and foot after receiving treatment for over six months; (2) he was willing to spend his own money for treatment from burn specialist; and (3) defendant refused to examine him, told him that “only God” could help him now, and threatened to write disciplinary report if plaintiff continued in his complaints about his leg. As such, plaintiff stated viable 8^th Amendment claim, where: (1) plaintiff’s leg injury, which included potential nerve damage that could result in progressively worse pain and numbness, was sufficiently severe condition for purposes of 8^th Amendment claim; and (2) plaintiff accused defendant of failing to either examine or treat said condition. Moreover, defendant could not threaten disciplinary action arising out of plaintiff’s attempt to seek treatment for his leg condition.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-debt collectors’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs' action alleging that defendants violated FDCPA by making misleading and deceptive statement in allegation in state-court debt collection complaints seeking to collect on plaintiffs' student loans. Ct. agreed with plaintiffs that allegation in state-court complaints that “debt referenced in this suit will be assumed to be valid and correct if not disputed in whole or in part within 30 days from date hereof” was misleading/deceptive as matter of law because, for each plaintiff, time period for “disputing debt” set forth in complaint was shorter than time period provided by law to answer said complaint. Ct. further noted that because defendants used same 30-period to dispute debt in their prior demand letter, unsophisticated consumer might believe that he must dispute debt through procedures set forth in demand letter. Ct. further found that representations made in state-court proceedings were covered under section 1692e of FDCPA.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion to dismiss by five of six defendants in section 1983 action alleging that said defendants (state officials) played role in improper revocation of plaintiff’s license to operate children daycare center, where revocation was based in part on allegations of child abuse and neglect. Said defendants were named parties in plaintiff’s prior lawsuit that was dismissed for failure to state valid cause of action based on same events as alleged in present lawsuit, and litigation in prior lawsuit had resulted in final judgment on merits. Dist. Ct. also did not err in dismissing instant lawsuit with respect to sixth defendant, even though plaintiff alleged that said defendant’s investigation of claim of child neglect against plaintiff led to daycare’s closure, since plaintiff failed to state claim under any constitutional provision or federal statute identified by plaintiff.