Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison medical officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his rupture of his Achilles tendon injury by, among other things, failing to immobilize his foot for 6-week period. Record showed that one defendant was aware of medical necessity to immobilize foot to treat ruptured Achilles tendon and yet failed to order available splint for plaintiff’s foot. As such, genuine issue arose as to whether said defendant’s failure to immobilize foot was non-actionable negligent oversight or was actionable conscious decision to impede plaintiff’s recovery and to prolong his pain. Ct. similarly found existence of triable issue as to whether second defendant’s decision to not order physical therapy in favor of his direction to have plaintiff walk on injured foot amounted to deliberate indifference of plaintiff’s medical condition, where there was no medical evidence to support such direction. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s amended False Claim Act action, alleging that defendant-City made false certifications to HUD that defendant was in compliance with certain federal requirements relating to its reduction of City’s racial housing segregation in order to obtain more than $1 billion in federal housing funds, where, according to plaintiff, defendant had in fact employed zoning and land use policies that increased residential housing segregation. Instant complaint failed to comply with special pleading requirements set forth in Rule 9(b), and plaintiff failed to plead any linkage between statutes at issue in relevant certifications and any particular false certification made by defendant. Ct. also noted that plaintiff failed to allege time, place and method by which alleged misrepresentation was communicated to him.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s initial motion to reopen his case, where: (1) Dist. Ct. had granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action; (2) plaintiff alleged that he did not receive defendant’s summary judgment motion or order granting same; (3) defendant waited over 8 months to file initial motion to reopen case after case had been dismissed; (4) after Dist. Ct. denied initial motion to reopen case, plaintiff failed to file notice of appeal from said order, but filed second motion to reopen case two months after denial of initial motion to reopen case; and (5) after Dist. Ct. denied second motion to reopen case, plaintiff filed instant notice of appeal. Instant appeal was untimely, where defendant had not filed timely notice of appeal from first denial of his motion to reopen case, and where second motion to reopen case did not serve as effective extension of time to appeal denial of first motion to reopen case. Ct. further noted that Appellate Rule 4(a)(6)(B) governs circumstances of instant case, where appellant did not receive timely notice of entry of judgment, but plaintiff failed to comply with said Rule, where, although he learned of original judgment order within 180 days after its entry, he waited approximately three more months (or beyond 180-day period) to ask Dist. Ct. for any sort of relief.

Ct. of Appeals remanded matter back to Dist. Ct. for determination as to whether plaintiff-union’s section 1983 action that challenged plaintiff’s ordinance on First Amendment grounds was moot, where: (1) instant ordinance precluded plaintiff from posting private signs on public way; (2) plaintiff wanted to post derogatory inflatable rat and cat near construction project during its labor dispute with entity using non-union labor at said construction project; and (3) at time Dist. Ct. entered summary judgment in favor of defendant, construction project that led to use of instant signs had been completed and plaintiff was no longer picketing job site. While plaintiff argued that case was not moot since it might use signs at future construction sites, remand was required since record lacked any evidence regarding number of construction projects built with non-union labor in defendant's town and/or number of such projects that were actually planned. Ct. further noted that plaintiff did not seek monetary damages in instant lawsuit, and that defendant had amended instant ordinance and changed definition of “sign”, which could have impact on outcome of instant case. Ct. also observed that should this case remain live controversy, Dist. Ct. should address plaintiff’s argument that defendant had selectively enforced ordinance. (Partial Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-pre-trial detainee’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs with respect to providing delayed treatment for his wrist injury. Dist. Ct. erred in finding that 2008 report authored by U.S. Dept. of Justice regarding its investigation of health care provided by defendants’ Jail was not admissible to prove truth of its findings, since said report was admissible under hearsay exception for civil cases under section 803(8)(A)(iii). Moreover, plaintiff himself proffered sufficient evidence to raise genuine issue of material fact as to whether his injury resulted from systemic gross deficiencies in Jail’s medical care, where plaintiff and Jail staff testified about systemic problems with health care scheduling and recordkeeping that resulted in extensive delay in treatment of plaintiff’s wrist injury. Ct. rejected defendant-Sheriff’s argument that he could not be liable for plaintiff’s injuries since Sheriff’s Dept. was not responsible for plaintiff’s medical care, since Ct. found that there was close relationship between Sheriff’s Dept. and entity providing medical services.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction plaintiff-creditor’s request to have defendant-insurance company in instant citation to discover assets proceeding turnover proceeds from insurance policy that defendant had issued to debtor in order to satisfy debt that debtor-insured owed to creditor. Record showed that defendant denied that it had insurance proceeds that it owed to debtor, and that defendant had same citizenship as plaintiff, which destroyed any diversity jurisdiction between plaintiff and defendant. Moreover, defendant’s response that it had no assets belonging to debtor-insured completed citation to discover assets proceeding, and thus, although plaintiff had ability to maintain separate action against defendant for recovery of any insurance proceeds to extent that plaintiff believed that defendant was not truthful with respect to existence of said proceeds, plaintiff needed to establish subject matter jurisdiction in order to do so, because said action relied upon different facts and law than plaintiff’s underling breach of contract claim against insured that had separate basis of subject matter jurisdiction.

Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss instant case on ground of forum non conveniens in action alleging that defendants were responsible for improper disposal and loss of plaintiff’s personal property located in India during proposed move of said property to Canada. Record showed that plaintiff was citizen of Canada and defendants were Delaware corporations with principal places of business in Illinois and corporate offices in Indiana. As such, defendants were required to show existence of another forum that was available to plaintiff in order to support said dismissal, and defendants were unable to show that India was available forum where, although plaintiff made bare assertion in complaint that defendants participated in joint venture with Indian entity during transaction at issue in complaint, defendants disputed said allegation and did not present any other evidence that would support allegation that they would be subject to jurisdiction in India so as to allow Indian court to resolve instant dispute. Also, Dist. Ct. failed to make any similar analysis with respect to Canada being available forum.

Dist. Ct. erred in approving proposed settlement of shareholder action seeking additional disclosures from corporation regarding details surrounding proposed acquisition of another corporation that would allow shareholders to make more informed decision as to whether to approve or deny said acquisition. Terms of settlement called for corporation to disclose six different facts that played role in proposed acquisition in exchange for shareholder’s attorneys receiving $370,000, and record showed that said supplemental facts either: (1) did not provide information that was not otherwise disclosed in proxy statement; (2) did not concern any material fact regarding acquisition process; or (3) did not provide facts that had material bearing on either cost of acquisition or cost of future formation of combined corporate entity. As such, where disclosed facts did not have any actual significance to shareholders, any award of attorney fees associated with proposed settlement of instant case would be inappropriate. Ct. further suggested that on remand, Dist. Ct. should give consideration to either appointing new class counsel or dismissing instant lawsuit.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials violated his constitutional rights when they arrested him on bogus traffic violation, where plaintiff filed instant lawsuit beyond applicable 2-year statute of limitations period. Record showed that on September 8, 2012, defendant was bound for trial on unlawful gun possession charge that arose out of traffic stop, and plaintiff did not file instant action until April 28, 2015. Moreover, neither equitable estoppel nor equitable tolling applied so as to render plaintiff’s complaint timely, even though plaintiff argued that defendant’s withholding of dash cam video of his arrest prevented him from filing timely lawsuit, since plaintiff still had seven months to file timely action at time he received said video.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants unlawfully arrested plaintiff, after finding that single-recovery rule applied so as to preclude plaintiff from obtaining any damages in instant lawsuit. Record showed that plaintiff had settled prior related state-court action alleging breach of employment contract and emotional distress damages for conduct that occurred following instant arrest, that parties to state court action entered into settlement, which contained stipulation that defendant in that case had paid plaintiff all monies (i.e., $3 million) due and owing to him as result of $3,177,500 judgment previously entered against said defendant, and that trial court vacated and dismissed state-court action pursuant to section 12-183(h) of Code of Civil Procedure due to said stipulation. As such, dismissal of instant action was required under Saichek, 787 N.E. 2d 827, since single-recovery rule precluded plaintiff from obtaining similar damages in instant case due to plaintiff‘s stipulation in prior case, and plaintiff's stipulated in instant matter that there were no other damages at issue in instant case. Also, doctrine of judicial estoppel precluded plaintiff from maintaining in instant action that state-court judgment was not fully satisfied.