Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s False Claims Act lawsuit, alleging that defendant gave bribes and kickbacks to customers who purchased defendant’s medical supplies, which resulted in U.S. govt. making inflated reimbursements for said purchases. Basis for said dismissal was perception that plaintiff’s lawsuit was too similar to prior lawsuit that alleged similar kickback scheme by defendant, so as to preclude plaintiff from being required “original source” of allegations contained in his complaint. Fact that instant complaint contained allegation that different purchaser received kickbacks from defendant did not require different result, where: (1) body of information contained in instant lawsuit did not materially add to publicly disclosed allegations in prior lawsuit; and (2) concept in instant complaint that defendant bribed nursing home facilities to purchase defendant’s products was briefly mentioned in prior lawsuit.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion in instant Anti-Injunction Act claim to enjoin state court from proceeding in defendant’s underlying lawsuit against plaintiff to enforce promissory note and guaranties, even though: (1) defendant had previously filed same claim on note and guaranties in federal court, which had granted plaintiff’s motion to dismiss said claim without prejudice to filing amended federal complaint; (2) instead of filing amended complaint in federal court, defendant filed notice of voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), which was granted by federal court; and (3) state court denied plaintiff’s motion to dismiss said lawsuit even though instant plaintiff had argued that prior federal court’s dismissal with leave to amended complaint precluded state court action on grounds of res judicata. Instant request for injunction was improper under Full Faith and Credit Act, where plaintiff had raised and lost its res judicata argument in state court. Moreover, party seeking injunction under exception to Anti-Injunction Act must show that state court preclusion was clear “beyond peradventure,” and plaintiff could not make such showing where, under Illinois law, federal court’s dismissal without prejudice was not final decision that was subject to res judicata defenses. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that prior voluntary dismissal should have been considered as precluding subsequent state court action, even though plaintiff argued that: (1) instant Rule 41(a) motion to voluntarily dismiss was filed only after federal court had rendered “adverse ruling” that dismissed complaint without prejudice; and (2) under doctrine of springing finality, federal court’s initial dismissal without prejudice to filing amended complaint ripened into final dismissal on merits where defendant had ignored prior federal court’s instruction to file amended complaint.

Ct. of Appeals denied plaintiffs-pro se prisoners’ motion seeking leave to appeal of Dist. Ct.’s denial of their motion for class certification in action alleging that defendants-prison officials violated plaintiffs' 8^th Amendment rights by providing inadequate mental-health services and by permitting overcrowding at state’s prisons. Dist. Ct. denied motion for certification of class on ground that plaintiffs, as pro se prisoners, could not adequately represent proposed class of all current and future prisoners in Wisc. Dept. of Corrections, and Ct. of Appeals denied their petition for leave to appeal, since: (1) instant case did not raise novel issue of law; and (2) Dist. Ct. generally does not abuse its discretion when denying class certification motion raised by pro se litigants. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs’ request for appointment of counsel under Rule 23(g), since: (1) purpose of Rule 23(g) is not to enable pro se plaintiffs to obtain recruited counsel in conjunction with class certification, but rather to ensure that proposed class counsel is adequate; and (2) plaintiffs failed to show that they made any effort to retain counsel for themselves.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed as moot plaintiff’s appeal of order denying her request for preliminary injunction in section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison doctors and probation officers were deliberately indifferent to her need for psychological and hormonal therapy for her gender dysphoria condition by prohibiting her from moving from men’s homeless shelter to her mother’s house and from dressing as woman in public. Record showed that plaintiff was now back in custody on unrelated theft and prostitution charges, and thus could not seek modification of her probation while incarcerated. Moreover, because decision on preliminary injunction has no preclusive effect on decision to issue permanent injunction, there was no need to vacate underlying order denying preliminary injunction upon order becoming moot, and Ct. noted that plaintiff had otherwise waived any right to seek said vacatur.

Dist. Ct. did not err imposing $5,000 sanction on plaintiff’s counsel for misconduct representing plaintiff, where counsel asserted in instant sex discrimination/hostile environment action that plaintiff had been victimized by acts of sexual assault by defendant’s male employees, and where plaintiff denied at her deposition that she had been sexually assaulted by defendant’s employees and asserted that she had not seen or signed instant complaint. While counsel maintained that inclusion of instant false accusation had been oversight on his part and was proofreading error, counsel’s explanation did not inform Dist. Ct. as to how or why counsel falsified instant complaint.

In action seeking to enjoin defendant from publishing certain report regarding urban water agencies, Dist. Ct. erred in entering injunction that purported to reflect terms of settlement of parties, which precluded defendant from mentioning in said report that certain members of advisory committee had sponsored said report, where: (1) said injunction constituted improper prior restraint of speech; and (2) instant injunction contained terms that were not part of parties’ settlement. Fact that there was potential for defendant to violate terms of settlement agreement when he published his report did not require different result since: (1) plaintiff could always seek damages from defendant if violation of settlement agreement occurred; and (2) plaintiff failed to show that subject matter of report concerned matter of national security or other compelling interest that could justify imposition of prior restraint of speech.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s finding that defendants defamed plaintiffs by accusing them of theft and misappropriation of certain religious items/assets that defendants claimed belonged to them. However, Dist. Ct. erred by entering injunction that essentially prohibited defendants from repeating all nine alleged defamatory statements that were contained in jury instructions, where jury was never asked to identify which statements were false and defamatory. Moreover, instant injunction included certain statements that did not correspond to statements plaintiffs had claimed were defamatory. Also, injunction was excessive, since it improperly directed one defendant to take down his website, which would have prevented defendant from posting any non-defamatory messages. As such, Ct. remanded matter to Dist. Ct. to attempt to craft another injunction that was supported by record.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant’s decision to return plaintiff’s application for “FOID” card because plaintiff, as individual who was over 18, but under 21, failed to include signature of parent as required by statute violated plaintiff’s Second Amendment rights. Defendant established sufficient means/ends relationship between instant statute and important governmental interest in protecting public safety, where parent’s signature provided one method of making individualized assessment of applicant’s fitness for possession of firearm, and where parent’s signature on application subjected parent to liability for harm caused by applicant’s firearm ownership, which in turn provided victim with second source of income to pay for said harm. Moreover, instant statute did not impose blanket prohibition gun ownership for 18 to 21 year olds, since plaintiff always had ability to seek review/approval of her application from Director of Ill. State Police in event no parent was willing or statutorily able to sign her application form. Ct., though, did not resolve defendant’s argument that individuals under 21 have no Second Amendment rights.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in action alleging that Indiana statute, which prohibits holders of beer dealer’s permit from selling cooled package liquor, violated plaintiffs’ (gas stations and convenience stores) equal protection rights. Instant statute was constitutional under rational-basis review, where stated goal of statute, i.e. to curb under-aged beer consumption by limiting sale of immediately consumable beer to package liquor stores, was rationally related to legitimate governmental interest, since package liquor stores had stricter regulations that were designed to limit and control distribution of alcohol.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in qui tam action under False Claims Act, alleging that defendants falsely certified that helicopter engine part that was sold to U.S. govt. met applicable standards and that defendants terminated them in retaliation for lodging complaints that said part did not meet applicable standards. Plaintiffs failed to establish knowledge element required for False Claims Act claim, since record failed to contain any evidence that applicable decision-maker believed merits of plaintiffs’ concerns about said helicopter part, and since defendants actually took plaintiffs’ concerns seriously by undergoing two investigations that ultimately did not support plaintiffs’ allegations. Thus, plaintiffs’ failed to show that decision-maker had knowledge that certifications to govt. were false at time they were made. Moreover, fact that govt. continued to accept helicopter part after plaintiffs informed govt. of their concerns indicates that alleged false certifications were immaterial. Plaintiffs also could not prevail on their retaliation claim, where: (1) defendants explained that plaintiffs were terminated because they were insubordinate; and (2) record showed that plaintiffs were actually insubordinate in failing to resume working on said helicopter part in face of multiple direct commands to do so.