Local Government Law

Plaintiff police union filed declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that an activity-points policy used by City to evaluate the performance of its police officers established an unlawful ticket quota in violation of Section 11-1-12 of Illinois Municipal Code. Plain language of section 11-1-12 of Municipal Code prohibits municipalities from including the issuance of citations in a "points of contact" system used to evaluate the job performance of police officers. By granting awards based on points of contact, City's policy may provide incentive for officers to write citations to accumulate as many points as possible. (A. BURKE, GARMAN, KARMEIER, THEIS, NEVILLE, and M. BURKE, concurring.)

Plaintiffs, various elected officials and citizens of Township, filed suit seeking order requiring Democratic nominees to be selected through a primary instead of through the Township caucus process, alleging that the COVID-19 pandemic makes a caucus unsafe. Court properly denied Plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunction, as Plaintiffs failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. Plaintiffs have not shown that they can dictate the method by which a township's political party selects its nominees, or that holding a caucus meeting will violate Plaintiffs' rights. If Defendants choose to proceed with a caucus meeting, trial court is ordered to ensure safety of participants by imposing appropriate restrictions, based on public health guidelines in effect at the time, and Defendants must provide for method of remote participation in the caucus meeting. (HALL and ELLIS, concurring.)

Plaintiff homeowners filed declaratory judgment action to invalidate a 1988 municipal ordinance which Plaintiffs claimed to pave the way for rezoning of property adjacent to their homes from residential to commercial.  Court erred in dismissing complaint as time-barred, based on a 90-day limitations provision in the Municipal Code that governs challenges to municipal zoning “decisions.” Ordinance  unambiguously left the rezoning decision for later, in the hands of the Board of Trustees, should the landowner choose to apply for it. As the 1988 ordinance was not a “decision” to rezone, limitations provision in Municipal Code are inapplicable. Suit is not time-barred. (HOWSE and COBBS, concurring.)

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Defendants violated local zoning ordinances by operating a boarding house and a vehicle parking and storage facility on residential property they owned next door to Plaintiff's property.Court properly granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiff and entered a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from those  activities. Requests to admit established that Defendants were operating a boarding house and used the property as a parking and storage facility for vehicles. No adequate remedy at law exists. Defendants were not denied due process, as they were given time to respond but failed to do so in compliance with deadlines. (LYTTON and SCHMIDT, concurring.)

County Board Chairman petitioned court to appoint a special prosecutor to represent him in declaratory judgment action on his claims that County Board improperly eliminated by ordinance certain of his duties as chairman and improperly sought to prevent him from participating in discussion and debate of issues on the County Board floor. Court erred in denying State's Attorney's section 2-615 motion to dismiss on the pleadings and abused its discretion in appointing a special prosecutor under section 3-9008(a-10) of the Counties Code. County Board chairman did not raise a colorable claim, which is a prerequisite for appointment of a special prosecutor under these circumstances. County Board has unfettered discretion to modify duties of the chair, except where those duties are constitutionally enshrined or provided by statute. Whether chairman should be afforded additional discussion-and-debate opportunities is a political question and not a legal question, and thus this claim is not colorable. (JORGENSEN and BRIDGES, concurring.)

Plaintiff LLC filed action against municipal defendants, seeking to invalidate an intergovernmental contract and some related ordinances. The contract governs annexations of territory to the Sanitary District new connections to the sewer lines of the Sanitary District. Plaintiff has not been deprived of a property interest or due process. Plaintiff has no protectable property interest in subdivision approval. Illinois statutory law explicitly authorizes the negotiation and execution of an annexation agreement between a landowner and a municipality.No provision of Illinois Municipal Code would necessarily be violated if a landlowner and a municipality agreed to subdivision approval in return for a municipal annexation. (KNECHT and TURNER, concurring.)

Class action filed as to constitutionality of city ordinance which authorizes city to impound a motor vehicle used to commit certain offenses, including DUI, and provides for a $500 charge to owner of any vehicle impounded under the ordinance. Towing and storage fees and penalties may also be imposed. Ordinance's $500 charge is a fee, rather than a fine. Due process requires that a fee be in an amount that bears some reasonable relationship tot eh actual costs the fee is intended to recoup. Court erred in granting summary judgment for city on basis that ordinance provided for a fine. (MOORE and OVERSTREET, concurring.)

Plaintiff filed complaint challenging TIF ordinances approved by City to establish a certain TIF District under the Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act. Court erred in granting summary judgment for Defendant, finding that there was "over 400 feet of contiguity" connecting parcels A and B within the TIF District, and "well over 1000 feet of contiguity" connecting parcels B and C, within the TIF District. Court faileddc to account for the difference between the boundaries of parcels A and B and the boundary of the TIF District. City cannot "jump" the natural gas right-of-way to establish contiguity between parcels A and B. As there is no other basis for contiguity between those parcels, TIF District is not contiguous under section 11-74.4-4(a) fo the Redevelopment Act. (LYTTON, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 6/24/20.) Plaintiffs sued owner of a strip mall and operator of grocery store, seeking to enjoin alleged violations of City's land-use ordinance and damages for alleged noise, light, and air nuisances arising from operation of grocery store. Court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' private-nuisance claims. Because Plaintiffs allege a temporary nuisance, they may properly seek recovery only for personal inconvenience, annoyance, and discomfort suffered on account of the nuisance, and the Moorman doctrine does not bar such damages, as they are not economic losses or injuries but a form of personal injury. Plaintiffs alleged sufficiently specific facts as to testing and that truck noise in delivery area of store significantly exceeds allowable limits. Court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' noise-ordinance-violation claims. (SCHOSTOK and BRENNAN, concurring.)s