Local Government Law

At issue was whether the plaintiff qualified as a candidate for the Lake County Board in the June 2022 general primary election. The parties agreed that she did not reside within the board district at the time she filed her nominating papers. The appellate court held that under its interpretation of section 2-3015 of the Counties Code, the candidate was required to reside in the district at the time she filed her statement of candidacy because to find otherwise would create a situation where a candidate would be eligible to run for office, but not to hold that office, a result that previously was rejected by the Illinois Supreme Court. (McLAREN and JORGENSEN, concurring)

Defendant appealed from trial court judgment finding it guilty of violating the Downers Grove Fire Prevention Code. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the village’s annual testing requirement did not violate defendant's residents' fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and that defendant's due process rights were not violated when the village initiated court proceedings without first allowing defendant to pursue administrative appeal procedures. The appellate court modified the amount of the fine imposed for failure to comply with the code. (McLAREN and SCHOSTOK, concurring)

Plaintiff, an inmate in custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections, filed a complaint for declarative judgment and injunctive relief against DOC pursuant to a FOIA request. The complaint also sought civil penalties, attorney fees, and costs. While the complaint was pending the DOC provided plaintiff with copies of the records he sought. The trial court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the DOC on all issues and plaintiff appealed arguing that disclosure of the records did not render his claim for declaratory relief moot and that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on his claims for costs and civil penalties. The appellate court affirmed the trial court entry of summary judgment based on mootness, but remanded the plaintiff’s claims for costs and civil penalties. (DeARMOND and HOLDER WHITE, concurring)

The Illinois Supreme Court addressed governmental immunity in a case arising out of the alleged intentional or reckless refusal of a 911 operator to dispatch emergency services. The court held that local government defendants were not immune to suit under section 4-102 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act because the complaint was instead governed by the limited immunity provided by section 15.1(a) of the Emergency Telephone System Act. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint premised on wrongful death and survival by finding that the actions of the defendants were not a proximate cause of harm to the plaintiff under the condition/cause analysis. (ANNE M. BURKE, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, and CARTER concurring. GARMAN and MICHAEL J. BURKE, specially concurring.)

Plaintiffs, a coalition of contracting firms in the public transportation construction and design industry, filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against Cook County alleging that the county was diverting revenues generated from transportation-related ordinances in contravention with the Safe Roads Amendment to the Illinois Constitution. The circuit court dismissed, finding the plaintiffs lack standing. The appellate court reversed on the issue of standing, but affirmed the circuit court’s determination that there had been no violation. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the plaintiffs had associational standing to bring the action, that the County’s interpretation of the Amendment was not reasonable, and that the Amendment properly limited the power of home-rule units in the context of transportation spending. The court reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of the complaint and remanded for further proceedings. (ANNE M. BURKE, NEVILLE, MICHAEL J. BURKE, OVERSTREET, and CARTER, concurring. THEIS, dissenting.)

The Illinois Supreme Court held that the defendants, several police officers and their municipal employers, did not have immunity under section 4-106(b) of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act in an action where the plaintiff was injured by a fleeing vehicle during a police chase. The court found that the person the police officers was chasing was not “an escaped or escaping prisoner” within the meaning of the Act, explaining that the officers did not have direct control of the person or the ability to limit the person’s freedom of movement to a particular place, as was required for section 4-106(b) to confer immunity to the officers, and that a “show of authority” by itself was not sufficient to establish that a person was being held in custody. (ANNE M. BURKE, GARMAN, THEIS, NEVILLE, MICHAEL J. BURKE, and OVERSTREET, concurring)

Plaintiff filed a class-action lawsuit alleging that the City of Chicago had an ongoing practice of improperly issuing central business district metered parking tickets outside the boundaries of the district. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff appealed arguing that exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine prevented dismissal of his complaint. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, agreed and reversed the trial court order finding that plaintiff was not required to exhaust the administrative remedies because it could not have provided him with the injunctive and monetary relief that he was seeking. (HARRIS, concurring, and ODEN JOHNSON, dissenting, with opinion).

Plaintiff, a surviving spouse of a deceased police officer, appealed the trial court’s order affirming the Board’s determination that while she was entitled to receive survival pension benefits, she was not entitled to receive them immediately but, rather, she was entitled to benefits on the date that her deceased husband would have turned 60 years old. The appellate court interpreted the language of section 3-112 of the Illinois Pension Code and affirmed the trial court, finding that had decedent lived he would not have been eligible to collect benefits until he was 60 years old, and that the plaintiff could not collect more than decedent was entitled to at the time of his death. (HARRIS and MIKVA, concurring)