Local Government Law

City held a referendum proposing that candidates could not seek the office of mayor while simultaneously holding an elected, paid state office. Before outcome of referendum was certified, State Representative Jones filed nomination papers seeking office of mayor. Referendum was later certified as adopted. Objectors filed suit to bar Jones from appearing on 2/23/21 ballot. Circuit court affirmed Electoral Board's decision removing Jones from the ballot. Appellate court summarily reversed and ordered that Jones appear on the ballot. Because Jones filed his nomination papers prior to date referendum became effective (the date election was certified), Jones was legally qualified to run for mayor at that time. Circuit court's agreed order impounding the votes for Jones is reversed. (A. BURKE, THEIS, M. BURKE, OVERSTREET, and CARTER, concurring.)

Plaintiffs, which are trade groups and associations in transportation planning and construction industry, filed suit alleging that Cook County violated the "Transportation Funds" Amendment to the Illinois Constitution by diverting tax revenues protected by the Amendment to non-transportation uses. Plaintiffs have standing to bring this challenge, but the complaint fails to state a constitutional violation. Amendment is applicable only to situations involving governments' use of transportation-related monies as specified by an applicable statute and is thus inapplicable to the County under the circumstances of this suit. The taxes imposed by the County which are the subject of the complaint are 6 different taxes. The County spends the revenue from each of these taxes pursuant to its home-rule spending power, not in accordance with a statute. Amendment does not restrict, or govern in any way, the spending of these tax revenues. (HOWSE and BURKE, concurring.)

City of Carlinville joined with a nearby village and Jersey County Rural Water Co. to form a not-for-profit corporation, Alluvial, which was approved for tens of millions of dollars in grants and loans from federal agencies to build infrastructure necessary to provide members with potable water. Plaintiffs filed declaratory judgment action asserting that Carlinville and Village had no constitutional or statutory authority to join with Jersey Water to form another private company. Section 10(a) of Illinois Constitution allows units of local government to contract, associate, or contract and associate with private entitles. Nothing prevented Defendants from forming Alluvial, and Alluvial may continue operating as a valid corporation.  (TURNER and CAVANAGH, concurring.)

Court properly granted summary judgment for Plaintiff union in a declaratory judgment action challenging the definitions in a City ordinance. City passed an ordinance defining terms used but not defined in section 10 of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act, specifically defining "injury", "gainful work", and "catastrophic injury". Circuit court held that the City's definitions of "catastrophic injury" and "injury" were invalid, null and void, and struck the definition of "gainful work" as superfluous. City, pursuant to its home rule authority and in accordance with section 20 of the Act, could define an administrative procedure for determining benefits under the Act, but it could not redefine the Act's substantive terms so that City would provide benefits inconsistent with the Act. City's definitions of these 3 terms were inconsistent with substantive requirements of the Act, and the ordinance was not a valid exercise of home rule authority. (McDADE and LYTTON, concurring).

Plaintiff, a tenured full-time elementary school teacher, filed complaint for administrative review of her dismissal for cause from employment. DCFS investigated Plaintiff for alleged physical abuse of her children, but DCFS ultimately concluded that the allegations were unfounded. The Board's assistant superintendent for human resources met with Plaintiff 4 times. Based on her review of the DCFS report, she concluded that Plaintiff had lied to her, and thus School Board issued a notice of remedial warning to remedy to Plaintiff, which specifically warned her to exercise appropriate and professional judgment, conduct herself professionally, and follow all the Board's policies, procedures, and practices. Hearing officer determined that Plaintiff's conduct (excessively leaving the classroom for extended periods) violated these requirements. Board adopted the hearing officer's determination without modification. Decision of hearing officer and the Board was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or not related to the requirements of service. (HUDSON and BIRKETT, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 12/7/20.)  In 2013, Village, which is a home rule unit, enacted ordinance which regulated storage and transportation of assault weapons within the village. In 2018, Village enacted 2 ordinances which were a total civilian ban on assault weapons and large capacity magazines. Court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs, and permanently enjoined Village from enforcing these ordinances. Section 13.1 of FOID Card Act does not preempt all regulation of assault weapons by home rule units. Village, in its 2013 ordinance, regulated possession and ownership of assault weapons in a manner inconsistent with FOID Card Act, thus preserving its power to regulate assault weapons concurrently with the State. Village's 2018 ordinances were amendments to the 2013 ordinance, as allowed by section 13.1(c) of FOID Card Act. Village's ban of large capacity magazines, to extend that it regulates ammunition for handguns, is preempted in its application to holders of valid FOID cards and concealed carry licenses by section 13.1(b) of FOID Card Act and section 90 of Concealed Carry Act. Appellate Court is without jurisdiction to consider claims that ordinances are preempted by Wildlife Code. Permanent injunctions are vacated except that Village is prohibited from enforcing regulation banning large capacity magazines, as to regulation of ammunition for handguns, against persons who hold valid FOID cards or concealed carry licenses. (HUDSON, concurring; McLAREN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)  

Plaintiff sued Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority (MPEA) and Navy Pier, Inc. (NPI) under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking records pertaining to operation of Navy Pier. NPI performs a governmental function on behalf of MPEA, and the records Plaintiff requested directly relate to NPI's performance of that governmental function. Court properly granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on count of complaint that alleged that MPEA violated FOIA on alternative theory that NPI performed a governmental function on MPEA's behalf and thus MPEA had a duty to produce public records in NPI's possession that relate directly to that function. MPEA, as a public body, bears burden of proving that records requested fall within an exemption, but MPEA did not attempt to meet that burden. Because NPI is not a subsidiary body of MPEA, court properly granted judgment for NPI on 2 counts of complaint that sought judgment declaring that NPI served as a public body obliged to respond directly to FOIA requests.  (HYMAN and COGHLAN, concurring.)

City determined that corporation (Mid-City) and its president and responsible officer (Summerfeld) had failed to collect and remit parking tax on funds it received from valet parking services, restaurants, and other entities that used space in its 2 parking lots. Administrative law officer (ALO) and director of Department of Administrative Hearings affirmed tax assessment, but circuit court reversed decision.  ALO's decision was not clearly erroneous because City established its prima facie case that Mid-City was a parking lot "operator" within the meaning of the Parking Tax Ordinances, by introducing into evidence the assessment showing Mid-City's liability, and Mid-City failed to rebut it with documentary evidence. The Uniform Revenue Procedures Ordinances does not require that liability must first be found against the operator or collector, or that an action against the tax collector must be fully litigated, before an officer or employee can be held personally liable for taxes owed. The ALO's decision as to Sommerfeld was clearly erroneous to extent that it required City to use certified mail to send notice and considered the misspelling of Sommerfeld's name, when he testified that he knew that the notice was for him. It was reasonable for City to send notice to Sommerfeld to Mid-City's business address. (FITZGERALD SMITH and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Plaintiffs filed suit in 2009 against several local public entities concerning flood damage to their property after heavy rains in September 2008. The public duty rule applies to all of Defendants' alleged conduct, and the new law, set forth in Illinois Supreme Court's 2016 Coleman decision, which abolished the common-law public duty rule, applies only prospectively. At the time of the alleged conduct, the public duty rules existed. A prospective application of the Coleman decision is proper and would avoid substantial inequitable results for Defendants who have relied upon the public duty rule throughout the long course of this litigation. To the extent that Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to provide adequate public services in the design, maintenance, improvement, and/or operation of the stormwater system, that duty ran to the public at large and not to individual members of the public such as Plaintiffs. Thus, the public duty rule bars Plaintiffs' claims. (A. BURKE, GARMAN, KARMEIER, NEVILLE, and M. BURKE, concurring.)