Local Government Law

Plaintiff appealed from the circuit court’s dismissal of her qui tam complaint filed on behalf of the City of Chicago and against the defendants seeking penalties and interest for their alleged failure to collect and remit lease taxes as required by the Chicago Municipal Code. At issue on appeal was whether plaintiff’s claim was barred by the City’s false claim act. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that plaintiff’s claim was barred by section 1-22-030(e) of the Chicago Municipal Code because her lawsuit concerned the application, interpretation, or enforcement of a tax ordinance. (MIKVA and C.A. WALKER, concurring)

In a tax rate objection complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the 2017 levy imposed by the Woodridge Park District was unlawful because the park district had an allegedly illegal excess accumulation in its corporate fund. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and found that the levy was unlawful. The district defendant appealed, arguing that there was no excess accumulation of funds. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because the district was not accumulating funds beyond what it historically spent to run the park district. (BRENNAN and ALBRECHT, concurring)

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging that the defendant violated the Freedom of information Act when it sought payment for the cost of copying a hard drive and obtaining a storage device in response to a FOIA request submitted by plaintiff. The trial court entered an order requiring the defendant to provide the plaintiffs with all documents stored on the computer that was subject to the request but noting that the lawsuit could have been avoided if the plaintiffs had made a reasonable attempt to clarify their request before filing suit. The trial court also denied plaintiffs’ request for fees, costs, and civil penalties. Plaintiffs appealed the order denying their motion for fees, costs, and civil penalties. The appellate court affirmed, finding, first, that the denial of attorneys fees and costs was consistent with the purposes of the FOIA’s fee-shifting provision because litigation was not necessary to ensure compliance and, second, that the defendant’s attempt to pass the costs of copying the hard drive on to the plaintiffs was not made in bad faith and, as a result, the trial court properly denied plaintiffs’ request for civil penalties. (DAVENPORT and McDADE, concurring)

Plaintiff sued the City of Chicago, two police officers, and two city employees for injuries he suffered when he was shot by a third party, which plaintiff argued was the result of the negligent and willful and wanton conduct of the police officers. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding that the defendants were immune pursuant to section 4-102 of the Local Governmental and Tort Immunity Act. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615, but reversing the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to section 2-619 by finding that the question of whether the officers were executing or enforcing any law at the time of the occurrence was a question of fact. (C.A. WALKER and TAILOR, concurring)

Appeal from a circuit court reversal of an administrative law judge’s decision that upheld taxes and penalties imposed by the Cook County Department of Revenue pursuant to the Cook County Retail Sale of Gasoline and Diesel Tax Ordinances. The department imposed fuel taxes and penalties on the plaintiff for out-of-book transactions. On appeal, the department argued that the administrative law judge was correct when he found that the out-of-book transactions, even though they do not involve the physical delivery of fuel, still involve the transfer of an ownership interest as to that fuel and are taxable. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment finding that the agency’s factual determinations were not against the manifest weight of the evidence; but also finding that the plaintiff had shown reasonable cause for its failure to pay taxes at the time of the sales so that the department improperly imposed penalties. (MIKVA and TAILOR, concurring)