Local Government Law

City's Department of Administrative Hearings found that Plaintiff was jointly liable for unpaid water bills at certain property in Chicago. Circuit court reversed Department's judgment upon administrative review. A trust was the legal owner of the property, and an LLC was the beneficiary of the trust. Trust agreement indicated that Plaintiff had the power of direction for the trust. Plaintiff was also manager of the LLC. Circuit court's judgment was error where Plaintiff was an "owner" of the property as defined by Chicago Municipal Code. Plaintiff's liability is not solely based on his status as manager of the LLC; he is being held accountable under Municipal Code, for his own acts or omissions as an owner of the property. The LLC Act does not conflict with the Municipal Code. (MIKVA and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring.)

Plaintiff, as county Auditor, filed suit alleging that county suffered economic damages when it unknowingly paid Board Chair monthly commuting expenses for several years in violation of Counties Code. Although Plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action, she did have the right to bring a petition for appointment of special prosecutor. As court properly dismissed Plaintiff's action with prejudice, the question of whether a special prosecutor should be appointed is moot. Dismissal, which was a final judgment terminating the litigation, meant that Plaintiff was no longer entitled to leave to amend her complaint. (HOLDRIDGE and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Plaintiff, individually and as City Clerk, filed complaint making facial challenge to a City ordinance, and asking court to declare it unconstitutional. Ordinance retained the elected office of city clerk and provided a nonexclusive list of the clerk's duties, and ordinance did not change the manner of selection of the city clerk nor the clerk's term of office. Plaintiff claim that ordinance transferred city clerk's duties to an executive assistant is not supported by plain language of the ordinance.  Court properly dismissed Plaintiff's 2nd amended complaint which alleged that ordinance violated the officers clause in section 6(f) of Article VII of the Illinois Constitution. City had the authority, under section 3.1-30-5(a) of Municipal Code, to create office of executive assistant. (McLAREN and HUDSON, concurring.)

Appellate court erred in holding that Defendant was not a qualified candidate for mayor of Markham due to a 1999 federal felony mail fraud conviction. Then-Governor Rauner, in 2018, issued an untitled document on official letterhead stating that Defendant's rights of citizenship which may have been forfeited under Illinois law as a result of that federal conviction were restored. In 2020, Defendant filed papers seeking reelection as mayor. Plain language of amended section 29-15 of Election Code and amended section 3-10-5(b) of Municipal Code provides that a person convicted of an infamous crime loses eligibility to assume municipal office but may regain eligibility by a restoration of rights from the governor. Governor Rauner's untitled document restored all of Defendant's Illinois rights of citizenship, including the right to hold municipal office, and he was eligible to be mayor of Markham. (A. BURKE, GARMAN, NEVILLE, M. BURKE, OVERSTREET, and CARTER, concurring.)

Illinois Commerce Commission denied City's petition for approval to acquire, by eminent domain, easements over certain property outside city limits, in order to construct a power line to connect City's power supply to the electricity infrastructure of Ameren Illinois Company. City filed petition with appellate court for direct review of Commission's decision. Petition was not brought pursuant to Public Utilities Act but pursuant to section 11-117-1(2) of Municipal Code. Legislature has not expressly incorporated the provisions of the Public Utilities Act in conferring decision-making authority on the Commission related to approval of a city's decision to exercise its eminent domain authority outside of its city limits. Appellate court does not have jurisdiction to proceed with direct review of Commission's decision. City must petition for a writ of certiorari in circuit court. (WELCH and VAUGHAN, concurring.)

Plaintiff sued 2 former employees alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, and usurpation of a corporate opportunity. After bench trial, court ruled in favor of Plaintiff on breach of fiduciary duty claim. Court entered directed findings for Defendants on breach of contract claim and usurpation of a corporate opportunity claim. Cause of action for usurpation of a corporate opportunity requires a plaintiff to show that the opportunity has in fact been taken, and is no longer available to it. Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendants wrongfully appropriated the turbine or funding opportunity. Defendants did not wrongfully appropriate for themselves the exclusive right to work on certain projects. Defendants breached their fiduciary duties during their employment, but Plaintiff failed to prove the injury necessary for its claim of usurpation of a corporate opportunity.  Remedy for breach of fiduciary duty lies within equitable discretion of court. Decision to deny disgorgement of management fees and refusal to impose a constructive trust on any profits was within court's equitable discretion. (THEIS, NEVILLE, and M. BURKE, concurring; OVERSTREET, GARMAN, and CARTER, dissenting.)

Plaintiff requested production of records under FOIA relating to a political action committee chaired by a Cook County Commissioner. As to 2 emails containing track edits to the Wikipedia page of the Commissioner, the track edits do not reflect predecisional communications about any substantive governmental policy or actions or about a policy relating to dissemination of information, and relate to factual content on the Commissioner's Wikipedia page. There is no basis for finding communications about the draft answers to a reporter's questions about recent women's marches do not reveal any deliberative process as to any substantive government policy. Defendant failed to meet its burden to show that the challenged redactions pertain to the deliberative process for the development of governmental policy or action relating to dissemination of information and failed to show that the production of the redacted information would reveal the deliberative process for any underlying substantive policy, and thus the deliberative process exemption would not apply. (HOFFMAN and CUNNINGHAM, concurring.)