Local Government Law

Plaintiff sued county, alleging county misused funds collected from litigation fees by failing to use them for purposes stated in enabling statutes. The enabling statutes do not provide for a private cause of action, and in absence of evidence of Plaintiff's personal liability to replentish public revenues depleted by alleged misuse, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a taxpayer lawsuit.(PIERCE and SIMON, concurring.)

Village, by majority vote of Board of Trustees, passed ordinance providing for recall of elected officials. Plaintiffs (2 Village Trustees who voted against ordinance) filed declaratory judgment action seeking declaration that ordinance is unconstitutional. A home rule unit such as the Village does has power to enact valid recall ordinance, but only after it is approved via a valid voter referendum.Ordinance is invalid, as it was enacted in violation of limitation in Section 6(f) of Article VII of Illinois Constitution, on home rule unit's authority, in a manner that deprived its voters of their constitutional right to have a say in the manner of selecting and terms of office of their elected officials.(LAVIN and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Plaintiffs, who pay property taxes that fund the intervenors’ expenditures, challenged propriety of 2013 tax levy ordinance enacted by City, which is one of the intervenors. Court erred in holding that tax levy had not been validly enacted and in ordering City to refund Plaintiffs’ tax payments for that year.Power to levy property taxes is an area particularly subject to a municipality’s home rule powers. Section 3.1-40-40 of Municipal Code explicitly permits the adoption of different voting procedures other than Robert's Rules of Order. To be validly enacted pursuant to the procedures set out in City’s code, the ordinance must have been voted upon at a meeting where a quorum of the city council was present, and it must have received the majority of the votes cast. As these conditions were met, the ordinance is valid.(ZENOFF and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Several Defendants, participating in Occupy Chicago, were arrested after numerous warnings to vacate Grant Park during hours when the park was to be vacated (from 11 p.m. to 6 a.m.), per Chicago Park District ordinance. Ordinance did not restrict their assembly, it restricted their stated purpose to "occupy" and indefinitely remain in a public area to detriment of park district's ability to perform its legitimate functions. The well established time, place and manner federal precedent employed in first amendment review under the U. S. Constitution applies equally to the analysis of a freedom to assemble claim under the Illinois Constitution. Ordinance does not violate article I, section 5, of Illinois Constitution. Selective enforcement of ordinance did not violate equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and does not violate article I, section 5 of the Illinois Constitution. (HARRIS and LIU, concurring.)

Plaintiff filed complaint challenging validity of Village Video Gaming Ordinance.  Court properly dismissed amended complaint, as Village had home rule authority to enact its Ordinance regulating video gaming within its boundaries. Even if license fee was a tax and not a fee, the tax was not an impermissible occupation tax, was not preempted by Section 21 of Riverboat Gambling Act, and was not an impermissible license for revenue. (REYES and McBRIDE, concurring.)

Cook County's independent inspector general filed complaint to enforce subpoena that Office of Independent Inspector General (OIIG) directed to assessor of Cook County.  Ordinances enacted by Cook County Board of Commissioners, empowering OIIG to issue subpoenas directed to elected county officials and requiring the officials to cooperate with OIIG, are valid exercise of home rule powers. Ordinances give OIIG power to investigate allegations that assessor and other county officials acted corruptly. County may delegate its subpoena power to its OIIG. Ordinances are not unconsitutional.(SIMON and HYMAN, concurring.)