Traffic/DUI

Defendant, who had just crossed into Illinois from Iowa at 1:15 a.m., made a U-turn 50 feet in front of a police roadblock, using a railroad crossing which was the only place to turn around before reaching the roadblock; roadblock, which was well-marked and which was not busy.  Deputy, emerging from roadblock, stopped him and discovered his license was suspended. Under totality of circumstances, there was reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of Defendant's vehicle.  Thus, circuit court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Avoidance of roadblock is only one factor in determining existence of reasonable suspicion. (GARMAN, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, and THEIS, concurring; THOMAS, specially concurring; BURKE, dissenting.)

Defendant refused to submit to breath test after his DUI arrest, where he hit a motorcyclist who sustained massive leg injury resulting in partial amputation of leg.  Defendant was taken to hospital where samples of his blood were drawn without warrant or consent.  Test results shown BAC over twice the legal limit of 0.08.  Court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress test results, as good-faith exception to exclusionary rule was applicable.  At time of Defendant's arrest, binding precedent of Illinois Supreme Court's 2005 Jones decision held that Section 11-501.2(c)(2) of Vehicle Code clearly allowed for warrantless, nonconsensual blood draws in all DUI cases. Section 11-5-1.2(c)(2) is constitutional as written, and Defendant's blood was drawn solely on basis of Jones court's interpretation of statute.(WELCH and GOLDENHERSH, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of felony driving while license suspended or revoked and sentenced to one year conditional discharge and 60 days in jail.  Court properly denied Defendant's pretrial motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. Deputy had reasonable suspicion to make investigatory stop of Defendant's vehicle for possible criminal trespass to real property. Deputy was responding to a live complaint of a very recent criminal trespass to real property, alleging that someone was trespassing and running dogs on his property, and that complainant took deputy to exact location of trespass, where there was one vehicle, with dogs inside of dog box in the back of vehicle. Officer may make a lawful Terry stop without first determining whether circumstances he observed would satisfy each element of a certain offense.(O'BRIEN and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant was arrested for DUI, and because he failed to complete a Breathalyzer test, his driving privileges were summarily suspended. Before the time to decided whether to take the Breathalyzer test expired, Defendant never expressly refused, or expressly agreed, to take the test, but "hemmed and hawed", and told officer that making a choice was a "huge" decision he didn't know how to resolve, and then used delay tactic of discussing various topics of conversation with officer. Defendant's failure to decide constituted a refusal, so that his statutory summary suspension was proper.(SCHOSTOK and McLAREN, concurring.)

Court properly denied Defendant's petition to rescind statutory summary suspension (SSS) of his driver's license, after he was charged with DUI. Court's finding that arrest took place in South Elgin was against manifest weight of evidence, as arresting police officer, who was on South Elgin City Police Department, testified that arrest was within Kane County's jurisdiction. If officer had probable cause to believe that Defendant was speeding within South Elgin, he was authorized to arrest Defendant outside of South Elgin. Officer used radar to monitor Defendant's speed while Defendant was driving within South Elgin, and thus he was performing official duty within his jurisdiction.(ZENOFF and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Defendant's driver's license was summarily suspended after his arrest for DUI. State failed to produce video of arrest, and court denied Defendant's sanctions motion based on its belief that video was not discoverable.  Defendant claimed that field sobriety tests and warning took place in booking room.  State did not dispute Defendant's claim, and State stipulated that a recording of events in booking room, responsive to Defendant's request, had existed.  Thus, booking room recording was relevant, and court erred in finding recording not discoverable. Because it was discoverable, no subpoena was required to obtain it, and once Defendant filed his Rule 214 motion for discovery and Rule 237 notice to produce, State was officially on notice to take action to preserve recording for its production either before trial or at trial.(SCHOSTOK and BURKE, concurring.)