Traffic/DUI

Officer personally observed the immediate commission of Defendant driving 61 mph in a 35-mph speed zone, a Class B misdemeanor offense. Section 7-4-8 of Municipal Code endows police officers with full authority and power within any municipality in a police district. The arrest statute applies to any jurisdiction in the State, whereas the Municipal Code provisions apply to extend jurisdiction of police officers in a police district, defined as adjoining municipalities in the same county. As officer was justified in stopping Defendant under arrest statute, court erred in granting petition to rescind statutory summary suspension, as officer had jurisdiction to arrest Defendant. (KNECHT and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

Court properly denied Defendant's petition to rescind statutory summary suspension (SSS) of his driving privileges. Rescission hearing must be held within 30 days of filing of petition to rescind SSS, and if delay is attributable to Defendant, by Defendant agreeing to a continuance, the 30-day period of time is temporarily suspended for length of time of such delay. (ROCHFORD and DELORT, concurring.)

Court properly granted Defendant's motion to suppress evidence and his petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension.  Warrantless entry into Defendant's home, which was justified by neither consent nor the need for emergency aid, violated 4th Amendment. Defendants' wife did not consent to officers' entry into their home, as she told officers repeatedly that she and Defendant did not need help, that the officers did not need to be there, and that they could leave; wife did not, indirectly or impliedly, invite officers in, upon cracking door open slightly to speak with them. Without evidence unlawfully gathered in Defendant's home, the only evidence of probable cause to believe that Defendant had driven under the influence was that he had been in accident and there was an open beer can in his vehicle, which was not sufficient to support finding of probable cause to arrest for DUI. (HUTCHINSON and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of failure to stop after an accident involving personal injury or death. Defendant, who was driving a semi, admitted that he fell asleep and traveled off roadway, but stated that he thought he hit a road sign or mile marker. Defendant had struck a person standing next to driver's side of pickup truck stopped on shoulder, who died from injuries. The charge required the State to prove that Defendant knew that he was in an accident with another person. No double jeopardy impediment to new trial, as Defendant does not argue that evidence was insufficient.(SCHOSTOK and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant, who had just crossed into Illinois from Iowa at 1:15 a.m., made a U-turn 50 feet in front of a police roadblock, using a railroad crossing which was the only place to turn around before reaching the roadblock; roadblock, which was well-marked and which was not busy.  Deputy, emerging from roadblock, stopped him and discovered his license was suspended. Under totality of circumstances, there was reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of Defendant's vehicle.  Thus, circuit court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Avoidance of roadblock is only one factor in determining existence of reasonable suspicion. (GARMAN, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, and THEIS, concurring; THOMAS, specially concurring; BURKE, dissenting.)

Defendant refused to submit to breath test after his DUI arrest, where he hit a motorcyclist who sustained massive leg injury resulting in partial amputation of leg.  Defendant was taken to hospital where samples of his blood were drawn without warrant or consent.  Test results shown BAC over twice the legal limit of 0.08.  Court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress test results, as good-faith exception to exclusionary rule was applicable.  At time of Defendant's arrest, binding precedent of Illinois Supreme Court's 2005 Jones decision held that Section 11-501.2(c)(2) of Vehicle Code clearly allowed for warrantless, nonconsensual blood draws in all DUI cases. Section 11-5-1.2(c)(2) is constitutional as written, and Defendant's blood was drawn solely on basis of Jones court's interpretation of statute.(WELCH and GOLDENHERSH, concurring.)