Traffic/DUI

Petitioner (Will Co. State's Attorney) seeks mandamus pursuant to Rule 381 against Respondent judge, asking court to compel Respondent to vacate a 1/6/16 sentencing order, and to classify as a Class 2 felony a Defendant's 3rd DUI, and to resentence Defendant as a Class X offender. Defendant's 3rd DUI conviction constitutes aggravated DUI and is a Class 2 felony, as charged in indictment. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(2)(B) demonstrates unambiguous legislative intent to classify a 3rd DUI conviction as a Class 2 felony, and Section 501(d)(2)(A) demonstrates unambiguous legislative intent to classify it as a Class 4 felony only if no other provision in Section 11-501 is applicable. As Defendant has at least 2 prior Class 2 felony or higher convictions, he must be sentenced as a Class X offender on his aggravated DUI conviction in this case. (KARMEIER, FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with DUI, and he submitted to blood and urine testing which revealed presence of alprazolam (Xanax), a controlled substance. Court granted Defendant's petition to rescind statutory summary suspension (SSS), as Defendant presented a valid prescription for Xanax. As Defendant had burden of making prima facie case for rescission of SSS, it was his burden to show that alprazolam did not affect his ability to operate a motor vehicle. Remanded for opportunity for Defendant to present evidence to show that he complied with prescription and could drive safely, and for State opportunity to present evidence to negate Defendant's claim.(CHAPMAN and CATES, concurring.)

Blue Island police officer observed Defendant's vehicle improperly parked on street within City of Chicago. Officer ticketed Defendant for improper parking on roadway, a petty offense; and DUI. Sections 7-4-7 and 7-4-8 of Municipal Code gave officer full authority and power to go into any part of police district that encompassed Blue Island, including Chicago (because it is an adjoining municipality in same county), to exercise that authority and power. Court erred in granting Defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence solely on legal issue of jurisdiction. Remanded for court to reconsider its ruling on Defendant's motion to quash and suppress after making factual findings and credibility determinations.(HYMAN and NEVILLE, concurring.)

After traffic stop, Claimant was arrested and charged with DUI and driving while license revoked (DWLR). Vehicle which Claimant was driving at time of arrest was owned by Defendant's live-in girlfriend. State commenced forfeiture action pursuant to Article 36 of Criminal Code, on basis that Claimant used it in commission of of offenses of DUI and DWLR. State offered affidavit that Defendant had been arrested or convicted for DUI on 5 prior occasions and that his license was suspended and revoked. To establish probable cause that property may be subject to forfeiture, State is only required to show that there is probable cause that property may have been used in commission of offense described in Section 36-1. Court erred in requiring State to show probable cause that vehicle owner knew or should have known that Claimant would be driving her vehicle on date it was seized. (GOLDENHERSH and MOORE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated DUI. Although indictment was defective in that it failed to include proximate cause element, Defendant was aware of proximate cause element and suffered no prejudice in preparation of his defense. A rational jury could find that a motorist pulled over onto narrow shoulder should have been foreseeable to Defendant. Although defense did present evidence probative of unreasonableness of motorist's actions, jury was under no obligation to accept its evidence. (HOLDRIDGE and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated DUI. Accident proximately caused death of woman, who Defendant argued was driving the pick-up truck. Court was within its discretion in granting State's motion in limine to bar physician from opining on who the driver was in accident. No evidence that physician's on-the-job experience equipped him to opine on who driver was. Court was within its discretion in denying Defendant's motion in limine to bar testimony of State's accident reconstructionist as to opining who the driver was, on basis of injury patterns. Looking at all evidence in light most favorable to prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant was the driver. (HARRIS and STEIGMANN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of DUI. No ineffective assistance of counsel in failure to file motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct investigatory stop when Defendant crossed over the fog line, thus deviating from his established lane. Record is devoid of any "affirmative testimony" indicating whether it was practicable for Defendant to have remained in his lane. Thus, question of probable cause cannot be addressed. (O'BRIEN, concurring; SCHMIDT, specially concurring.)