Traffic/DUI

Defendant was arrested for DUI with BAC of 0.08 or more. Court suppressed Defendant's (Portable Breath Test) (PBT) results. The PBT statute requires a suspect's consent prior to administering a PBT, and Defendant did not so consent. The "request" and "refuse" elements of PBT statute require some form of consent or choice, implicit in statutory language, before a PBT may be administered. Although officer is not obligated to inform suspect that he or she may refuse, it does require that suspect have a reasonable opportunity to refuse. Officer did not present Defendant with a choice to take or refuse PBT, and thus officer affected Defendant's opportunity to refuse PBT. Court's finding that officer lacked probable cause to arrest Defendant for DUI was not against manifest weight of evidence. Court reasonably discounted reliability of HGN and walk-and-turn tests, as both tests were administered against protocol.(BURKE and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Court dismissed Defendant's traffic citation based on violation of Supreme Court Rule 552, requiring arresting officer to transmit certain portions of citation to circuit court clerk within 48 hours after arrest. TIming requirement in Rule 552 is directory and thus dismissal of citation is not warranted unless noncompliance with the rule prejudices the defendants. A Rule 552 violation will not generally impede trial court in processing citations or prejudice a defendant's rights and thus it does not require exception to rule that procedural commands to governmental officials are directory. (THOMAS, KARMEIER, and THEIS, concurring; BURKE, GARMAN, and FREEMAN, specially concurring.)

The 2012 version of Section 5-6-1(p) of Unified Code of Corrections, which precluded disposition of supervision for those who have violated speed parameters of Section 11-601.5 of Vehicle Code (speed of 26 mph or more in excess of speed limit), does not violate proportionate penalty clause or due process. Restrictions on disposition of supervision is not an unreasonable or arbitrary means of address or deterring excessive speeding. (GARMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, and THEIS, concurring; BURKE and FREEMAN, specially concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing filed 6/15/16.) Defendant was convicted of 12 counts of driving while his license was suspended or revoked (DWLR) in violation of 5 different sub sections of Section 6-3-3 of Illinois Vehicle Code, which court merged into one count, a Class 2 felony. Any qualifying revocation could serve as a trigger to enhance the DWLR to a Class 2 felony under Section 6-303(d-5). Where Secretary of State has revoked driving privileges for any violation listed in Section 6-303(d), the revocation remains in effect until application for new license is presented and granted by Secretary. As this is Defendant' s 15th conviction for DWLR, and as Defendant had a 1992 revocation for leaving scene of accident involving death or personal injury, this offense is elevated to a Class 2 felony. A term of Mandatory Supervised Released (MSR) is part of every qualifying sentence regardless of whether the term is mentioned during sentencing or omitted from the sentencing order. Court ordered to correct Defendant's mittimus to reflect 1 conviction for DWLR.(NEVILLE and SIMON, concurring.)