(McCann, R-Carlinville) allows the chief judge at his or her discretion to operate the Veterans and Servicemembers Court program in one or more counties in the circuit, and allow veteran and servicemember defendants from all counties within the circuit to participate. It has just been introduced
(Guzzardi, D-Chicago) provides that the Act applies to any law enforcement agency that seizes property alleged to have been used in or derived from the commission of a criminal offense. Provides that every law enforcement agency that seizes property shall report specified information on a monthly basis. Changes most forfeiture distributions from law enforcement agencies to the Asset Forfeiture Proceeds Fund to be administered by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority. House Bill 689 was just introduced.
(Hutchinson, D-Chicago Heights) creates the Business Opportunity Tax that imposes a tax on all entities that issue a Form W-2 or a Form 1099 to a resident of Illinois. It imposes a sliding scale of taxation based on the employer’s total Illinois payroll as follows. (1) if the taxpayer’s total Illinois payroll for the taxable year is less than $100,000, then the annual tax is $225; (2) if the taxpayer’s total Illinois payroll for the taxable year is $100,000 or more but less than $250,000, then the annual tax is $750; (3) if the taxpayer’s total Illinois payroll for the taxable year is $250,000 or more but less than $500,000, then the annual tax is $3,750; (4) if the taxpayer’s total Illinois payroll for the taxable year is $500,000 or more but less than $1,500,000, then the annual tax is $7,500; and (5) if the taxpayer’s total Illinois payroll for the taxable year is $1,500,000 or more, then the annual tax is $15,000.
The following are exempt from taxation under this Act: (1) governmental employers described in Section 707 of the Illinois Income Tax Act; and (2) not-for-profit corporations that are exempt from taxation under Sections 501(c) or 501(d) of the Internal Revenue Code or organized under the General Not For Profit Corporation Act of 1986. Senate Amendment No. 2 becomes the bill and was just filed. It is part of the “grand bargain” being attempted by Senate leaders.
(Gordon-Booth, D-Peoria) changes current law for reporting of court supervision for a serious traffic violation under the Code or a similar provision in a local ordinance. Currently, a report of a disposition of court supervision for a serious traffic violation committed by a person under 21 years of age must be sent to the Secretary of State’s Office. This bill requires a reporting for all drivers regardless of their age. The second change affects the time for reporting to the Secretary of State a disposition of court supervision for any traffic violation (with some exceptions) under the Code. This bill requires immediate reporting instead of forwarding within five days after disposition. House Bill 221 has just been introduced.
Court erred in granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence and in granting his petition to rescind statutory summary suspension (SSS) of his driver's license. Trooper showed no coercive behavior and no physical force or show of authority to restrain Defendant's liberty. Thus, his encounter with Defendant, prior to trooper observing signs that Defendant was under the influence, was consensual and not a seizure. Trooper could reasonably have concluded that Defendant was experiencing distress, as Defendant was driving 20 mph under speed limit, then slowed and stopped in front of him on shoulder of a dark and deserted rural road in middle of night, any alleged seizure was reasonable under community caretaking doctrine. No unreasonable seizure in trooper taking Defendant's license and registration back to squad car, as Defendant offered them to trooper, and as there is evidence that a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity had arisen by then. (CHAPMAN, concurring; WELCH, dissenting.)
Defendant was aware of pending aggravated DUI felony charges when he pled guilty to misdemeanor charge of DUI which arose out of same set of circustances as felony charges. A defendant is not entitled to use Double Jeopardy Clause as a sword to prevent State from completing its prosecution on remaining charges. Thus, double jeopardy does not bar State from pursuing felony charges that were pending at the time that Defendant pled guilty to the lesser-included misdemeanor charges. (TURNER and HARRIS, concurring.)
(Court opinion corrected 12/14/16.) Defendant was charged with DUI. Court properly granted Defendant's petition to rescind statutory summary suspension (SSS). Officer administered field sobriety tests in improper fashion by asking Defendant to perform them on a wet surface while it was raining, so that probative weight to be given those tests is significantly impaired. Despite weather conditions, Defendant's performance on tests was reasonable, which would not lead a reasonably cautious person to believe Defendant was impaired by alcohol. The fact that Defendant had bloodshot and glassy eyes, without being confirmed by some other factor, does not rise to level of probable cause. (O'BRIEN and CARTER, concurring.)
Court erred in granting Defendant's petition to rescind statutory summary suspension (SSS). Defendant admitted that she failed to check her blind spot before changing lanes, causing another vehicle to drive into the ditch. Evidence presented at hearing, as to Defendant's erratic driving, strong odor of burnt cannabis in her vehicle, and presence of cannabis and paraphernalia in her vehicle were sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious person to believe Defendant was driving while under influenced of cannabis. (CARTER, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring.)
Court's finding that Defendant failed to make a prima facie case for rescission of his statutory summary suspension (SSS), after being charged with DUI, was not against manifest weight of evidence. Officer's testimony that he "probably" began observation period within 15 minutes of arriving at police station, although he stated that he observed Defendant for 29 minutes, did not mandate that officer's testimony be discredited entirely. Officer was in "substantial compliance" with 20-minute observation period, and it is not required that officer record time when 20-minute observation period began. No denial of due process in State failing to disclose to Defendant prior to hearing that officer would testify that he began 20-minute observation period before he read warning to Defendant, as time at which warning was giving, in relation to commencement of observation period, was not material under U.S. Supreme Court Brady v. Maryland decision. (SCHOSTOK and McLAREN, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated DUI. Court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Officer was acting in his community caretaking capacity when he approached Defendant's vehicle out of concern no one exited vehicle after 5 minutes at 1:20 a.m., then found Defendant slumped over the driver's seat. Defendant then showed symptoms of intoxication, and officer detected odor of alcoholic beverage, providing officer with reasonable, articulable suspicion. Court did not improperly consider Defendant's prior DUI convictions at sentencing.(STEIGMANN and APPLETON, concurring.)