Traffic/DUI

Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated DUI resulting in two deaths (man who was carrying his infant son along road after midnight, having run out of gas), and two counts of failure to report an accident involving two deaths, and sentenced to 10 years and 5 years, to run consecutively. State presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant's actions of driving truck and of driving under the influence caused deaths. Court's consideration of only two of the seven mitigating factors presented by Defendant was not abuse of discretion. That adult victim was intoxicated and had parked his car in road with no lights on are not extraordinary circumstances to warrant sentence of probation. GOLDENHERSH and WEXSTTEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of two counts of aggravated DUI, from incident resulting in death after her passenger was ejected from convertible. Despite its misstatements as to legal standard, court exercised discretion in reviewing evidence and pronouncing Defendant's sentence. Court explicitly addressed factors in mitigation and aggravation, and concluded that sentence of three years would have deterrent effect and minimize hardship to family, as Defendant's extended family can care for her three children during her incarceration, and her minor daughters will continue to receive financial support from social security payments from prior death of their father. (McDADE and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with aggravated DUI and aggravated driving while license revoked (DWLR). Officer's observations justified investigatory traffic stop, when he twice saw Defendant deviate from his own lane into another lane for no obvious reason. Motor Vehicle Code provision for improper lane usage contains no distance requirement; thus, it is irrelevant to officer's justification for investigatory stop whether motorist has driven for any appreciable distance in more than one lane. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

As original DUI(a)(5) charge was filed via uniform traffic citation and complaint form, compulsory-joinder rule does not apply as between that charge and subsequent DUI(a)(2) charge. Thus, speedy-trial period from original DUI(a)(5) charge does not apply to subsequent DUI(a)(2) charge, and State did not violate speedy-trial term as to subsequent DUI(a)(2) charge. (HOLDRIDGE, concurring; SCHMIDT, specially concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 7/3/12.) Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of aggravated driving with revoked or suspended license (DWRL), and sentenced as Class X offender to six years imprisonment. State failed to prove aggravating factor that Defendant's license had been revoked for violation of Section 11-501 of Vehicle Code. Trial court erred in rejecting, without explanation, Defendant's argument that revocation in effect in 2008 was not for DUI but for 1991 drug offense, so Defendant was guilty only of Class A misdemeanor DWLR. Secretary of State's 2001 formal administrative sanction of revocation for DUI had no effect because Secretary had never issued Defendant a new license after 1991 revocation. (McLAREN, concurring; BIRKETT, dissenting.)

Court properly dismissed without prejudice Defendant’s petition to rescind statutory summary suspension (SSS). Vehicle Code permits petition to rescind SSS to be brought only after State has served notice of suspension, and hearing must be held within 30 days of date petition to rescind SSS is properly filed. Service of notice of SSSS is satisfied by mailing with prepaid postage the notice to Defendant’s address as shown on traffic ticket. Substantial compliance with regulations for officer obtaining urine sample from arrestee is required, as strict compliance is not always realistic. (ZENOFF and BURKE, concurring.)