Traffic/DUI

Defendant was stopped by City police officer for not wearing a seat belt; officer learned that her license was suspended, and she could not produce proof of insurance. Officer did not question teenage passenger for license or proof of insurance, Court found that officer should not have impounded car because it was, in fact, insured. Vehicle Code and city police department procedures mandated that officer impound vehicle, because driver was suspended and vehicle was presumed uninsured as driver failed to produce proof of insurance, and neither Code nor procedures required thaty officer investigate the presence of a licensed driver and facilitate the showing of proof of insurance. (ZENOFF, concurring; BOWMAN, dissenting.)

Court affirmed decisions of Illinois Secretary of State to deny petitions to rescind license suspensions per Section 6-206(a)(31) of Motor Vehicle Code, for refusal to submit to blood-alcohol test, on basis that Petitioners were driving vehicles involved in accidents where injured persons were transported from scene via ambulance. Secretary of State erred in finding that the fact that an injured party was carried from the scene by ambulance is sufficient to establish a "type A" injury under the Code; plain language of Code requires that the persons have injuries which require them to be carried from the scene. (CHAPMAN and DONOVAN, concurring.)

Court properly rescinded statutory summary suspension of driver charged with DUI. Court properly factored into its decision that because of the State's inability to produce video of Defendant's performance on field sobriety tests, the video presumptively would have weighed against the State, and might have held exculpatory value for Defendant. Court's understanding that police video camera recorded the stop, but that the recording could not be produced because of a technical problem, was supported by the record. Court inherently found that information presumed on video, and Defendant's testimony, outweighed State's evidence. (McLAREN and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was arrested for DUI, and as a result of her BAC was notified by Secretary of State that her license would be suspended effective 8/6/09. Less than 30 days after her first arrest, Defendant was arrested again for DUI, and was informed that due to her BAC her license would be suspended effective 9/1/09. Court issued order directing Secretary of State to issue Defendant a Monitoring Device Driving Permit (MDDP), and finding that Defendant was a first offender. Court later found Secretary in indirect civil contempt upon refusal to ssue MDDP to Defendant. Defendant was no longer a "first offender" upon Secretary of State confirming her suspension in first arrest, which disqualified her from receiving a MDDP in her second DUI case, and thus court was barred from ordering issuance of MDDP. (JORGENSEN and BOWMAN, concurring.)

Police officer saw Defendant driving with his turn signal activated, but driving past three opportunities to turn, and stopped Defendant based on belief that use of turn signal was a traffic violation. Defendant, whose license was suspended, was arrested and heroin was found on his person. Court properly granted motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, as no violation of traffic laws was committed in use of turn signal, and officer's mistake of law did not justify the stop at its inception. Vehicle Code statutes which prohibit flashing lights except as authorized govern a vehicle's equipment, including that equipment must be operable, and not the driver's conduct. (ZENOFF and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with DUI, after sherrif's deputy ticketed her for driving with all four wheels over the fog lane, but did not stop her until two to four miles after violation. Court granted Defendant's motion to quash arrest, finding that deputy was credible but lacked probable cause for stop, with delay in stop being a "significant" factor in its ruling. Officer's observation of traffic violation is sufficient to provide probable cause, and delay between violation and stop does not dissipate probable cause. (HUDSON and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of his seventh violation of felony driving while license revoked, his license having been revoked for a DUI conviction. Although "imprisonment" is an ambiguous term within the meaning of Section 6-303(d-3) of the Vehicle Code, which requires imprisonment for fourth or subsequent offense, electronic home monitoring is not the equivalent of imprisonment. Court did not err in denying Defendant's request that his imprisonment be served by electronic home monitoring. (BOWMAN and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with aggravated DUI and aggravated driving while license revoked. Court properly granted Defendant's motion to quash arrest and to suppress evidence, as police officer lacked probable cause to stop Defendant's vehicle. Officer testified that he saw Defendant's tires twice "barely" cross the striped lane divider between two northbound lanes of traffic, for a matter of seconds, followed him for awhile, did not see any other traffic violations, and then pulled vehicle over. A momentary and minimal veering over a lane line does not necessarily mean a driver is driving in more than one lane of traffic. Officer's testimony failed to establish a reasonable belief that Defendant was actually driving in two lanes and was thus in violation of statute prohibiting improper lane usage. (O'BRIEN, concurring; SCHMIDT, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted of felony driving on revoked license after bench trial. Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel, as counsel failed to file motion to suppress the revoked license which would likely have been granted. Police officer testified that he saw Defendant driving only for 20-25 seconds before he pulled over into "No Parking" zone, but Defendant and passenger remained in the car, and City of Chicago ordinance defines "No Parking" zones as requiring that vehicles not be left unoccupied there. Officer turned on his flashing lights when he pulled behind vehicle, and this was a display of force such that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave nor to refuse to produce license and insurance card. Thus, Defendant, who produced his state ID, leading officer to learn that his license was revoked, was subjected to unlawful seizure of his revoked license. (KARNEZIS and CONNORS, concurring.)