Traffic/DUI

Defendant was arrested for DUI late at night on 9/2. Court properly granted DUI defendant's petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension (SSS). Officer's sworn report failed to establish on its face validity of suspension, because report indicated that notice of SSS was given on 9/2, which was before Defendant completed breath test (in early morning hours of 9/3). (McLAREN and HUTCHINSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of obstructing a peace officer. State failed to prove Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Officers stopped vehicle at 3 a.m. on New Year's Day because five people were in car. Defendant was front-seat passenger in vehicle driven by his wife who was asked to perform field sobriety tests after officers detected odor of alcohol in car. Defendant had stepped outside of car, which was not an act of obstruction, because officer never told Defendant he had to stay inside the car, but only a brief 21-second interruption of officer's duties. Defendant delayed only 47 seconds, per video, in getting back in car after officer told him to do so, and video contradicted officers' testimony as to course of events. (McLAREN and BOWMAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of aggravated DUI. Defendant filed motion to dismiss, arguing that statute required only that he possess a driver's license, not necessarily that he possess a valid drivers license. Issue is whether Defendant, at time of offense, possessed permission from the State to drive. If license was at that time revoked, suspended, or expired, then no such permission existed, and Defendant did not possess a driver's license within meaning of statute. (JORGENSEN and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of driving while revoked and aggravated DUI. Defendant was not "in custody" for Miranda purposes, while sitting in squad car which he had entered voluntarily, knowing he was being transported to his vehicle a short distance away. That officer did not tell Defendant that he could refuse request for blood and urine samples does not render results inadmissible. A defendant who has been arrested for DUI does not hava a right to refuse chemical testing, as police inquiry into whether a suspect would submit to blood-alcohol test is not interrogation within meaning of Miranda. (TURNER, concurring; COOK, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted on three counts of aggravated DUI, from fatal car accident which killed state trooper. DUI violation was proximate cause of trooper's death, even though another driver had first crossed into other lane and then collided with trooper's car. Jury could reasonably have found that a sober driver would have reacted more appropriately to traffic. Court properly instructed jury on proximate cause with IPI Criminal No. 23.28A, which adequately states the foreseeability component of proximate cause. Defendant committed a single actof DUI, and a single death resulted from accident; thus, conviction should be on one count, not three, per the "one-act, one-crime" rule. (STEIGMANN and POPE, concurring.)