Traffic/DUI

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of obstructing a peace officer. State failed to prove Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Officers stopped vehicle at 3 a.m. on New Year's Day because five people were in car. Defendant was front-seat passenger in vehicle driven by his wife who was asked to perform field sobriety tests after officers detected odor of alcohol in car. Defendant had stepped outside of car, which was not an act of obstruction, because officer never told Defendant he had to stay inside the car, but only a brief 21-second interruption of officer's duties. Defendant delayed only 47 seconds, per video, in getting back in car after officer told him to do so, and video contradicted officers' testimony as to course of events. (McLAREN and BOWMAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of aggravated DUI. Defendant filed motion to dismiss, arguing that statute required only that he possess a driver's license, not necessarily that he possess a valid drivers license. Issue is whether Defendant, at time of offense, possessed permission from the State to drive. If license was at that time revoked, suspended, or expired, then no such permission existed, and Defendant did not possess a driver's license within meaning of statute. (JORGENSEN and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of driving while revoked and aggravated DUI. Defendant was not "in custody" for Miranda purposes, while sitting in squad car which he had entered voluntarily, knowing he was being transported to his vehicle a short distance away. That officer did not tell Defendant that he could refuse request for blood and urine samples does not render results inadmissible. A defendant who has been arrested for DUI does not hava a right to refuse chemical testing, as police inquiry into whether a suspect would submit to blood-alcohol test is not interrogation within meaning of Miranda. (TURNER, concurring; COOK, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted on three counts of aggravated DUI, from fatal car accident which killed state trooper. DUI violation was proximate cause of trooper's death, even though another driver had first crossed into other lane and then collided with trooper's car. Jury could reasonably have found that a sober driver would have reacted more appropriately to traffic. Court properly instructed jury on proximate cause with IPI Criminal No. 23.28A, which adequately states the foreseeability component of proximate cause. Defendant committed a single actof DUI, and a single death resulted from accident; thus, conviction should be on one count, not three, per the "one-act, one-crime" rule. (STEIGMANN and POPE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of driving on suspended license and driving without insurance. Court made adequate inquiry into posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, as defense counsel's failure to cross-examine officer about validity of Defendant's driver's license was matter of trial strategy and was irrelevant. No inquiry was needed into Defendant's fitness for trial. Defense counsel did not state, during trial, that Defendant was unable to understand proceedings or could not assista in his defense. Defense counsel's general statement during pretrial hearing that communication with Defendant had been somewhat difficult was not enough to raise doubt about fitness. (CAHILL and McBRIDE, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with DUI, and filed petition to rescind statutory summary suspension (SSS). Court erred in rescinding SSS. Defendant refused to consent to police request for alcohol testing, and then he was told he would be taken to hospital to undergo involuntary blood and urine draws. Although hospital testing was done at behest of police, it was hospital staff who asked Defendant to sign a hospital consent form to perform draws, and Defendant did so. Signing hospital consent form at request of hospital staff is not tantamount to police giving Defendant a "second chance" to consent to testing. (WRIGHT, concurring; SCHMIDT, specially concurring.)