Traffic/DUI

A defendant must raise an issue in a posttrial motion after bench trial to preserve it for appeal. Defendant forfeited argument that court erred in admitting evidence of moving radar reading in his bench trial for speeding, by failing to file posttrial motion raising argument. (McDADE and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Jury verdict for $1.66 million, reduced to $700,143 for decedent's contributory negligence, for injury to train passenger who hurried across pedestrian crosswalk and was blown back into oncoming train, whose horn had sounded while passenger was halfway across crosswalk. Defendant railroad had duty to warn decedent of the approaching train. Jury's finding that decedent walked in front of train when he knew it was unsafe to do so is consistent with its finding that accident was partially attributable to his own negligence, and is not inconsistent with its verdict or it findings that Defendant failed to adequately warn of approaching train. (QUINN and NEVILLE, concurring.)

The 30 days in which a defendant is entitled to a hearing on a petition to rescind statutory summary suspension of his driving privileges begins to run before the Secretary of State has confirmed the suspension. Defendant is entitled to the recission of suspension if he was not given a hearing within 30 days after filing his petition. Without a confirmation of the suspension, there is not a suspension for the trial court to rescind, but the Motor Vehicle Code does not indicate that the 30-day period begins with the Secretary's confirmation. (SCHOSTOK and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendants were charged with DUI and aggravated DUI as repeat offenders, having been convicted of one prior DUI and charged with a second, pending DUI. Court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss aggravated DUI charges for failure to state an offense and denial of due process. Court's consideration of circumstances of each Defendant's second prior DUI violation and its finding that a pending DUI is not a "violation" were premature and impermissible in context of motions to dismiss. Court improperly assessed evidentiary support for allegations in indictments, that Defendants had committed DUIs on two prior occasions, rather than assessing legal sufficiency of indictments themselves. (McLAREN and BOWMAN, concurring.)

Defendant pled guilty to Class 2 felony of aggravated DUI and Class 3 felony of driving while license revoked, and was sentenced to concurrent prison sentences of six years and four years. Date that a court reporter certifies a report of proceedings per Rule 608(b) has nothing to do with the date the transcript of proceedings was prepared, and is thus irrelevant to whether defense counsel could have examined transcript to be stated in counsel's Rule 604(d) certificate. Sentences were not excessive; Defendant had 11 prior convictions for driving on revoked or suspended license and failed to attend TASC screening as referred by probation officer. (KNECHT and APPLETON, concurring.)

Court erred in holding that officer's seizure of Defendant was not a legitimate community-caretaking exercise, and thus erred in granting motion to quash and suppress. It was a reasonable public-safety enbdeavor for officer to check on Defendant's stopped vehicle, which came to a stop while officer observed it, and officer had reason to believe the occupants might need assistance, given hazards posed by passing traffic. Statutory grounds for rescission of statutory summary suspension (SSS) is that officer lacked reasonable basis to believe that person was in actual physical control of vehicle upon highway while under the influence; and this is separate from the constitutional ground for rescission based on propriety of initial traffic stop. (BOWMAN and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Plaintiff Village charged Defendant with DUI. Court properly dismissed charge on basis of denial of right to speedy trial. Defendant did not forfeit his statutory right to a speedy trial by failing to object to court's own decision to continue the trial date beyond the 160-day period. A defendant who proceeds under Section 103-5(a), applicable to defendants in custody, has a duty to object when the court sets trial date outside statutory period, but a defendant who proceeds under 103-5(b), applicable to defendants not in custody, has no such duty. No basis to conclude that any delays were attributable to Defendant, where continuances were due to matters outside Defendant's control or responsibility, such as court's busy schedule. (ZENOFF and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Circuit court had improperly dismissed traffic tickets upon which officer had written a first appearance date beyond the 60 day period provided in Supreme Court Rule 504. Showing of prejudice, in denial of Defendant's due process rights, was required, rather than automatically dismissing tickets based on violation of Rule 504 as to time period for first appearance. (KILBRIDE, THOMAS, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant was hospitalized after head-on collision, and consented to blood and urine tests. Although blood tests did not reveal alcohol, his urine contained methamphetamine, at trial he admitted to being a "crystal meth" user but denied having used it on night of accident. No tests are available to determine impairment based on drugs such as methamphetamine, and thus there was no need to prove that Defendant suffered from any degree of impairment which caused the accidental fatalities. Conviction and sentence for aggravated DUI reinstated. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, KARMEIER, and BURKE, concurring.)