Traffic/DUI

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated DUI. One minute footage of video, of Defendant in back of police car after arrest, was played for jury. As Defendant did not object at time of stop when he was informed of recording, his consent to recording is implied, and exemption to eavesdropping statute applies as arrest did not necessarily signal end of investigation. Court properly allowed arresting officer to testify as to his opinions on HGN, as foundation was established as to officer's training and knowledge. (COOK, concurring; APPLETON, specially concurring.)

Deputy's testimony that he observed Defendant's right-side tires cross over fog line twice for a couple of seconds each time while following him, was sufficient, if believed, for deputy to believe that Defendant violated improper-lane-usage statute and to provide him with probable cause to effect initial traffic stop. Evidence of endangerment in violation of improper-lane-usage statute is not essential to finding of probable cause for stop. (WELCH and CHAPMAN, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with DUI, and requested that State produce video of arrest. City had destroyed video a few hours prior to hearing on Defendant's petition to rescind SSS, as videos were purged within 30 days of arrest pursuant to Department policy. Court granted Defendant's motion for sanctions and barred State from introducing testimony relating to what was contained on video. Court was within its discretion in finding that video was subject to discovery and that State committed discovery violation by allowing video to be destroyed. Sanction was appropriate, as State was not precluded from prosecuting Defendant and could have questioned officer about his observations other than what was shown on video. (KILBRIDE, THOMAS, GARMAN, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with two counts of DUI. Court entered interlocutory order granting Defendant's motion to strike results of breath test on basis that amended version of regulations for certification of evidentiary breath test instruments retroactively applied to exclude results, as State did not proffer reference sample value. Trial court properly considered Defendant's motion to strike promptly after Defendant raised objection at first available opportunity, which was during trial. Thus, appellate court is without jurisdiction over appeal, as motion to strike did not allege that results of breath test were illegally obtained, and appeal of that ruling is not the type of appeal contemplated by Rule 604(a)(1). (McLAREN and BURKE, concurring.)

Failure to indicate, on the arresting officer's Sworn Report, the manner by which Defendant was given notice of his statutory summary suspension (whether by immediate service or by notice via mail) is not a defect warranting rescission of his suspension. (BOWMAN, concurring; McLAREN, dissenting.)

Police officer sprayed Defendant with pepper spray while arresting him for DUI, and Defendant was then taken to hospital for treatment of eye. Blood was drawn for testing of heart issues, and court ordered hospital to release blood samples for blood alcohol testing by ISP lab; testing was done three weeks after arrest. Court properly barred use of BAC evidence, finding that blood had not been collected and stored per Administrative Code regulations requiring that blood collection tubes contain preservatives. Issue of failure to comply with that regulation requires inquiry into scientific basis for it. Defendant made no speedy-trial demand, and thus no speedy trial period, for either initial charges or later-brought BAC charge, could run. (BOWMAN and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of DUI, unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, and unlawful possession of cannabis. Officer stopped Defendant's vehicle because of broken taillight and air freshener hanging from rearview mirror which would obstruct Defendant's view. Court properly denied motion to suppress evidence and motion to rescind statutory summary suspension (SSS). Air freshener, 3 inches by 4 to 5 inches and swaying side to side, hung by elastic string two inches below the mirror, was a material obstruction based on its placement in vehicle and in relation to Defendant's eye level, thus justifying traffic stop. (POPE, concurring; APPLETON, dissenting.)

Defendant, charged with DUI, first demanded trial, and then 3 1/2 months later was absent from scheduled court date. After bond forfeiture warrant was issued, Defendant appeared the next day and stated that she mixed up the court dates, and demanded a speedy trial 2 1/2 months later. New speedy trial period began on date of Defendant's last demand, speedy trial term was not tolled, and her rights to speedy trial were not violated. A defendant's failure to appear in court operates as waiver to prior demand for speedy trial, regardless of whether failure to appear is "explained" or "unexplained". (R. GORDON and GARCIA, concurring.)