Traffic/DUI

Circuit court had improperly dismissed traffic tickets upon which officer had written a first appearance date beyond the 60 day period provided in Supreme Court Rule 504. Showing of prejudice, in denial of Defendant's due process rights, was required, rather than automatically dismissing tickets based on violation of Rule 504 as to time period for first appearance. (KILBRIDE, THOMAS, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant was hospitalized after head-on collision, and consented to blood and urine tests. Although blood tests did not reveal alcohol, his urine contained methamphetamine, at trial he admitted to being a "crystal meth" user but denied having used it on night of accident. No tests are available to determine impairment based on drugs such as methamphetamine, and thus there was no need to prove that Defendant suffered from any degree of impairment which caused the accidental fatalities. Conviction and sentence for aggravated DUI reinstated. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, KARMEIER, and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was stopped by City police officer for not wearing a seat belt; officer learned that her license was suspended, and she could not produce proof of insurance. Officer did not question teenage passenger for license or proof of insurance, Court found that officer should not have impounded car because it was, in fact, insured. Vehicle Code and city police department procedures mandated that officer impound vehicle, because driver was suspended and vehicle was presumed uninsured as driver failed to produce proof of insurance, and neither Code nor procedures required thaty officer investigate the presence of a licensed driver and facilitate the showing of proof of insurance. (ZENOFF, concurring; BOWMAN, dissenting.)

Court affirmed decisions of Illinois Secretary of State to deny petitions to rescind license suspensions per Section 6-206(a)(31) of Motor Vehicle Code, for refusal to submit to blood-alcohol test, on basis that Petitioners were driving vehicles involved in accidents where injured persons were transported from scene via ambulance. Secretary of State erred in finding that the fact that an injured party was carried from the scene by ambulance is sufficient to establish a "type A" injury under the Code; plain language of Code requires that the persons have injuries which require them to be carried from the scene. (CHAPMAN and DONOVAN, concurring.)

Court properly rescinded statutory summary suspension of driver charged with DUI. Court properly factored into its decision that because of the State's inability to produce video of Defendant's performance on field sobriety tests, the video presumptively would have weighed against the State, and might have held exculpatory value for Defendant. Court's understanding that police video camera recorded the stop, but that the recording could not be produced because of a technical problem, was supported by the record. Court inherently found that information presumed on video, and Defendant's testimony, outweighed State's evidence. (McLAREN and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was arrested for DUI, and as a result of her BAC was notified by Secretary of State that her license would be suspended effective 8/6/09. Less than 30 days after her first arrest, Defendant was arrested again for DUI, and was informed that due to her BAC her license would be suspended effective 9/1/09. Court issued order directing Secretary of State to issue Defendant a Monitoring Device Driving Permit (MDDP), and finding that Defendant was a first offender. Court later found Secretary in indirect civil contempt upon refusal to ssue MDDP to Defendant. Defendant was no longer a "first offender" upon Secretary of State confirming her suspension in first arrest, which disqualified her from receiving a MDDP in her second DUI case, and thus court was barred from ordering issuance of MDDP. (JORGENSEN and BOWMAN, concurring.)

Police officer saw Defendant driving with his turn signal activated, but driving past three opportunities to turn, and stopped Defendant based on belief that use of turn signal was a traffic violation. Defendant, whose license was suspended, was arrested and heroin was found on his person. Court properly granted motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, as no violation of traffic laws was committed in use of turn signal, and officer's mistake of law did not justify the stop at its inception. Vehicle Code statutes which prohibit flashing lights except as authorized govern a vehicle's equipment, including that equipment must be operable, and not the driver's conduct. (ZENOFF and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with DUI, after sherrif's deputy ticketed her for driving with all four wheels over the fog lane, but did not stop her until two to four miles after violation. Court granted Defendant's motion to quash arrest, finding that deputy was credible but lacked probable cause for stop, with delay in stop being a "significant" factor in its ruling. Officer's observation of traffic violation is sufficient to provide probable cause, and delay between violation and stop does not dissipate probable cause. (HUDSON and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of his seventh violation of felony driving while license revoked, his license having been revoked for a DUI conviction. Although "imprisonment" is an ambiguous term within the meaning of Section 6-303(d-3) of the Vehicle Code, which requires imprisonment for fourth or subsequent offense, electronic home monitoring is not the equivalent of imprisonment. Court did not err in denying Defendant's request that his imprisonment be served by electronic home monitoring. (BOWMAN and BURKE, concurring.)