Workers’ Compensation Law

Circuit court did not have jurisdiction to review decision of Workers' Compensation Commission where claimant's written request for summons was file-stamped after the 20-day filing period in Section 19(f)(1) of Workers' Occupational Diseases Act, and claimant failed to file proof of mailing the written request for summons in circuit court within 20 days after he received Commission's decision. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HARRIS, and STEWART, concurring.)

Claimant, age 42, was employed as a "line haul" truck driver when he sustained workplace accident, when a dolly weighing several thousand pounds ran over both of his feet while he was assisting another driver. Court confirmed Commission's decision, affirming (other than correcting a calculation error) arbitrator's decision awarding benefits, including permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits for 30% loss of right foot and 8% loss of left foot. Section 8.1b of Workers' Compensation Act does not specify the weight that Workers' Compensation Commission must give to the physician's report. Commission is obligated to weigh all five factors listed within Section 8.1b(b) of the Act and make a factual finding as to level of worker's permanent partial disability, with no single factor being the sole determinant of disability.(HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and HARRIS, concurring.)

Claimant filed worker's compensation claim for injury to his right wrist, sustained when the rolling chair he was sitting in at work, while filling out forms, went out from underneath him as he reached to retrieve a dropped pen. Act of reaching for dropped pen while sitting in chair was not one he was instructed to perform or had a duty to perform, and was not incidental to his assigned duties. Risk of injury at issue was not one distinctly associated with his employment. (HOFFMAN and HUDSON, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring; STEWART, dissenting.)

When attorneys for a worker covered by Workers' Compensation Act bring a successful action against a 3rd-party to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the worker in the course of his employment, thus enabling the worker's employer to obtain reimbursement of compensation benefits it is obligated to pay under the Act, the Act requires the employer to pay 25% of the gross amount it obtains in reimbursement as attorney fees, absent other agreement. The gross amount of reimbursement subject to attorney fees under the Act includes the amount of benefits the employer will be relieved from paying in the future because of this recovery in the 3rd-party action, which calculation should include the value of future medical care.(GARMAN, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Village fire department lieutenant/paramedic filed workers' compensation claim for PTSD allegedly caused by work-related incident. Physician testified that, within a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric certainty, the claimant's PTSD was caused by trauma of incident when  witnessed a firefighter on Claimant's crew immediately after he suffered work-related death. Employer's actions after fire indicate that it believed that crew suffered sudden, severe, emotional shock of greater dimensions than emotional strain and tension all employees experience from worry, anxiety, pressure and overwork. Claimant's psychological injuries stemmed from single, traumatic event and he is entitled to workers compensation benefits. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and HARRIS, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 8/10/16.) Court properly confirmed decision of Workers' Compensation Commission denying Plaintiff police officer's claim for benefits for injuries sustained in motor vehicle accident during his drive from home to training session. Officer's injuries took place during normal commuting, and he was not acting within scope of his employment at time of accident. Traveling employee doctrine is not extended to include any claimant involved in accident on the way to their normal workplace, not performing any duties incidental to their employment, where employee's regular work shift was different that day.(HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HARRIS, and STEWART, concurring.)

 Claimant filed for workers compensation benefits for injury to lower that he allegedly sustained in 1999 accident. Arbitrator ordered employer to pay TTD, TPD and maintenance benefits. Commission affirmed arbitrator's decision, but vacated TPD/maintenance benefits and awarding wage differential. Claimant sought judicial review of Commission's decision. Section 8(d)(1) purpose is to compensate a claimant for diminished earning capacity caused by work-related injury. The fact that claimant subsequently suffered unrelated and more disabling work injury to neck in 2002 did not alter fact that 1999 back injury reduced his earning capacity. Commission's decision fails to adequately compensate claimant for his first economic injury. Nothing prohibits awarding both PTD and wage differential benefits simultaneously and indefinitely under these circumstances. (HOFFMAN, HUDSON, HARRIS, and STEWART, concurring.)

Claimant, a lineman, filed claim for workers' compensation benefits for back injury. Claimant's chiropractic records show that claimant had a significant preexisting condition involving same area of the body, and involving same modes of treatment. A claimant may obtain compensation under the Workers Compensation Act even when he suffers from a preexisting condition of ill-being; recovery depends on claimant's ability to establish that his work-related accident aggravated or accelerated his preexisting condition. Causation in preexisting injury cases may be established without medical opinion evidence and through circumstantial evidence, i.e., a chain of events. Record contains sufficient evidence to show that claimant's work accident aggravated his preexisting back condition of ill-being. Section 8.1b does not make submission of a PPD impairment report a prerequisite to an award of PPD benefits by the Commission.(HOLDRIDGE, HUDSON, and STEWART, concurring; HOFFMAN, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Plaintiff filed suit for injuries he suffered while assisting in roof repairs on a commercial building. Plaintiff filed workers compensation claim against his employer, but not against general contractor (Defendant here). Plaintiff never asserted, in his workers compensation claim, that he was injured while acting as employee of general contractor, other than in caption of settlement contract. Court erred in granting summary judgment for Defendant, as genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Plaintiff was a borrowed employee in service of Defendant at time of injury.  (ROCHFORD and DELORT, concurring.)