Workers’ Compensation Law

Vehicle collision occurred in Illinois. Plaintiff, in the course of his employment as a semitruck driver with a Pennsylvania-based company, was allegedly struck and injured by the semitruck operated by Defendant in the course of his employment with another company. As a result of collision, Plaintiff filed in Pennsylvania a workers' compensation claim against his employer, which led to execution of a "Compromise and Release Agreement by Stipulation" settling the claim. Plaintiff also filed claim against Defendants in Grundy County (IL) circuit court, which held that the Agreement included a judicial admission that prohibited Plaintiff from claiming injuries other than a right knee strain, and granted Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment or Summary Determination of a Major Issue. That order resolved an issue, not a claim, and thus was not subject to review under Rule 304(a). Court's entry of a Rule 304(a) finding was improper, and appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review circuit court's order. (GARMAN, THEIS, and M. BURKE, concurring; A. BURKE and NEVILLE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Temporary employee of university hopped over a chain barrier along a sidewalk on her way to drop off her time card. The heel of her shoe got caught and she fell and suffered injury to her elbow. Workers' Compensation Commission properly denied Claimant's claim for benefits, as Claimant failed to prove that her accident arose out of her employment. Claimant's decision to hop over chain fence, rather than use the walkway, was for her own benefit, and she voluntarily exposed herself to an unnecessary personal danger. Thus, injury did not arise out of employment as a non-traveling employee. Record supports Commission's conclusion that travel was not an essential element of Claimant's employment.  (HOFFMAN, HUDSON, CAVANAGH, and BARBERIS, concurring.)

Petitioner won benefits from Respondent employer, which then filed 2 actions for judicial review. Court issued a decision that was partly unfavorable to Petitioner. Both appeals were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Circuit court then issued a further decision, and Petitioner appeals again in the 2 cases. Even though in one case there is a decision or an analysis, both cases still await a disposition by the circuit court. Both appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and BARBERIS, concurring.)

Defendant entered into a contract with a building owner to be the construction manager on a construction project at the building. As per the contract, Defendant obtained a workers' compensation insurance policy for its employees as well as the employees of its wholly owned subsidiary, which contained a $250,000 deductible. Plaintiff, an employee of this subsidiary, was injured while working on the project. Defendant provided Plaintiff with workers' compensation benefits. Court properly dismissed Plaintiff's suit, as Defendant was immune from suit under exclusive remedy provisions of Workers' Compensation Act. Even though Defendant was not Plaintiff's direct employer, it had a preexisting contractual obligation to pay for workers' compensation insurance and thus could avail itself to the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act. (HOWSE and McBRIDE, concurring.)

Claimant filed claim for benefits under Workers' Occupational Diseases Act for injuries he alleged were caused by exposure to coal dust during his 40-year work as a coal miner. Arbitrator denied claim for benefits. There was sufficient evidence to support Commission's implicit finding that claimant proved that he suffered timely disablement, and its judgment as to impairment. Workers' Compensation Commission affirmed arbitrator's decision in part and reversed in part. Commission affirmed arbitrator's finding that claimant failed to prove that he suffered from coal miner's pneumoconiosis. Commission's finding that claimant sustained COPD and chronic bronchitis which was causally related to his employment was not against manifest weight of evidence. Commission found that claimant was permanently disabled to extent of 10% of the person as a whole and ordered employer to pay claimant permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits for 50 weeks. c(HOFFMAN, HUDSON, CAVANAGH, and BARBERIS, concurring.)