Workers’ Compensation Law

Claimant injured his knee while working as a sous-chef. Arbitrator awarded workers' compensation benefits to him, but Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission reversed, finding that the injury did not "arise out of" his employment.  Commission's finding is against manifest weight of evidence. Knee injury arose out of Claimant's employment because at the time of his injury, when he was searching in the walk-in cooler for a coworker's misplaced pan of carrots, he was at work performing an act his employer might reasonably expect him to perform incident to his assigned job duties which included arranging the walk-in cooler. Once it is established that the injury is work related, claimant is not required to present additional evidence for work-related injuries that are caused by common bodily movements or everyday activities such as bending, twisting, reaching, or standing up for a kneeling position. (A. BURKE, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, KARMEIER, and THEIS, concurring.)

Court found that Respondent knowingly failed to provide workers' compensation coverage as required by Workers' Compensation Act. The record was insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the Commission's finding that the Nonrenewal Notice was sent to Respondent by a certain date, as no proof of mailing in accordance with section 143.17a of Insurance Code was provided. The other justifications proffered by the Commission were insufficient to show what Respondent knew about the status of its workers' compensation insurance on date of claimant's alleged accident. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, CAVANAGH, and BARBERIS, concurring.)

Claimant filed claim for injuries allegedly sustained in employment. No error in Commission attaching to its decision the arbitrator's decision and considering the transcript from  the Morales case which aided in the efficient disposition of the case where claimant admitted that he used the stolen identity of "Nelson Centeno". Commission properly took judicial notice of the Morales case. Claimant did present evidence at the 2nd section 19(b) hearing as to his need for further medical care, and he testified that he was unable to work. Commission was not required to accept this evidence, especially given evidence that placed his credibility in doubt. Commission correctly determined that the award in Claimant's prior case, in 2016, was a final award and that the only way to seek enforcement was in the circuit court pursuant to section 19(g). Commission erred in failing to award penalties and attorney fees for Respondent's failure to pay an additional $1,101.57 in TTD benefits and its failure to pay previously awarded and uncontested portion of medical bills.  (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, CAVANAGH, and BARBERIS, concurring.) 

Claimant suffered right knee injury when doing work as a marine technician, installing a swim platform on the back of a boat. Employer revoked authorization for knee surgery because of a note entered by a "check-in person" at a VA facility, in VA records, referencing a prior right knee procedure 14 years prior. Claimant denied any prior injury or procedure to the right knee, but admitted he had prior surgery to the right leg in the shin area. Arbitrator found that in refusing to authorize claimant's surgery employer was unreasonable and vexatious, and awarded penalties of $6900 under Section 19(l) of Workers' Compensation Act, and attorney fees of $1380, under Section 16 of the Act, but declined to impose penalties under Section 19(k) of the Act. The Act does not allow the Commission to assess penalties against an employer based on failure or delay in authorizing medical treatment, and Commission properly vacated Section 19(l) penalty. (HOFFMAN, CAVANAGH, and BARBERIS, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, dissenting.)

 Plaintiff filed retaliatory discharge claim alleging that he was fired in retaliation for exercising his right under the Workers’ Compensation Act. After bench trial, court entered judgment for Defendants. Giving deference to trial court on credibility, nothing is manifestly erroneous in its determination that ComEd had valid, nonpretextual reasons to terminate the Plaintiff, wholly unrelated to filing of his workers' compensation claims:  misrepresentation about his condition during medical leave, and his "total work" record, including poor productivity and insubordination. (HOWSE and ELLIS, concurring.)

Employee was, while working, pinned between 2 vehicles resulting in his death. Employee's minor son qualifies as a dependent under Section 7(a) of the Workers' Compensation Act, event though he was adopted by his stepfather after his father's death. The Act contains no express language terminating minor's right to benefits by reason of his adoption where he otherwise qualified for benefits based on his age at time of accident. Ample evidence supported Commission's determination that minor was dependent on his father at the time of the accident. Employer lacked a reasonable basis for challenging existence of an employment relations, and decedent's status as an employee gave rise to employer's obligation to pay his medical expenses.  Thus, it was not irrational for Commission to impose penalties and late fee on employer for failure to pay decedent's medical expenses.(HOLDRIDGE, HUDSON, CAVANAGH, and BARBERIS, concurring.)

Employee filed workers' compensation claim, but court found that his employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier had no duty to defendant or indemnify it because employer had breached the insurance contract. Employee then amended his application for for adjustment of claim to name the Illinois State Treasurer. Prior to arbitration hearing, employee died of causes unrelated to his claim. In absence of appointment and substitution of a personal representative after employee's death, Commission's decision was premature and improper. Even if gross value of employee's estate is less than $100,000, so that under Section 25-1 of Probate Act estate's assets may be distributed by a small-estate affidavit, appointment of a personal representative is still required, as court's jurisdiction is suspended by employee's death until such appointment.(HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, CAVANAGH, and BARBERIS, concurring.)