Workers’ Compensation Law

Court properly granted summary judgment for Defendant and denied Plaintiff's motion to vacate and reconsider. Court properly held that Plaintiff's personal injury action was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. A borrowed-employee relationship existed, as a temporary staffing agency sent Plaintiff to work as a forklift operator at the facility where he was injured. Plaintiff thus impliedly agreed to the borrowed-employee relationship.  The facility directed and controlled Plaintiff's work; no supervisors from the staffing agency were present at the facility while Plaitiff worked there. (McLAREN and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

Claimant filed for workers' compensation benefits for knee injury he sustained when working as a sous chef for his employer; he had gone from a kneeling position, while looking for food in walk-in cooler, to standing up when his knee "popped".  An "arising out of" determination requires an analysis of the claimant's employment and the work duties he or she was required or expected to perform. The risk posed to claimant from the act of standing from a kneeling position while looking for something was not distinctly related to, or incidental to, his employment, as he was not required to perform the specific activity of looking for food misplaced by a co-worker. Thus, Commission's determination that claimant was not injured due to an employment risk was supported by the record and not against manifest weight of evidence. (HUDSON and MOORE, concurring; HOLDRIDGE and HOFFMAN, specially concurring).

Former railroad employee sued railroad, alleging he injured his back while attempting to board a moving train. After investigating his claim, railroad filed 3rd-party complaint against Plaintiff's doctor for contribution. Court abused its discretion in finding that settlement that Plaintiff and his doctor reached was entered into in good faith, especially as amount of settlement was far less than doctor's fair share of liability. Court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that common-interest exception applied to prevent waiver of attorney-client privilege when Plaintiff and his doctor shared attorney-client privileged communications with each other. Even when a common interest exists between parties, the client must, at time of disclosure, have an agreement with the receiving party that that party will treat the information as privileged.(PIERCE and GRIFFIN, concurring.)

Claimant filed workers' compensation claim against her employer, a school district. Claimant sought review of arbitrator's decision before the Commission; Commission affirmed and adopted arbitrator's decision. Claimant filed a petition for administrative review, and requested that summonses issue; the summonses were issued the next day. Claimant failed to file a notice of intent or an affidavit in circuit court within 20 days of receipt of the Commission's decision. The newest amendment to Section 19(f)(1) of Workers' Compensation Act requires petitioner to exhibit proof of filing with Commission of the notice of intent to file for review in circuit court or an affidavit of attorney setting forth notice of intent to file for review in circuit court within 20 days of receiving the Commission's decision. As claimant failed to do so, circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over petition for review.(HOFFMAN, HUDSON, CAVANAGH, and BARBERIS, concurring.)

Insurer filed declaratory judgment action, seeking ruling that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Defendants against a workers' compensation claim for a forklift accident. Insurer then filed an emergency motion requesting that circuit court stay workers' compensation proceedings pending resolution of declaratory judgment action. Court granted motion to stay. Circuit court shares concurrent jurisdiction with Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (IWCC), and jurisdiction of the circuit court is "paramount". Because claimant's 19(b) petition seeks to determine only whether he is entitled to receive medical services, staying the proceedings in the IWCC is contrary to purpose of expeditious resolution of such issues.(SCHOSTOK and SPENCE, concurring.)

Circuit court set aside Commission's decision to award maintenance benefits, finding that record did not show that claimant participated in a vocational rehabilitation program or self-directed job search over a 3-year period, and confirming Commission's decision to award permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits as a percentage of the person as a whole. Claimant did not show an intention to return to work, although he was capable, and he did not enroll in a vocational rehabilitation program or engage in a job search after his termination. Claimant did not prove a reduction in his earning capacity after his termination. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and CAVANGH, concurring.) 

(Correcting case name, number, and link.) Plaintiff police officer was injured, while on duty, in a car accident caused by Defendant. Plaintiff suffered another injury to his back while at a police training. Court erred in awarding City any amount on its workers' compensation lien, as court failed to distinguish which benefits corresponded to which of his 2 injuries, and erred in not requiring City to present medical evidence in support of its lien. Evidence depositions of physicians deposed for the pension board proceeding should be admitted. Medical testimony in depositions is necessary for court to properly determine to what portion of lien City was entitled as reimbursement for payments it made for injury from car accident. (CARTER and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Plaintiff filed 3 applications for workers' compensation benefits for injuries sustained while working for City. Arbitrator issued a single decision on all 3 claims, awarding permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits for injuries to right wrist and right elbow arising out of 1st accident, and a wage-differential award for injury to right wrist arising out of 2nd accident. Arbitrator determined that injuries from 3rd accident arose out of and in course of vocational-rehabilitation process for 2nd accident. Commission modified rate and commencement date of wage differential awarded for 2nd accident and otherwise adopted arbitrator's decision. Appellate court reinstated scheduled PPD award for injuries to right elbow as entered by the Commission in its original decision, and wage-differential for injuries to right wrist from 1st and 2nd accidents. Finding that claimant was not entitled to PTD benefits was not against manifest weight of evidence, as employer showed that he was suitable for employment as a watchman. Decision claimant was not entitled to a separate PPD award for injuries to neck and shoulders as a result of 3rd accident was not against manifest weight of evidence. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, CAVANAGH, and BARBERIS, concurring.)