Workers’ Compensation Law

Plaintiff appealed from an order of the circuit court affirming the final decision of the Director of Insurance in favor of the defendant regarding a workers’ compensation insurance dispute. The parties disputed whether the plaintiff owed the defendant additional workers’ compensation insurance premiums because certain subcontractors hired by the plaintiff did not have additional coverage. In a prior proceeding, the Supreme Court had reversed an appellate court finding that the DOI lacked statutory authority to resolve the dispute and the matter was returned to the appellate court. On remand, the appellate court reversed the finding of the DOI on the basis that the record did not support the hearing officer’s finding that the employees at issue were subject to workers’ compensation coverage. (MIKVA and CONNORS, concurring)

Claimant appealed from an order of the circuit court confirming the decisions of the Workers’ Compensation Commission awarding him benefits for four separate injuries he sustained while working for the respondent, the City of Chicago. On appeal, claimant argued that the commission erred by declining to award wage-differential benefits under section 8(d)(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, declining to award penalties and fees under sections 19(k), 19(l) and 16 of the Act, and awarding respondent credit under section 8(j) of the Act. The appellate court affirmed the portion of the circuit court’s judgment confirming the commission’s decisions with respect to the permanency award and the imposition of penalties and fees, but vacated the portion of the circuit court’s judgment confirming the commission’s decisions regarding the section 8(j) credits. The appellate court remanded the matter back to the commission for clarification regarding the section 8(j) credits. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and CAVANAGH, concurring)

Petitioner sought payment from respondent employer for past and future medical expenses to treat a workplace injury. On appeal, petitioner argued that the Commission erred when it rejected his life care plan without support from utilization review. Petitioner also challenged the requirement that his future medical care be managed by a central treating physician. The appellate court held that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority and reversed on both issues. The appellate court also affirmed the trial court’s finding that certain conditions were not causally related to the injury and the trial court’s finding that petitioner was not entitled to penalties and attorney’s fees. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and BARBERIS, concurring)

Illinois Supreme Court held that the exclusivity provisions of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act do not bar a claim for statutory damages under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act where an employer is alleged to have violated an employee’s statutory rights under the Privacy Act. The court explained that whether the exclusivity provision of the Compensation Act bars an employee’s civil claim depends on the nature of the damages as it only applies if the injury is one that is covered by the Compensation Act. The injuries alleged by plaintiffs for the alleged violation of the Privacy Act were not the type of injuries that are compensable under the Compensation Act and, as a result, the claims were not barred. (ANNE M. BURKE, GARMAN, THEIS, NEVILLE, and CARTER, concurring and MICHAEL J. BURKE, specially concurring.)

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a general contractor, for injuries he sustained while an employee of the defendant’s subcontractor. The circuit court found defendant was immune under the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Compensation Act. The appellate court affirmed.  The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding that the exclusive remedy provisions under sections 5(a) and 11 of the Workers’ Compensation Act do not extend to a general contractor who is not the employee’s immediate employer even where the general contractor has paid workers’ compensation premiums and benefits for employees of the subcontractor pursuant to a contractual agreement. (ANNE M. BURKE, GARMAN, THEIS, NEVILLE, MICHAEL J. BURKE, and OVERSTREET, concurring)

Defendant was allegedly injured while working for his employer and filed a workers' compensation claim. Plaintiff, the employer's workers' compensation insurer, contacted employer for information about the claim, but employer failed to respond. Insurer filed declaratory judgment action, claiming that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify employer because it had breached the policy's cooperation clause. Record does not show as a matter of law that Plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in seeking employer's participation or that employer willfully refused to participate in investigation. Plaintiff did nothing to discover alternative methods of contacting employer, and its rote efforts to reach employer were not sufficient to show Plaintiff's diligence or that employer willfully refused to cooperate. (McBRIDE and BURKE, concurring.)

Vehicle collision occurred in Illinois. Plaintiff, in the course of his employment as a semitruck driver with a Pennsylvania-based company, was allegedly struck and injured by the semitruck operated by Defendant in the course of his employment with another company. As a result of collision, Plaintiff filed in Pennsylvania a workers' compensation claim against his employer, which led to execution of a "Compromise and Release Agreement by Stipulation" settling the claim. Plaintiff also filed claim against Defendants in Grundy County (IL) circuit court, which held that the Agreement included a judicial admission that prohibited Plaintiff from claiming injuries other than a right knee strain, and granted Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment or Summary Determination of a Major Issue. That order resolved an issue, not a claim, and thus was not subject to review under Rule 304(a). Court's entry of a Rule 304(a) finding was improper, and appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review circuit court's order. (GARMAN, THEIS, and M. BURKE, concurring; A. BURKE and NEVILLE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)