Workers’ Compensation Law

Claimant filed claim for injuries allegedly sustained in employment. No error in Commission attaching to its decision the arbitrator's decision and considering the transcript from  the Morales case which aided in the efficient disposition of the case where claimant admitted that he used the stolen identity of "Nelson Centeno". Commission properly took judicial notice of the Morales case. Claimant did present evidence at the 2nd section 19(b) hearing as to his need for further medical care, and he testified that he was unable to work. Commission was not required to accept this evidence, especially given evidence that placed his credibility in doubt. Commission correctly determined that the award in Claimant's prior case, in 2016, was a final award and that the only way to seek enforcement was in the circuit court pursuant to section 19(g). Commission erred in failing to award penalties and attorney fees for Respondent's failure to pay an additional $1,101.57 in TTD benefits and its failure to pay previously awarded and uncontested portion of medical bills.  (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, CAVANAGH, and BARBERIS, concurring.) 

Claimant suffered right knee injury when doing work as a marine technician, installing a swim platform on the back of a boat. Employer revoked authorization for knee surgery because of a note entered by a "check-in person" at a VA facility, in VA records, referencing a prior right knee procedure 14 years prior. Claimant denied any prior injury or procedure to the right knee, but admitted he had prior surgery to the right leg in the shin area. Arbitrator found that in refusing to authorize claimant's surgery employer was unreasonable and vexatious, and awarded penalties of $6900 under Section 19(l) of Workers' Compensation Act, and attorney fees of $1380, under Section 16 of the Act, but declined to impose penalties under Section 19(k) of the Act. The Act does not allow the Commission to assess penalties against an employer based on failure or delay in authorizing medical treatment, and Commission properly vacated Section 19(l) penalty. (HOFFMAN, CAVANAGH, and BARBERIS, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, dissenting.)

 Plaintiff filed retaliatory discharge claim alleging that he was fired in retaliation for exercising his right under the Workers’ Compensation Act. After bench trial, court entered judgment for Defendants. Giving deference to trial court on credibility, nothing is manifestly erroneous in its determination that ComEd had valid, nonpretextual reasons to terminate the Plaintiff, wholly unrelated to filing of his workers' compensation claims:  misrepresentation about his condition during medical leave, and his "total work" record, including poor productivity and insubordination. (HOWSE and ELLIS, concurring.)

Employee was, while working, pinned between 2 vehicles resulting in his death. Employee's minor son qualifies as a dependent under Section 7(a) of the Workers' Compensation Act, event though he was adopted by his stepfather after his father's death. The Act contains no express language terminating minor's right to benefits by reason of his adoption where he otherwise qualified for benefits based on his age at time of accident. Ample evidence supported Commission's determination that minor was dependent on his father at the time of the accident. Employer lacked a reasonable basis for challenging existence of an employment relations, and decedent's status as an employee gave rise to employer's obligation to pay his medical expenses.  Thus, it was not irrational for Commission to impose penalties and late fee on employer for failure to pay decedent's medical expenses.(HOLDRIDGE, HUDSON, CAVANAGH, and BARBERIS, concurring.)

Employee filed workers' compensation claim, but court found that his employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier had no duty to defendant or indemnify it because employer had breached the insurance contract. Employee then amended his application for for adjustment of claim to name the Illinois State Treasurer. Prior to arbitration hearing, employee died of causes unrelated to his claim. In absence of appointment and substitution of a personal representative after employee's death, Commission's decision was premature and improper. Even if gross value of employee's estate is less than $100,000, so that under Section 25-1 of Probate Act estate's assets may be distributed by a small-estate affidavit, appointment of a personal representative is still required, as court's jurisdiction is suspended by employee's death until such appointment.(HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, CAVANAGH, and BARBERIS, concurring.)

Court properly granted summary judgment for Defendant and denied Plaintiff's motion to vacate and reconsider. Court properly held that Plaintiff's personal injury action was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. A borrowed-employee relationship existed, as a temporary staffing agency sent Plaintiff to work as a forklift operator at the facility where he was injured. Plaintiff thus impliedly agreed to the borrowed-employee relationship.  The facility directed and controlled Plaintiff's work; no supervisors from the staffing agency were present at the facility while Plaitiff worked there. (McLAREN and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

Claimant filed for workers' compensation benefits for knee injury he sustained when working as a sous chef for his employer; he had gone from a kneeling position, while looking for food in walk-in cooler, to standing up when his knee "popped".  An "arising out of" determination requires an analysis of the claimant's employment and the work duties he or she was required or expected to perform. The risk posed to claimant from the act of standing from a kneeling position while looking for something was not distinctly related to, or incidental to, his employment, as he was not required to perform the specific activity of looking for food misplaced by a co-worker. Thus, Commission's determination that claimant was not injured due to an employment risk was supported by the record and not against manifest weight of evidence. (HUDSON and MOORE, concurring; HOLDRIDGE and HOFFMAN, specially concurring).

Former railroad employee sued railroad, alleging he injured his back while attempting to board a moving train. After investigating his claim, railroad filed 3rd-party complaint against Plaintiff's doctor for contribution. Court abused its discretion in finding that settlement that Plaintiff and his doctor reached was entered into in good faith, especially as amount of settlement was far less than doctor's fair share of liability. Court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that common-interest exception applied to prevent waiver of attorney-client privilege when Plaintiff and his doctor shared attorney-client privileged communications with each other. Even when a common interest exists between parties, the client must, at time of disclosure, have an agreement with the receiving party that that party will treat the information as privileged.(PIERCE and GRIFFIN, concurring.)