Workers’ Compensation Law

Defendant was convicted, in 1996, of unlawful use of a weapon (UUW). The UUW statute under which Defendant was convicted is nearly identical to 2008 aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) statute and 2010 UUW statute which Illinois Supreme Court has held are unconstitutional as violating the second amendment because they are overly broad. The 1996 UUW statute is facially unconstitutional and conviction is reversed. (LAVIN and COBBS, concurring.)

Claimant worked in employer's candy factory for 27 years. Claimant injured his back at work, and eight months later, soon after claimant returned to work, he reinjured his lower back. Claimant also served as a church pastor for 16 years, and was paid by church, at same time he was employed in candy factory. Commission properly excluded his earnings as a pastor from his average weekly wage calculation for purposes of determining his wage differential benefit. Claimant failed to prove that employer knew that he received payment for work as a pastor, so no requirement that wages earned as a pastor must be included as wages earned from employer under section 10. (HOFFMAN, HUDSON, HARRIS, and MOORE, concurring.)

Plaintiffs filed four putative class-action lawsuits against Defendants seeking redress for Defendants’ alleged failure to comply with requirements contained in the Workers’ Compensation Act. Defendants filed motions to dismiss each suit for failure to state claims, which Court granted with prejudice.  Plaintiffs had the burden of sufficiently pleading that Defendants and the employers they insured intentionally entered into the standard contract for the direct, and not merely incidental, benefit of Plaintiffs. Because they failed to do so, their claims that they were intended third-party beneficiaries were properly dismissed. Additionally, Court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims that that Defendants breached an implied in-fact contract, because there was no contract since consideration cannot flow from an act performed pursuant to preexisting legal duty.

Claimant, a  transportation operator, filed for workers' compensation benefits for injuries sustained when chainmail strap on crane snapped loose and caused multiple injuries to his face, teeth, and chest.  Commission's decision to deny TTD benefits after claimant's termination, for failure to call in or report for work, was not against manifest weight of evidence.  Ample evidence support Commission's finding that, at time of termination, claimant's work-related injuries had stabilized, and that his injuries had no effect on his employment. (HOFFMAN, HUDSON, HARRIS, and MOORE, concurring.)

Trial court found that Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission erred in finding claimant had shown a causal link between her condition of ill-being and an at-work accident. Commission's decision as to causation is not contrary to manifest weight of evidence. Claimant's consistent reports of pain were not required to be given more weight than changes in her ability to work. Where an accident accelerates the need for surgery, a claimant may recover under the Workers' Compensation Act.Physician's testimony supports inference that accident accelerated need for surgery. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HARRIS, and MOORE, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 6/2/17.) Claimant sought workers' compensation benefits for injury allegedly sustained while working for Respondent hotel. Parties executed lump-sum, settlement contract which provided that Respondent had paid all of Claimant's medical bills. Circuit court, pursuant to Section 19(g) of Workers' Compensation Act, is proper venue to seek enforcement of a Commission's final award. Imposition of penalties and attorney fees in this case was improper because Claimant abandoned his request for such relief. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HARRIS, and MOORE, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 4/20/17.) Court confirmed decision of Workers' Compensation Commission to deny him benefits under Section 8 of Workers' Compensation Act. Commission found that Claimant failed to meet his burden because at time of his heart attack, he was at home and had just physically exerted himself and was not performing any activity connected to his duties as firefighter or assistant fire chief. Expert cardiologist's opinion that Claimant's 3 major risk factors for heart disease caused the heart disease that resulted in a heart attack was sufficient evidence to rebut presumption of causation. Commission's decision was not against manifest weight of evidence. (HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and HARRIS, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, dissenting.)

Firefighter filed for workers' compensation benefits, alleging injuries from shoveling snow in fire department parking lot. Commission's determination that heart attack did not arise out of his employment was not against manifest weight of evidence. Employer rebutted presumption by showing claimant's smoking history. Testimony of physician was about  medical research generally supporting correlation between firefighter's occupational exposure and development of coronary artery disease, but was not making correlation specifically as to claimant. (HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and MOORE, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, dissenting.)

Workers' compensation claimant properly reversed Commission's award of section 19(l) penalties. Employer provided adequate justification for its delay in paying claimant's award of medical expenses.(HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and MOORE, concurring.)

Workers' Compensation Commission erred in its method of determining average amount which claimant is able to earn in some suitable employment or business after work-related accident. If claimant is not working at time of calculation, Commission must identify, based on evidence in the record, an occupation that claimant is able and qualified to perform, and apply average wage for that occupation to wage differential calculation. Claimant is required to introduce evidence sufficient for Commission to identify occupation that claimant is able and qualified to perform, and average wage for that occupation. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and HARRIS, concurring.)